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LABOR LAW
1. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. *Access Rights of Nonemployee Union Organizers to an Employer's
Property: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB'
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") pro-
vides in relevant part, "Employees shall have the right to self-or-
ganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 2 Under
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to "interfere with, coerce or restrain" employees in their exercise
of rights guaranteed to them by § 7 of the NLRA. 5 These § 7 rights
include, among others, the right of employees to organize or form
independent associations for mutual aid' and the right to engage
in area standards picketing. 5 In seeking to facilitate the employees'
exercise of their § 7 rights, unions have often engaged in conduct
inconsistent with employers' traditional property rights, such as the
right to exclude.6
* By Timothy A. Gudas, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE' LAW REVIEW.
1 112 S. Ct. 841, 139 L.R.R.M. 2225 (1992).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
4 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 16 L.R.R.M. 620, 623 (1945).
5 Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 727, 728, 100 L.R.R.M. 1598, 1599 (1979),
order set aside and case remanded, 633 F.2d 18, 26, 105 L.R.R.M. 2916, 2922 (6th Cir. 1980).
The National Labor Relations Board (the "Board" or "NLRB") in Giant Food defined area
standards picketing as picketing "engaged in by a union to protect the employment standards
it has successfully negotiated in a particular geographic area from the unfair competitive
edge that would be enjoyed by an employer whose labor cost package was less than those of
employers subjected to area contract standards." Id. The Board in Giant Food reasoned that
such picketing is protected under 7 because unions have a right to protect the employment
standards they have negotiated. Id.
6 See generally Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. 841, 139 L.R.R.M. 2225 (union's organizing campaign
inconsistent with employer's private property right); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters: 436 U.S. 180, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282 (1978) (union's area
standards picketing inconsistent with employer's private property right); Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507, 91 L.R.R.M. 2489 (1976) (union's economic picketing inconsistent with em-
ployer's private property right); Central Hardware Corp. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 80 L.R.R.M.
2769 (1972) (union's organizing campaign inconsistent with employer's private property
right); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1956) (union's
organizing campaign inconsistent with employer's private property right); Jean Country, 291
N.L.R.B. 11, 129 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1988) (union's area standards picketing inconsistent with
employer's private property right); Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139, 123 L.R.R.M.
1257 (1986) (union's area standards picketing inconsistent with employer's private property
right).
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In 1956, in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that an employer may validly bar nonemployee
distribution of union literature on its property without violating
§ 8(a)(1) if the union has other reasonable means of communication
that will enable it to reach the employees with its message.'' The
case involved an employer's refusal to permit distribution of union
literature by nonemployee union organizers on company-owned
parking lots. 8 The Babcock Court reasoned that the employees' or-
ganizational rights and the employer's property rights both de-
served protection.9 The Court explained, however, that distribution
of union literature by nonemployees is not entitled to the same
protection as distribution of such literature by employees."' The
Babcock Court limited its holding to instances in which the employer
does not discriminate against union distribution by allowing other
third-party distribution."
In Babcock, nonemployee union organizers attempted to dis-
tribute union literature on the company-owned parking lot of a
manufacturing plant.' 2 The plant was located on a large parcel of
land near a community of 21,000 people.'s Roughly forty percent
of the company's 500 employees lived in that community while the
others lived within thirty miles of the plant." The union had com-
municated with many of the company's employees by sending lit-
erature to them through the mail, speaking with them on the streets
of the nearby town, making visits to employees' homes, and talking
with them over the telephone.' 5
The National Labor Relations Board (the "Board" or "NLRB")
in Babcock found that it was unreasonably difficult for the union to
reach employees off company property and held that the employer
had violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interfering with the employ-
ees' right of self-organization. 16 The Board ordered the employer
to refrain from interfering with the distribution of union literature
by the nonemployee union organizers on its property.' 7 The com-
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
Id. at 106, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2001-02.
9 1d. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
'° Id. at 112-13, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2094. See infra note 20.
" Id. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 106, 38 L.R.R.M, at 2002.
" Id.
1 4 Id,
16 Id. at 107 n.1, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2002 n.l.
' 6 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 494, 34 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1954).
"Id. at 486, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1374.
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pany refused to obey the Board's order and the Board petitioned
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for en-
forcement. 18 The court of appeals denied enforcement of the
Board's order, reasoning that the NLRA did not authorize the
Board to impose a "servitude" on the employer's property where
no employee was involved.I 9
The Supreme Court in Babcock acknowledged that the employ-
ees' right of self-organization includes their right to learn the ad-
vantages of organization from others, but drew a substantive dis-
tinction between employees and nonemployees. 2° Faced with the
issue of nonemployee union organizers' access to company property,
the Babcock Court reasoned that the employees' organizational rights
and the employer's property rights both deserve protection. 2 ' The
Court explained that accommodation between these two competing
rights "must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is con-
sistent with maintenance of the other." 22 The Supreme Court in
Babcock further explained that if reasonable efforts by the union to
communicate with the employees are futile because of the inacces-
sibility of the employees, the employer must allow the union access
to its property." The Babcock Court indicated that the inaccessibility
of the employees would be determined by the location of the plant
and the living quarters of the employees. 24 Relying on the union's
success in contacting over twenty percent of the employees by mail-
ings, discussions on the streets of the nearby town, home visits and
telephone calls, the Babcock Court rejected the Board's determina-
tion that the union had no reasonable alternative means of com-
municating with the employees. 25 Thus, the Court ruled that the
employer had not violated the NLRA by barring nonemployee
16 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 317, 36 L.R.R.M. 2097, 2097 (5th Cir.
1955).
19 Id. at 319, 36 L.R.R.M. at 2099.
29 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004. In emphasizing the difference between
employees and nonemployees, the Babcock Court distinguished Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 16 L.R.R.M. 620 (1945). Id. The Babcock Court interpreted Republic
Aviation as holding that no restriction may be placed on the employees' right to discuss self-
organization with fellow employees on company property, unless the restriction is necessary
to maintain the effective operation of the business. Id. (citing Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at
803, 16 L.R.R.M. at 625).
21
 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
02 Id.
"Id.
24 Id. at 113, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
45 See id. at 106, 113-14, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2001, 2004.
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union organizers from its property because other reasonable ave-
nues of communication existed.26
Following its decision in Babcock, which defined the statutory
right of access of nonemployee union organizers to company prop-
erty, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, considered whether
nonemployees had a constitutional right under the First Amend-
ment to solicit or picket on company property. 27 In 1968, in Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, the
Court held that a privately owned shopping center could not pro-
hibit area standards picketing in its parking lot. 2° In Logan Valley,
members of a union picketed a retail store within the shopping
center because the store was nonunion and its employees were
receiving wages and benefits that were below union standards. 29
The Logan Valley Court reasoned that the shopping center was the
"functional equivalent" of a municipality's business district and must
be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. 3° Thus, the Court
concluded that the picketers had a First Amendment right to picket
on the privately owned shopping center property. 31
Then, in 1972, in Central Hardware Co.' v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court held that the rights of nonemployee union organizers to
confront and speak with the employees in the company-owned
parking lots of a single retail store were not to be determined by
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, but rather by the
NLRA. 32 Central Hardware involved company-owned parking lots
that were maintained exclusively for the company's customers and
employees and that were not part of a shopping center complex."
The Central Hardware Court reasoned that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not apply to an owner of private property unless
his or her property has assumed "to some significant degree the
functional attributes of public property devoted to public use." 34
Z6 Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113-14, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004-05.
27 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 512, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2495; Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 547,
80 L.R.R.M. at 2772; Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308, 315, 68 L.R.R.M. 2209, 2212 (1968).
" Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319-20, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2213-14.
"Id. at 311, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2210.
"Id. at 325, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2216. The Logan Valley Court applied the rationale of Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945), in which the Supreme Court held that distribution of
religious literature by a Jehovah's Witness in a company-owned town was protected under
the First Amendment. Id. at 316-17, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2212-13.
51 Id. at 319-20, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2213-14.
32 407 U.S. 539, 547-48, 80 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2772 (1972).
"Id. at 540, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2769.
54 Id. at 547, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2772.
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The Supreme Court in Central Hardware concluded that the retail
store's parking lots had not acquired the characteristics of a public
municipal facility simply because they were open to the public."
The Central Hardware Court thus held that Logan Valley was inap-
plicable and remanded the case with instructions to apply Babcock's
principle of accommodating organizational rights and private prop-
erty rights."
In 1976, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Supreme Court recognized
that Logan Valley had been overruled and held that the rights and
liabilities of striking employees and the property owner were to be
determined solely by the NLRA, not by the First Amendment."
Hudgens involved striking warehouse employees who picketed one
of their employer's retail stores in an enclosed shopping mall." The
Court reasoned that the basic objective under the NLRA, as defined
by Babcock, was the accommodation of 7 rights and private prop-
erty rights." The Hudgens Court indicated that the required degree
of accommodation would depend on the strength of the conflicting
rights." Thus, the Court remanded the case for a determination
under the NLRA.4 '
In 1978, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA did
not preempt an employer's state-law trespass claims against union
picketing that was arguably protected by the NLRA. 42 Sears involved
picketing by nonemployee union members in Sears's parking lot to
protest the assignment of carpentry work in its store to a contractor
who had neither used the union hiring hall nor agreed in writing
to abide by the terms of the union's master agreement."
33 Id.
"Id. at 544-45, 547-48, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2771, 2772. The Central Hardware Court noted
that even after the requisite need for access to the employer's property had been demon-
strated by the union, the union's access to company property must be limited to that necessary
to accommodate the exercise of 7 rights. Id. at 545, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2771.
Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518, 521, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2493-94, 2495.
38 Id. at 509, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2490.
39 Id. at 522, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
42 1d.
41 Id, at 523, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
32 436 U.S. 180, 207, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282, 2293 (1978).
95
 Id. at 182, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2283. The Sears Court assumed for the purpose of analysis
that the union wanted Sears to comply with area standards and that the picketing was
therefore protected by 7. Id. at 186-87, 204, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2285, 2292. The Court noted
that the picketing was arguably prohibited by 8(b)(4)(D) or by 8(b)(7)(C) of the NIRA,
depending on the objective of the picketers. Id. at 185-86, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2285.
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In determining whether the trespassory nature of the picketing
caused the picketing to forfeit its protected status, the Sears Court
considered Babcock." The Court reasoned that Babcock established
a general rule that an employer may bar nonemployee union or-
ganizers from its property. 45 The Sears Court explained that, under
Babcock, in order to gain access to company property, the union
must demonstrate that no other reasonable means of communicat-
ing with the employees existed or that the employer's access rules
discriminated against the union." The Sears Court assumed, but
doubted, that picketing to enforce area standards was entitled to
the same weight in the Babcock accommodation analysis as organi-
zational solicitation. 47 The Sears Court concluded that the assertion
of state court jurisdiction did not threaten protected conduct be-
cause the trespassory nature of the picketing would probably cause
it to be unprotected."
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, in 1986, in Fairmont Hotel
Co., the Board held that the Fairmont Hotel did not violate the
NLRA when it barred nonemployee union agents from using its
property to distribute union literature." In Fairmont Hotel, the union
had an area standards dispute with a bakery that supplied the hotel
with baked products. 5° On the premises of the hotel, the union
distributed handbills explaining the union's dispute and requesting
that the public not patronize the hotel as long as the hotel conducted
business with the bakery.'' The Board reasoned that the property
rights of the Fairmont Hotel clearly outweighed the § 7 rights of
the union to engage in area standards picketing. 52 Thus, the Board
4' Id. at 204-05, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2291-92.
" Id. at 205, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292.
" Id. The Supreme Court in Sears described the union's burden as a "heavy one" and
observed that, in practice, unions had generally been denied access except in cases involving
"unique obstacles" to nontrespassory means of communicating with the employees. Id. at 205
& n.41, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292 & n.41 (citing NLRB v. S&H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26,
64 L.R.R.M. 2295 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 21
L.R.R.M. 2707 (6th Cir. 1948)).
" See Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 & n.42, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292 & n.42. The Court indicated
in a footnote that trespassory organizational solicitation is more worthy of protection under
the NLRA than is trespassory area standards picketing because the right to organize is at the
"very core of the purpose" of the NLRA. Id. at 206 n.42, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292 n.42.
48 See id. at 206, 207, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292, 2293.
49
 Fairmont Hotel, 282 N.L.R.B. 139, 143, 123 L.R.R.M. 1257, 1261.
5Q
	 at 139, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1257.
" Id.
" Id. at 143, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
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concluded that the Fairmont Hotel could lawfully bar the nonem-
ployee union members from its property!'
Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Babcock, Hudgens
and Sears, the Board in Fairmont Hotel articulated a test for resolving
conflicting claims of property rights and § 7 rights. 54 Under this
test, where the property owner's claim is stronger than the employ-
ees' § 7 right, the property right prevails; where the property own-
er's claim is weaker than the § 7 right, the § 7 right prevails. 55 The
Board in Fairmont Hotel stated that reasonable alternative methods
of communication were only relevant when the § 7 rights and
property interests weighed evenly. 56 The Board then applied its
newly articulated test to the facts before it and concluded that the
hotel's right to exclude nonemployee union members from its prop-
erty outweighed the union's interest in handbilling on hotel prop-
erty for its area standards dispute with the bakery. 57
Then, in 1988, in Jean Country, the Board abandoned its Fair-
mont Hotel approach to resolving conflicting claims of property and
§ 7 rights because the approach failed to consider in every access-
to-property case the availability of reasonable alternative methods
of communication." Jean Country involved picketing by nonem-
ployee union members to inform the public that a retail store in a
large shopping mall was nonunion. 59 The Jean Country Board ruled
53 Id.
" Fairmont Hotel, 282 N.L.R.B. at 141-42, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60.
35 Id. at 142, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1260. The Board reasoned that factors to be considered
in the analysis of the private property claim would include the use of the property, the
degree to which the property was open to the public, and the size and location of the
property. Id., 123 L.R.R.M. at 1259-60. The Board would consider the following factors in
its analysis of the § 7 claim; the nature and purpose of the § 7 right; the relationship of the
targeted employer to the purpose; the location of the union's activity; the relationship of
that location to the union's purpose; and the intended audience of the union's activity. Id.,
123 L.R.R.M. at 1260.
" Id. The Board concluded that its approach was consistent with Babcock because the
Board viewed Babcock as a case in which the competing claims were relatively equal in strength
and in which the Supreme Court therefore looked to the availability of alternative methods
of communicating with the employees as a tie-breaker. Id. at 142 n.I8, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1260
n.18.
57 Id, at 142-43, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1260-61. The Board in Fairmont Hotel, therefore, did
not consider whether the union had reasonable alternative methods of communicating its
message. Id. at 143, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1261.
se 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 11 & n.2, 129 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1202-03 & n.2 (1988).
39 Id. The Board concluded that the picketing had, in part, an area standards objective
and that it was thus protected by 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 17, 18 & n.17, 129 L.R.R.M. at
1208 & n.17.
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that reasonable alternative methods of communication were a sig-
nificant factor when balancing the § 7 right against the private
property right." Applying this balancing test to the facts of the case,
the Jean Country Board found that the mall owner's property right
was weak because the mall was readily open to the public, that the
union's § 7 right to picket for area standards was also relatively
weak, and that the union had no reasonably effective alternative
methods of communicating its message to the mall's shoppers off
the mall's property. 6 ' The Board in Jean Country therefore con-
cluded that the refusal to permit the picketing on mall property
violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 62
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB held that as long as nonemployee union
organizers have reasonable access to employees off company prop-
erty, the employer may post its property against nonemployee dis-
tribution of union literature." The case involved a union's attempt
to distribute handbills for organizational purposes on the premises
of a retail store located in a shopping plaza. 64 The Lechmere Court
interpreted Babcock as extending access rights to nonemployee
union organizers only in rare cases where the "location of the plant
and the living quarters of the employees place the employees be-
yond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with
them." 65
 Thus, the Lechmere Court reasoned that the availability of
alternative methods of communication with the employees is the
threshold inquiry in access cases and that any balancing of the
strength of the competing property and § 7 rights is the second
level of inquiry, triggered only where access to employees is un-
available." The Court therefore rejected the Board's Jean Country
approach, where the conflicting claims of the parties were balanced
against each other and with the availability of alternative means of
communication. 67 The Supreme Court in Lechmere then applied its
test to the facts of Lechmere and determined that the employer did
not violate the NLRA by barring the union organizers from its
60 Id. at 14, 129 L.R.R.M. at 1205.
6L Id. at 16-17, 18-19, 129 L.R.R.M. at 1207-09.
62 Id. at 19, 129 L.R.R.M. at 1209.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 846, 848, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2228, 2230.
64 Id. at 844, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
6" id. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2230 (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113, 38 L.R.R.M. at
2004).
66 Id. at 848, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2230.
67 Id.
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property because the organizers had alternative methods of con-
tacting the employees.68
Lechmere owned and operated a retail store in Newington,
Connecticut, located in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza.° Lechmere's
store was situated at one end of the plaza, adjacent to the main
parking lot." The parking lot was owned by both Lechmere and a
developer of other stores in the plaza. 7 ' The parking lot was sepa-
rated from a public highway to its east, where the main entrance to
the plaza was located, by a 46-foot wide grassy strip, almost all of
which was public property. 72
Local 919 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
(the "Union") began its campaign to organize the store's 200 em-
ployees, none of whom were represented by a union, in June 1987. 73
The Union placed a full-page advertisement in a local newspaper,
but received little response. 74 As a result, nonemployee Union or-
ganizers entered Lechmere's parking lot and placed handbills on
the windshields of cars parked in the employees' section of the
parking lot." Lechmere's manager immediately confronted the or-
ganizers, informed them of Lechmere's rules against solicitation and
handbill distribution, and asked them to leave. 76 Lechmere consis-
tently enforced its established policy prohibiting nonemployees
from soliciting and distributing literature on Lechmere's property,
including the parking lot." The Union organizers left the parking
lot as requested and the handbills were removed by Lechmere
personnel."
The Union organizers repeated the handbilling on several
other occasions, but each time, Lechmere personnel requested them
to leave and removed the handbills." The organizers subsequently
attempted to pass out handbills from the grassy strip to cars entering
68
 Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849-50, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
" Id. at 843, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
70 Id. at 843-44, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2226.
7 ' Id. at 844, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2226.




76 1d., 139 L.R.R.M, at 2226-27.
77
 Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 844 & n.l, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2226 & n.l. Lechmere even enforced
this policy against the Salvation Army and the Girl Scouts. Id. at 844 n.1, 139 L.R.R.M. at
2226 n. I .
78 Id. at 844, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
79 1d.
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the lot during hours when the drivers would be primarily Lechmere
employees." The Union organizers continued their efforts for one
month, and then picketed intermittently for an additional six
months.' The Union organizers also recorded the license plate
numbers of cars parked in the employee parking area and, with the
cooperation of the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, ob-
tained the names and addresses of forty-one (twenty percent) of
the store's nonsupervisory employees." The Union sent four mail-
ings to these employees and attempted to contact them by phone
or in person." The Union's efforts resulted in one signed union
authorization card . 84
The Union filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging that Lech-
mere had committed an unfair labor practice when it barred the
nonemployee organizers from its property. 85 The Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") applied the test set forth in Fairmont Hotel, in
which the stronger of the competing rights prevails regardless of
the availability of reasonable alternative means, and ruled in the
Union's favor." The ALJ recommended that Lechmere be ordered,
among other things, to cease and desist from barring the Union
organizers from its parking lot. 87
Lechmere filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the
Board. 88 The Board applied the analysis articulated in Jean Country,
balancing the competing § 7 and property claims against each other
and with the availability of alternative means of communication,
affirmed the ALJ's rulings, and adopted the recommended order. 89
The Board in Lechmere determined that no reasonable alternative
means of contacting the employees existed." The United States
" Id.
" Id.




" Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 98-99 (1988). The ALJ concluded that the § 7 right
outweighed the private property right and found it unnecessary to consider the availability
of reasonable alternative methods of communication open to the Union. Id. at 99. The ALJ,
concerned that his finding would not be upheld, nonetheless considered this issue and
determined that reasonable alternative methods were available to the Union. Id.
B4
	 at 100.
" Id. at 92.
"Id. at 92-93, 94, 131 L.R.R.M. 1480, 1481-82.
9° Id. at 93, 131 L.R.R.M. at 1482. The Board rejected the ALJ's finding that alternative
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, one judge dissenting, denied
Lechmere's petition for review and enforced the Board's order. 91
The United States Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision reversed
the judgment of the First Circuit and denied enforcement of the
Board's order.92 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas first noted
that the plain language of § 7 only extends rights to employees, and
not to unions or nonemployee union organizers.° The Court then
reviewed the facts and its reasoning in Babcock and interpreted
Babcock as establishing a rule that an employer may prohibit distri-
bution of union literature by nonemployees on its property without
violating the NLRA. 94 The Lechmere Court reasoned that the Babcock
Court had recognized an exception to this rule when unique obsta-
cles impede reasonable union efforts to contact the employees." If
such circumstances are present, the Lechmere Court reasoned that,
under Babcock, the employer's property rights must give way, per-
mitting the union to inform the employees of their right to orga-
nize . 96
Acknowledging that the Court had not faced the precise issue
in Babcock since Babcock itself, the Lechmere 'Court stated that its
decisions in Central Hardware, Hudgens and Sears had not modified
Babcock or established a general accommodation/balancing test, but
rather affirmed Babcock's holding that an employer must only ac-
commodate nonemployee organizers when the employees are oth-
erwise inaccessible. 97 In making this statement, the Lechmere Court
relied on the reasoning and language in Sears, where the Court
noted that the employer's right to bar nonemployee organizers was
the general rule and that unions bear a heavy burden of demon-
strating that no other reasonable means of communicating its mes-
sage to the employees exist. 98 The Lechmere Court recalled a Sears
footnote which stated that, generally, nonemployee organizers had
been denied access to employers' property in the absence of "unique
91
 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 325, 135 L.R.R.M. 2329, 2338 (1st Cir. 1990).
In enforcing the Board's order, the First Circuit in Lechmere described the Board's Jean
Country approach as a "useful analytic model for resolution of access-to-property cases." Id.
at 321, 135 L.R.R.M. at 2334.
' Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
93 1d, at 845, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
" Id. at 845-46, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2227-28.
us Id. at 846, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2228. See Babcock, 351 U.S. 105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001.
" Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 846, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2228.
' Id.
" Id. at 847, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2229.
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obstacles" to communicating with the employees through other
methods."
The Lechmere Court recognized that the Board's interpretation
of the NLRA deserved deference from the courts.w° The Court
stated, however, that the Board's interpretation of the NLRA after
a Supreme Court interpretation is not entitled to the same defer-
ence.'°' The Supreme Court in Lechmere concluded that the Board,
through Jean Country's formulation of accommodation principles,
had misinterpreted the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding in
Babcock.")2
 The Court stated that the Board had placed undue em-
phasis on the accommodation language of the Court in fashioning
the Jean Country test in which the availability of alternative means
of communication was but one factor to be considered.' 03 The Lech-
mere Court rejected the Board's lean Country "multi-factor balancing
test" for failing to recognize the two separate stages of inquiry. 104
The Supreme Court in Lechmere concluded that it only becomes
necessary to balance the competing property and § 7 rights when
no alternative means of access to employees exist.i°5
The Court considered its inquiry to be whether the facts of the
case justified an exception to the general rule that an employer may
bar nonemployee union organizers from its property.'w Although
the ALT had determined that the Union had reasonable alternative
means of communicating with the employees, the Board concluded
that the Union had no such alternatives.'" The Lechmere Court
refused to accept the Board's determination, reasoning that it was
based on an erroneous legal interpretation of Babcock. l°8 The Court
stated that exceptions to Babcock's general rule are rare and only
apply where the location of the plant and the living quarters of the
employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable
union efforts to contact them. 1 °9
 The Court reasoned that Babcock
" Id.
1 °° Id.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847-48, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2229.





 See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2230.
1 °7 Id. See supra notes 87, 91.
I" 112 S. Ct. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2230.
I" Id. (citing Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004). Examples of such a situation,
the Lechmere Court stated, would include logging camps, mining camps and mountain resort
hotels that house the employees. Id.
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created an exception to its general rule of no access in order to
protect the § 7 rights of "employees who, by virtue of their em-
ployment, are isolated from the ordinary flow of information that
characterizes our society.'itio
The Lechmere Court ruled that because Lechmere's employees
were otherwise accessible, they did not fall within Babcock's excep-
tion."' The Supreme Court presumed that Lechmere's employees
were not inaccessible to the Union organizers because the employees
did not reside on Lechmere's property." 2 The Lechmere Court re-
jected the notion that the employees were inaccessible by virtue of
their living throughout the Greater Hartford area, and held that
the Union's success in reaching a large number of them directly,
through mailings, phone calls and home visits, demonstrated their
accessibility. "s
The Lechmere Court, in addition, stated that direct contact was
not necessarily the only form of reasonable alternative contact with
the employees." 4 The Court indicated that signs or advertising
might also constitute reasonable alternative means and noted that
the signs displayed from the public grassy strip would have alerted
Lechmere's employees as to the Union's organizational efforts." 5
Thus, the Lechmere Court reasoned that Lechmere's employees were
not inaccessible to the Union under Babcock's narrow exception."
The Court therefore ruled that the Board erred in determining
that Lechmere violated the NLRA when it barred the Union orga-
nizers from its property." 7
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented." Justice
White disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Babcock as
creating only a narrow exception to the general rule of no access
for nonemployees." 9 He argued that the Babcock Court never in-
tended to confine its exception only to the rare situations identified
by the majority.'" According to Justice White, Babcock allowed the
Board to consider the nature of the employer's property and the
ila id., 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
111 /01.
112 1d.
115 Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
"4 /d.
" 5 14. at 849-50, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
116 See id. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
"7 /d. at 850, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231.
"6 Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231 (White, J., dissenting).
lig Id. at 851, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2232.
nrohi,
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dispersion of the employees' residences in determining whether the
Union should gain access to the employer's property. 121 In addition,
Justice White argued that Babcock recognized that "actual commu-
nication with nonemployee organizers, not mere notice that an
organizing campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate § 7 rights." 122
He therefore disagreed with the majority's contention that the signs
displayed from the public grassy strip might constitute reasonable
alternative means.' 23
Justice White also reasoned that the majority's interpretation
of Babcock was inconsistent with the accommodation language of
the Court in Central Hardware and Hudgens. 124 In Justice White's
view, Hudgens had interpreted Babcock as creating a flexible rule in
access cases, not the rigid rule announced by the Court's majority.' 25
Justice White argued that the Court's decisions in Central Hardware
and Hudgens were more consistent with the Board's Jean Country
approach than they were with the majority's opinion. 126 He also
argued that previous Supreme Court cases had never articulated
the two-stage inquiry set forth by the majority and had never re-
quired an initial determination of reasonable alternatives as a pre-
condition to a balancing of the conflicting § 7 and private property
rights. 127
Finally, Justice White asserted that Babcock itself conflicted with
recent developments in the law concerning judicial deference to an
administrative agency charged with administering a statute.' 28 Stat-
ing that the Court's role in reviewing an agency's construction of a
statute, where congressional intent is unclear, is to determine if the
agency has reasonably construed the statute, Justice White argued
that the Babcock Court had exceeded its role by usurping the Board's
function in construing the NLRA and applying the facts. 129 He
therefore contended that Babcock, and not Jean Country, rested on
tenuous legal grounds.'" Justice White argued that the Court
should have deferred to the Board in Lechmere because he viewed
121 Id.
122 Id.
1" Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2231 (White, J., dissenting).
124 1d.
125 ,rd.
1 " See id. at 852, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2233.
' 57 Id.
128 Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 852, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2233 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
129 See id. at 852-53, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2233.
"0 Id. at 853, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2233.
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the Board's analysis in Jean Country as rational and consistent with
the NLRA.' 3 '
Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion. 132 J ustice Stevens
agreed with Justice White that the majority's interpretation of Bab-
cock was inconsistent with the Hudgens Court's interpretation of
Babcock.° He disagreed, however, with Justice White's assertion
that Babcock was at odds with modern concepts of deference to
administrative agencies and argued that Babcock was correctly de-
cided.' 34
The Supreme Court's holding in Lechmere places a severe bur-
den on unions in their efforts to organize employees. Lechmere
signifies that union organizers will have to resort to newspaper
advertisements and picketing on public property in order to inform
and persuade the employees to organize. Although unions may also
contact employees through mass mailings, telephone calls and home
visits, these methods presuppose that the union knows, or can ob-
tain, the names and addresses of the employees. Furthermore, these
alternatives often have the disadvantages of increased costs and
decreased effectiveness.
The Supreme Court's holding in Lechmere is a welcome devel-
opment for employers. After Lechmere, employers may bar nonem-
ployee union organizers from their property as long as the employ-
ers enforce their rules against solicitation evenhandedly and as long
as the employees are accessible to the union away from company
property. This general rule is not affected by the nature of the
employer's property or the degree to which the employer has
opened it to the public. Furthermore, the Lechmere Court, by pre-
suming that employees are accessible to the union if the employees
do not live on company property, indicated that the Court will rarely
determine that employees are inaccessible.
An issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Lechmere is
whether a union must actually attempt and exhaust every possible
means of communicating with the employees in order to show that
the employees are truly inaccessible, or whether the union may rely
on objective facts, such as the living quarters of the employees and
the location of the plant, in order to satisfy its burden. The Lechmere
Court suggested that it might require the union to exhaust all
," Id., 139 L.R.R.M. at 2234.
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possible means when it stated that "mere conjecture or the expres-
sion of doubts concerning the effectiveness of nontrespassory means
of communication" would not satisfy the union's burden. 135
Another issue stemming from Lechmere is whether its holding
only pertains to organizational activity or whether it also extends to
other § 7 activity. If Lechmere applies to other § 7 activity, such as
area standards picketing, many problems arise because the intended
audience of area standards picketing is the customers of a company.
Customers, unlike the company's employees, often cannot be iden-
tified in advance by the union and are, in that sense, less accessible
to the union. The Board recognized this in Fairmont Hotel and Jean
Country and adopted its balancing tests to ensure that weaker § 7
claims, such as area standards picketing, would not have greater
success in obtaining access to employer property than would
stronger § 7 claims, such as organizational activity.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held in Lechmere that so long
as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable access to em-
ployees outside the employer's property, the employer may bar the
nonemployees from its property. In so holding, the Supreme Court
rejected the Board's Jean Country formulation for resolving access
cases. The Lechmere Court interpreted Babcock as extending access
rights to nonemployee union organizers only in rare cases where
the location of the plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts
to communicate with them.
B. *The Presumption of Arbitrability as Applied to Last Chance
Agreements: United Steelworkers of America v. Lukens Steel'
More than thirty years ago, in a series of cases known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the United States Supreme Court adopted a
framework of principles governing the arbitration of grievances
under collective bargaining agreements. 2
 In 1986, the Supreme
135 Id. at 849, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2230-31. The courts of appeals have disagreed on this
issue. Compare National Maritime Union of Am. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767, 771, 130 L.R.R.M.
2641, 2644 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that union need not attempt every possible method of
communication in order to demonstrate that employees are inaccessible) with NLRB v. Tam-
iment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794, 799, 78 L.R.R.M. 2726, 2730 (3d Cir. 1971) {holding that union
must show that it actually used reasonable efforts to communicate with employees).
* By Joseph C. Hogan 111, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
969 F.2d 1468, 140 L.R.R.M. 2757 (3d Cir. 1992).
2 The Trilogy consists of: United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
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Court reaffirmed these principles in the case of AT&T Technologies
v. Communications Workers of America. 3 With the recent development
of last chance agreements in labor law, the issue has arisen whether
to extend the principles of arbitration to last chance agreements.
In AT&T, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that an ar-
bitrator could properly determine the arbitrability of a grievance
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 4 The case
involved a dispute that arose when the company laid off union
employees and replaced them with transferees from other plants. 5
The union sought to arbitrate the grievance under an arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining agreement, but AT&T asserted
that other limitations in the agreement excluded the issue from
arbitration.6
The AT&T Court held that the duty to interpret an agreement
and to determine whether parties intended to arbitrate a grievance
belongs to the courts.' In reaching this conclusion, the Court utilized
the principles set forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy, reasoning that
arbitration is a matter of contract, and parties cannot be forced to
arbitrate a dispute that they have not agreed to resolve in that
manner.9 The Court further concluded that unless the parties ex-
plicitly provide otherwise, the court, not the arbitrator, is to decide
the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular
issue. 9 In making this decision, the Court held that a contract con-
taining an arbitration clause creates a presumption of arbitrability,
and an order to arbitrate a particular grievance should not be
denied unless the arbitration clause is clearly not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."'
The recent development of last chance agreements as a method
of regulating the means of dispute resolution has added a new
dimension to the question of the arbitrability of grievances. Last
chance agreements are probationary contracts between an employer
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416 (1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 2414 (1960).
3 475 U.S. 643, 648-49, 121 L.R.R.M. 3329, 3331-32 (1986).
Id. at 649, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331-32.
5 1d. at 644, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3330.
Id. at 645-46, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3330.
7 1d. at 649, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331-32.
8
 475 U.S. at 648, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582, 46
L.R.R.M. at 2419).
9 AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3331-32.
'° Id. at 650, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3332 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 46
L.R.R.M. at 2419-20).
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and an employee who faces removal or discipline for poor perfor-
mance." These agreements generally operate to allow an employee
to remain in the company subject to satisfactory performance and
adherence to the special terms of the agreement, which ordinarily
include methods designed to curb poor performance. 12 Last chance
agreements typically contain terms restricting the means of dispute
resolution should the employee fail to perform adequately, and such
terms frequently prohibit arbitration of issues covered by the agree-
ment.'
Last chance agreements are a novel development in labor prac-
tice. Until this Survey year, only one federal appellate court case,
Stewart v. United States Postal Service, had addressed the issue of the
scope of a non-arbitration clause contained in such an agreement."
The Stewart case arose from a last chance agreement that precluded
appeals to any forum for the sanctions rendered against the prob-
lematic employee for absenteeism. 15 During termination proce-
dures, the question arose as to the validity of the claim that the
employee had even violated the agreement, but the employer de-
nied the employee any recourse to address this issue. 16 The court
held that, although Stewart had agreed to waive his right to appeal
sanctions upon a finding of breach, he had not waived his right to
have a neutral party determine the threshold issue of breach.°
Thus, the court, in interpreting the waiver in the last chance agree-
ment, construed its terms narrowly and allowed Stewart to appeal
to a neutral forum on the threshold issue of breach.' 8
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in United Steelworkers of America v. Lukens Steel,
considered the extent to which last chance agreements excluded
certain issues from arbitration. 19 In Lukens, the court held that
although the last chance agreements in question stipulated that the
j United States Dep't of Air Force v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 949 F.2d 475, 478,
139 L.R.R.M. 2076, 2078 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing last chance agreements).
12 Id.
1, See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., 926 F.2d 1146, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(no right of appeal through grievance/arbitration procedures); McCall v. United States Postal
Serv., 839 F.2d 664, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (removal will be reissued with no right of appeal
to any forum if employee fails to meet terms of agreement).
14 See Stewart, 926 F.2d at 1148-49.
15 Id, at 1147.
16 Id. at 1147-48.
1 ' Id. at 1149.
18 See id. at 1148-49.
19 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
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disciplinary committee's disposition was final and not arbitratable,
the agreements did not cover the issue of actual breach by the
employees, and this issue was subject to arbitration under the col-
lective bargaining agreement." In so doing, the court extended the
presumption of arbitrability set forth in AT&T to this new area of
employment contracts."
Lukens involved a dispute over the interpretation of three Last
Chance Agreements ("Agreements") between Lukens and appellant
United Steelworkers of America ("Union"), representing three of
Lukens's former employees ("Employees"). 22 The Employees were
hourly wage employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Union and Lukens." The collective bargaining
agreement included grievance and arbitration procedures govern-
ing suspension and discharge. 24 Each Employee had tested positive
for drug use at least once, but instead of being discharged, they
executed Last Chance Agreements. 25 The Employees received con-
ditional reinstatement in return for compliance, with company rules
and consent to limited recourse should they subsequently violate
the agreement." The operative terms of the Agreements provided
that, upon violation of their terms, the employee would be allowed
to plead his or her case before the disciplinary committee." The
disciplinary committee's decision would be final, and neither the
Employee nor Union would have recourse to protest the decision
through the grievance/arbitration procedure."
A few months after signing the Agreements, Lukens charged
the Employees with violating the Agreements by either testing pos-
itive for drug use again or refusing to submit to a drug test. 2°
Consistent with the Agreements, Lukens suspended the Employees
for five days, and then convened the disciplinary committee to
render its decision." The committee rejected each of the Employee's
explanations and terminated all three. 31
2° Id.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 1470, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2758.
"Id, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2757.
24 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1470, 190 L.R.R.M. at 2758.
" Id. at 1471-73, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2758-61.
2° Id.
" Id. at 1471 n.1, 190 L.R.R.M. at 2758 n.l.
Ye Id.
" Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1472-73, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2759-60.
" Id.
21 Id.
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The dispute arose when the Union attempted to force Lukens
to arbitrate each Employee's suspension and discharge." The Union
asserted that, although the Employees waived their rights to arbi-
trate the final disposition of the disciplinary committee, the Agree-
ments failed to specify the proper procedures for determining the
threshold issue of breach." The Union postulated that the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement entitled the Employees to have the ques-
tion of whether they had violated the Last Chance Agreements
arbitrated." Lukens refused to accept the grievances, claiming that
the Last Chance Agreements precluded the Employees from re-
course through the grievance/arbitration procedure." The Union
filed three actions to compel arbitration in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." The district court
agreed with Lukens that the Agreements barred arbitration and
entered summary judgment in its favor."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the Agreements
and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judg-
ment in the Union's favor." The court, employing a two-part anal-
ysis, first examined the terms of the Last Chance Agreements to
ascertain the presence or absence of express exclusion." Second,
the court examined the surrounding circumstances to discern any
intent to exclude the issue from arbitration. 4°
The court determined that the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment contained a broad grievance and arbitration clause, and there-
fore the presumption of arbitrability was applicable. 4 ' The court
further asserted that only positive assurance that the broad arbitra-
tion clause did not cover the particular grievance could defeat the
presumption of arbitrability.42 The court concluded that the lan-
guage of the Agreements was unclear and ambiguous as to the
arbitrability of the issue of breach. 4s
52 Id,
53
 Id, at 1473, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2760.
" Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1473, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2760.
35 Id. at 1472-73, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2759-60.
36 Id. at 1470-71, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2757-58.
37 Id.
58 Id, at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
59 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1475, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
40 Id.
4' Id. at 1474, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
+ 2 1d. (quoting AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3332 (doubts should be resolved
in favor of arbitrability)).
4 s Id. at 1475, 1476, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2761, 2762.
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In order to overcome the presumption of arbitrability, the court
required that Lukens show either an express exclusion of the griev-
ance issue from arbitration or the existence of "strong and forceful"
evidence of an intention to do so." Examining the Agreements, the
court found no express exclusion from arbitration of the threshold
issue of breach." Concluding that Lukens could • have used clear
and unambiguous language if it had intended to exclude the issue
of breach from arbitration, the court rejected Lukens's contention
that the Union's strict reading of the clause was strained." The
court found instead that such an interpretation was consistent with
the Federal Circuit's reading of the agreement in Stewart, where the
court held that Stewart had not waived his right to have a neutral
party determine the issue of breach.47
The court further held that the Last Chance Agreements and
the events surrounding their formation contained no strong and
forceful evidence of an intention to exclude the question from
arbitration." The court rejected Lukens's contention that the
Union's interpretation of the Agreements made no sense because it
conveyed no value to the employer.49 Instead, the court found that
the Union's reading ensured Lukens the benefit of foreclosing any
possibility that an arbitrator might order reinstatement of a consis-
tently troublesome employee by making the Disciplinary Commit-
tee's disposition final." Moreover, the court noted that even if Lu-
kens viewed the Agreements as precluding arbitration of the
question of breach, there was no indication that the parties ever
agreed on the issue." Thus, reading the Agreements in light of the
presumption of arbitrability, and finding no express exclusion or
intent to exclude the matter from arbitration, the court remanded
" Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1475, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2762.
46 Id. at 1476, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2762. This is consistent with the only other appellate case
deciding whether a last chance agreement precludes arbitration of the factual question of an
employee's violation of the agreement. See Stewart, 926 F.2d at 1148-49 (last chance agree-
ment prohibiting appeal to any forum of penalty for violations, but silent as to factual
determination of violation's occurrence retains presumption of arbitrability as to that issue).
46 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1476-77, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2762-63. See Stewart, 936 F.2d at 1148
(waiver went only to issue of penalty, not to threshold question of breach).
47 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1476-77, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2763-64.
46 Id. at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764. See also Morristown Daily Record, Inc. v. Graphic
Communications, Local 8N, 832 F.2d 31, 35, 126 L.R.R.M. 2902, 2906 (3d Cir. 1987) (strong
and forceful evidence of an intention to exclude issue from arbitration overcomes presump-
tion of arbitrability).
49 Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
so Id.
" Id.
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the case to the district court with instructions to render summary
judgment in favor of the Union and allow arbitration of the thresh-
old issue of breach. 52
Senior District Judge McCune, sitting by designation, dissented
from the majority's interpretation of the Last Chance Agreements,
concluding instead that the plain meaning of the words made no
sense under the majority's reading. 53 Judge McCune asserted that
if Lukens had not intended that the disciplinary committee decide
the issue of breach, then the committee served no purpose, because
it had nothing to decide. 54 Judge McCune also distinguished the
Stewart case, noting that there was no disciplinary committee or
other forum included in that Last Chance Agreement, but merely
the possibility of the employer's reinstatement of the original dis-
charge. 55
 Judge McCune found this distinction significant because
in Stewart no opportunity existed for the employee to plead his case
upon charges of violating the agreement. 56 In Lukens, however, the
Employees could plead their case to the disciplinary committee. 57
Thus, Judge McCune concluded that in contrast to Stewart, the
potential for injustice in Lukens was greatly reduced. 58
The Lukens decision has several consequences for practitioners.
First, Lukens is only the second appellate case to directly address the
problem of the scope of arbitration restrictions in last chance agree-
ments. Both decisions have imposed a strict interpretation on these
types of agreements, demonstrating the courts' unwillingness to
prevent an employee or union from seeking redress of grievances
in a neutral forum.59 Based on both cases, the judicial inclination
seems to be in favor of a stringent examination of labor agreements,
seeking to discover a means of allowing arbitration of grievances.
The allowance of such arbitration in the Lukens scenario, however,
is problematic, but not detrimental to the integrity of these types of
agreements because the only issue arbitrable is a factual finding that
the employees violated the agreement. Thus, to control the appli-
cation of a presumption of arbitrability, it is necessary to draft last
chance agreements carefully, anticipating the possible issues that
could arise under the terms of the contract.
52 Id.
" Id. at 1479, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764 (McCune, J., dissenting).





"See Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764; Stewart, 926 F.2d at 1148.
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Second, the Lukens decision may create confusion as to what is
necessary to overcome the presumption of arbitrability under last
chance agreements. Although the express exclusion test employed
by the court is a rather clear standard, the strong and forceful
intent test is vague and uncertain.° The Lukens court rejected affi-
davits expressing Lukens's intent in drafting the agreements, and
also rejected the argument relied on in Judge McCune's dissent that
the court's narrow construction of the non-arbitration clause con-
veyed little value to the employers' The court did not state what
would constitute sufficiently "strong and forceful" evidence of an
intent to exclude an issue from arbitration. Thus, practitioners
drafting last chance agreements would be prudent in anticipating
and expressly stating in the agreement all issues they intend to
exclude from arbitration.
The third significant impact of Lukens is the potential it creates
for increased litigation over the arbitrability of issues under existing
last chance agreements. Courts may be less reluctant to reject an
employer's interpretation of what constitutes a fool-proof non-ar-
bitration clause after Lukens. Practitioners should be careful to rein-
spect any existing contracts and consider the possibility of renego-
tiating unclear agreements. A less drastic option for employers
would be to provide the employee covered under an unclear agree-
ment with documentation expressing the scope of the non-arbitra-
tion clause. Such documentation may be of assistance in providing
a court with evidence of a sufficiently strong and forceful intent to
exclude an issue from arbitration should litigation ensue.
In sum, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Lukens
has imposed a stringent presumption of arbitrability on non-arbi-
tration clauses in last chance agreements. 62 The Lukens court held
that a collective bargaining agreement containing a broad grievance
and arbitration clause creates a presumption of arbitrability appli-
cable to the issue of breach of the last chance agreement if not
clearly prohibited by that agreement." The court's imposition of
rigorous standards in determining an issue's exclusion from arbi-
tration necessitates diligence in the drafting of last chance agree-
ments. The Lukens decision paves the way for future litigation over
what may seem to be binding prohibitions on arbitration and leaves
60 See Lukens, 969 F.2d at 1478, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2764.
61 Id.
"See id. at 1475, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
63 Id. at 1474, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2761.
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one important question unanswered. In the absence of express
terms restricting an issue from litigation, what evidence of an intent
to exclude the issue is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
arbitrability? The resolution of this question may provide some
guidelines for those drafting and signing last chance agreements.
C. *NLRA Does Not Preempt Work Preservation Clause When City Is
Acting as Market Participant: Associated Builders and Contractors,
Inc. v. City of Seward'
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA") was de-
signed to entrust administration of the nation's labor policy to a
centralized federal authority, thereby prohibiting most state regu-
lation of labor relations. 2 In 1985, in Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, the United States Supreme Court recognized two
distinct principles governing when the NLRA preempts state labor
regulation. 3
 The first principle forbids states from regulating activ-
ities that the NLRA protects or prohibits. 4 Called the Garmon rule,
this principle precludes states from interfering in the National La-
bor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "Board") interpretation or en-
forcement of the NLRA. 5 The second principle, developed in the
1976 case of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
and referred to as the "Machinists preemption," prohibits states from
regulating activities that Congress intended to leave to natural mar-
ket forces. 6
In Golden State, the United States Supreme Court relied upon
this second Machinists preemption principle in holding that the Los
Angeles City Council's conditioning of the renewal of plaintiff's taxi
cab franchise on the settlement of a pending labor dispute was
preempted by the NLRA. 7 The Golden State Court reasoned that
* By Heidi J. Goldstein, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 966 F.2d 492, 140 L.R.R.M. 2539 (9th Cir. 1992).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). See also Wisconsin Dep't of
Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289-90, 121 L.R.R.M.
2737, 2740 (1986).
3 475 U.S. 608, 613, 121 L.R.R.M. 3233, 3235-36 (1986).
Id. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246, 43 L.R.R.M.
2838, 2842 (1959) (holding that NLRA precludes California state court from awarding
damages to an employer for the peaceful picketing of his plant by labor unions who had not
been selected by the plant's employees as their representatives).
3 Golden State, 475 U.S. at 613, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236.
6 See 427 U.S. 132, 140, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2883-84 (1976) (holding a state commission's
prohibition against union refusals to work overtime during collective bargaining negotiations
to be preempted by the NLRA).
7 475 U.S. at 615-16, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236-37.
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Congress, in enacting the NLRA, intended to leave the bargaining
process to the parties. 8 Therefore, according to the Court, the city
was preempted from regulating the collective bargaining activities
of private parties. 9
In 1985, in Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations v. Gould, Inc., however, the United States Supreme Court
stated, in dicta, that when the state's interference in the collective
bargaining process is peripheral to the focus of the NLRA, deeply
entrenched in local concerns, or deals with a matter Congress in-
tentionally left to the states, the Court may determine that the
NLRA does not preempt the regulation.") In making such a deter-
mination, the Court will focus on the statute's intent." Thus, in
Gould the Court determined that a Wisconsin statute forbidding
state procurement agents from purchasing products manufactured
or sold by habitual violators of the NLRA was merely an attempt
to enforce the NLRA. 12 The Gould Court held that the statute was
preempted by the NLRA because the state was exercising its regu-
latory, as opposed to its spending power.' 5
The Gould Court was careful to note that although the Com-
merce Clause permits states to participate freely in the open market,
the NLRA was designed to entrust administration of the nation's
labor policy to a centralized federal authority. 14 Thus, spending
activities that may have been permissible for a state under the
Commerce Clause were preempted when the NLRA was enacted. 15
The Gould Court noted that because of the unique position of power
occupied by the government in our society, the public sector is
subject to special restraints.' 8 According to the Court, the NLRA,
therefore, necessarily controls state activities to a greater extent than
private parties."
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
applied the Supreme Court's NLRA preemption analysis in Associ-
n Id. at 616, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3237 (citing H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103,
73 L.R.R.M. 2561, 2562 (1970)).
See id. at 615-16, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236-37.
1 ° See 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741 (1986) (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44,
43 L.R.R.M. at 2841; Associated Builders and Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. v. Massachusetts
Water Resources Auth., 935 F.2d 345, 358, 137 L.R.R.M. 2249, 2259 (1st Cir. 1991) (en
banc) cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992).
"See Gould, 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
" Id. at 287, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
" Id.
H Id. at 289-90, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
" See id. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
10 Gould, 475 U.S. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
"Id.
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ated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. v. Mas-
sachusetts Water Resources Authority, known as Boston Harbor. 18 In Bos-
ton Harbor, the First Circuit held that the NLRA preempted an
attempt by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
("MWRA") to limit bidding on a multi-million dollar Boston Harbor
clean-up project to contractors who agreed to enter a collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Construction Trades Coun-
cil and affiliated labor organizations. 19 The Boston Harbor court de-
termined that: 1) the MWRA had interfered with the bargaining
process itself and its actions did not fall under any of the exceptions
to NLRA preemption articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Gould;2° 2) although sections 8(e) and (f) of the NLRA
permit pre-hire agreements for private employers, Congress im-
plicitly excluded public employers from this exception, thereby
demonstrating its intent to occupy the field exclusively; 2 ' and 3)
18 935 F.2d at 352, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2254.
19 Id. at 360, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
z) Id. at 353-54, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2255. These exceptions were originally developed by
the United States Supreme Court in Gannon, 359 U.S. at 243-44, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841.
2 ' Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 357, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2258. Sections 8(e) and (f) of the
NLRA allow pre-hire agreements for private employers in the construction industry. 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agree-
ment shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in
this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and
an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcon-
tracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting,
or repair of a building, structure or other work: ...
29 U.S.C. 158(1) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon
their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry
with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are
members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in
subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice) because . . . (2) such
agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor
organization . . ., or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such
labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or
gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for
such employment... .
See also Glenwood Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 371, 137 L.R.R.M. 3001,
3004 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that Sections 8(e) and (f) do not grant public employers the
ability to enter into pre-hire agreements).
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other than the dicta in Gould (which provided that only actions that
are peripheral to the NLRA, deeply rooted in local interests or deal
with matters Congress intentionally left to the states may evade
NLRA preemption) no real proprietary interest or market partici-
pant exception to the NLRA exists. 22 The Boston Harbor court de-
termined that the efforts of the MWRA interfered too pervasively
with the labor negotiation process to be regarded as either periph-
eral or of local concern. 23
During the Survey year, in Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.
v. City of Seward, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a city's adoption of a work
preservation clause requiring contractors bidding on a particular
project to have an agreement with the union that represents some
of the municipality's employees is preempted by the NLRA. 24 The
Seward court held that when a municipality is using its spending
powers, thereby acting as a "market participant," to protect its own
employees, rather than as a regulator of industrial relations, its
actions are not preempted by the NLRA. 25 Relying on Gould, the
Seward court focused on the non-regulatory intent of the munici-
pality in adopting the work preservation clauSe to protect its own
employees. 26
 Furthermore, the court determined that a municipality
should not be prevented from entering into an agreement that a
private employer could freely enter. 27 Therefore, under Seward,
when a state is not acting with intent to regulate industrial relations,
but rather is operating in an area Congress intended to leave to the
states, the state's actions are not preempted by the NLRA. 25
The dispute in Seward arose in 1990 when the City of Seward,
Alaska ("City") received a grant from the Alaska legislature to re-
place a high-voltage transmission line. 29 The City owned and op-
erated an electrical utility, staffed with its own employees." These
employees were covered by a CBA between the City and the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("1BEW"). 3 ' Because
22 Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 358, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2259.
23 Id. at 359, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
966 F.2d 492, 494, 140 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2541 (9th Cir. 1992). Neither the fact that
Seward is a municipality, as opposed to a state, nor that it acted not by statute but through
adoption of a work preservation clause affects the preemption analysis defined by the Su-
preme Court. See Golden State, 475 U.S. at 614 n.5, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236 n.5 (1986).
" 966 F.2d at 496, 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542, 2543,
" Id. at 496, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
" Id. at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
28 See id.
"Id. at 493, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540.
38 Seward, 966 F.2d at 493, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540.
" Id.
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the City lacked the heavy construction equipment necessary to per-
form the job internally, it sought a private contractor for the ren-
ovation project." To protect the interests of the City's 1BEW em-
ployees, the union negotiated with the City to add a work
preservation clause to their CBA, limiting bidding on the renovation
project to contractors who agreed to enter into a labor agreement
with the IBEW. 33
Trade associations representing construction industry contrac-
tors ("Contractors") sought to enjoin the enforcement of the work
preservation clause in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Alaska. 34
 The Contractors argued that the work preservation
clause was preempted by the NLRA. 35 The district court, ruling on
stipulated facts, granted summary judgment for the City, and the
Contractors appealed the matter to the Ninth Circuit. 36
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that when a municipality requires a contractor to
enter an agreement with the union that represents the City's em-
52 Id.
35 Id. The work preservation clause provided as follows:
The City of Seward ("the Employer") agrees to the extent permitted by law ...
it will not contract for or allow the subcontract for the construction of the 115
kv main electrical transmission inertie line between Lawing and Fort. Raymond
[substations) for work traditionally performed by employees represented by the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1547 ("1BEW")
except to a person, firm, or corporation that is a party to an appropriate current
labor agreement with IBEW.
Id. at 493-94 n.1, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540 n. 1.
"Id. at 494, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540.
35
 966 F.2d at 494, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540. The Contractors also argued that the work
preservation clause was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and contrary to the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution. Id.
The Contractors based their antitrust claim on the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 498,
140 L.R.R.M. at 2543. Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e)very contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Seward court concluded, however, that because the agreement
entered into by Seward and the IBEW is valid under the NLRA, it would be inconsistent to
render it illegal under antitrust law. 966 F.2d at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544.
As for the Contractors' constitutional claims, the Seward court concluded that there was
no equal protection violation because a rational basis existed—like a private employer, a
public employer is free to favor union contractors in a work preservation clause. Id. (citing
Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame, 567 F.2d 1197, 1203, 97 L.R.R.M. 2259, 2263 (2d Cir. 1977),
cot denied, 440 U.S. 979, 100 L.R.R.M. 3055 (1979) (holding that rational basis exists for
city policy favoring union printers over non-union printers and thus bidding requirements
do not constitute violation of equal protection). The Seward court also rejected the Contrac-
tors' due process claims because wishful bidders on a contract have no constitutionally
protected property interests in a project. 966 F.2d at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544:
66 Seward, 966 F.2d at 494, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540.
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ployees, who have traditionally performed the work being con-
tracted out, the work preservation clause is not preempted by the
NLRA. 37 The court reasoned that when a municipality acts merely
out of concern toward furthering harmonious industrial relations,
it functions as a market participant, rather than as a regulator whose
interference with free market forces is preempted by the NLRA. 38
Furthermore, the court concluded that because Congress exempted
public sector collective bargaining from the NLRA, the City's adop-
tion of the work preservation clause represented an activity that
Congress had intended to leave to the states. 39
The Seward court began its discussion by examining the Con-
tractors' argument that the work preservation clause violated the
Machinists principle prohibiting states from regulating activities that
Congress intended to leave to free market forces." The Seward court
concluded that, unlike the City of Los Angeles in Golden State, which
thwarted the natural bargaining process when it threatened to with-
hold a taxi franchise, the City of Seward was merely acting as a
market participant.'" In support of this determination, the Seward
court pointed to the fact that the City did not require all contractors
doing business in the city to have agreements with the IBEW. 42
Rather, the work preservation clause was limited to the specific
project at issue.43 The Seward court relied on the market participant
exception carved out by the United States Supreme Court in the
Commerce Clause context, extending it to the NLRA. 44
Recognizing the limits imposed by the Gould Court on the
market participant exception, however, the Seward court then ex-
" Id. at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
"Id. at 496, 190 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
"Id. at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
'' 966 F.2d at 494, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2540. See International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154-55, 92
L.R.R.M. 2881, 2889 (1976).
4 i Seward, 966 F.2d at 495, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2541.
42 Id.
42 Id.
44 Id. (citing United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and
Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984)) (when the state acts solely as a
market participant, no conflict between state regulation and federal regulatory authority can
arise) (emphasis in original). Although the Seward court correctly noted that the United States
Supreme Court has adopted a market participant exception in the Commerce Clause context,
it failed to acknowledge the careful language of the Gould Court limiting the application of
a market participant exception: "[W]e cannot believe that Congress intended to allow States
to interfere with the 'interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration,' under
the NLRA as long as they did so through exercises of the spending power." Gould, 475 U.S.
at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740 (quoting Garman, 359 U.S. at 243, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841).
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amined the City's intent in requiring the winning bidder on the
renovation project to comply with the work preservation clause.'"
The court concluded that, unlike the Wisconsin statute in Gould,
which, on its face, manifested an intent to regulate labor relations,
the work preservation clause was not motivated by regulatory con-
cerns." Rather, the City merely sought to provide a measure of
economic protection for its own electrical employees when forced
to utilize outside contractors. 47 Like a private employer, therefore,
the City engaged in a collective bargaining process with the IBEW
to insure harmonious relations with the union and its workers."
Next, the Seward court questioned whether the NLRA prohibits
a public employer from creating such a work preservation clause."
The court noted that in enacting § 2(2) of the NLRA, which pro-
vides that "[t]he term 'employer' . . . shall not include . . . any State,"
Congress exempted public employers from the labor restrictions of
the NLRA. 5° Thus, the Seward court concluded that Congress could
not have intended to prohibit a public employer from establishing
the same work preservation clause that a private employer might
adopt. 5 ' The court noted that if the NLRA were interpreted to
prohibit municipalities from fulfilling their duties as employers, the
court would be imputing an intent to Congress to enforce harsher
restrictions on states, who are free to regulate their own labor
regulations, than on private employers, whose activities are regu-
lated.52
 Thus, the court determined that the work preservation
clause in Seward met the Gould Court's market participant exception
because Seward was operating in an area Congress intended to leave
to the states."
The Seward court also concluded its discussion of NLRA
preemption by distinguishing the 1991 opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston Harbor." The First
45





" Seward, 966 F.2d at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542; 29 U.S.C. 152(2) (1988); See also
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223, 95 L.R.R.M. 2411, 2416 (1977) ("The
INLRAJ leaves regulation of the labor relations of state and local governments to the States.").
" 966 F.2d at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542. Presumably, the Seward court was referring to
the pre-hire exceptions under 8(e) and (f) of the NLRA. See supra note 21.
"Id. at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
55 See id.
54 Id. at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543. See Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d 345, 137 L.R.R.M. 2249.
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Circuit held that the NLRA preempted an attempt by the Massa-
chusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") to curtail bidding
on a multi-million dollar Boston Harbor clean-up project to con-
tractors who consented to enter into a CBA with the Construction.
Trades Council and affiliated labor organizations. 55 Unlike the City
of Seward, the MWRA did not employ workers who could have
performed the job internally. 56 The Boston Harbor court noted, how-
ever, that had the MWRA been the actual employer of the workers
on the project, the NLRA would have been inapplicable because of
the exclusion of states from the definition of employer under § 2(2)
of the NLRA. 57 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, distinguished Boston
Harbor because, unlike the MWRA, the City was acting as a public
employer and thus was not preempted by the NLRA. 58
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wright argued that the major-
ity's opinion rested on a faulty premise. 59 The dissent maintained
that there was no evidence that the City was acting as a public
employer when it conditioned bidding on the renovation project to
contractors who would cooperate with the IBEW.6° Moreover, the
dissent noted, if such evidence existed, the NLRA would be inap-
plicable to the City's actions." Thus, the majority need not have
gone through its detailed market participant analysis because the
NLRA excludes states from the definition of "employer." 62
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
because a private employer could adopt a work preservation clause,
there was no reason why the City could not also adopt such a
clause.° Rather, Judge Wright relied on the reasoning of the First
Circuit in Boston Harbor in determining that while sections 8(e) and
55 Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 360, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
" See id. at 354, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2256; see also Seward, 966 F.2d at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at
2593.
57 Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 354, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2256.
58 Seward, 966 F.2d at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
" Id. at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544 (Wright, J., dissenting).
6° Id. at 500, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2545.
Al Id. at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544.
62 Id. Furthermore, the dissent forecasted the dangers of allowing a city to engage in
regulation of other employer's labor relations. Taken to its logical extreme, the dissent
argued, the majority's decision would permit an anti-labor state to allow only non-union
contractors to bid on state projects. Moreover, by resting its decision on the City's intent in
adopting the work preservation clause, the majority's opinion would force federal courts to
evaluate the motives behind municipal decisions. The dissent argued, therefore, that when
a state is acting as a public employer, its regulatory function should be limited to its employees
only. Id, at 500, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2545 (Wright, J., dissenting).
63 Seward, 966 F.2d at 500, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2545.
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(f) of the NLRA allow pre-hire agreements for private employers
in the construction industry, the statute does not explicitly include
states in this exception. 64 In enacting the two NLRA sections, there-
fore, Congress occupied the field excluding local regulation, such
as the work preservation clause at issue here. 65
In Seward, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when
a city is acting to protect its own employees it serves as a market
participant and not as a regulator." The Ninth Circuit extended
the United States Supreme Court's dicta in Gould, where the Court
indicated that state spending actions that are of great local concern,
incidental to federal interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA,
or involve areas intentionally left to the states by Congress, may co-
exist with the NLRA. 67 The Seward court concluded that the City's
enactment of the work preservation clause was an activity that Con-
gress intended to leave to the states." The court further relied on
§ 2(2) of the NLRA which exempts states from the NLRA's defini-
tion of "employer."69 If the Ninth Circuit had demonstrated the
employer-employee relationship, as suggested by Judge Wright in
his dissent, its analysis could have ended there. 7° The Seward court
failed, however, to demonstrate that the City, as opposed to the
successful Contractor, would be the actual employer of the reno-
vation line workers.' I Consequently, the court failed to demonstrate
logically why the work preservation clause met the exception under
§ 2(2) of the NLRA. 72 The Ninth Circuit did not prove that the
work preservation clause governed an area that Congress had in-
tentionally left to the states.
The Gould dicta also indicated that a state may regulate in areas
that are either peripheral to the focus of the NLRA or deeply
entrenched in local concerns." Without demonstrating that the City
of Seward would be the actual employer of the workers, however,
the Ninth Circuit did not show that the City was doing anything
but unnecessarily interfering in the collective bargaining process,
as prohibited by the Machinists preemption principle. As stressed by
Id.; Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 357, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2258.
68 Seward, 966 F.2d at 500, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2545-46 (Wright, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 496, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
6  Gould, 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
" 966 F.2d at 498, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2543.
66 Id. at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542; 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
'7° See Seward, 966 F.2d at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544-45 (Wright, J., dissenting).
71 Id.
See id. at 499, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2544-45.
"Could, 475 U.S. at 291, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2741.
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the United States Supreme Court in Gould, the government occupies
a peculiar position of power in our society and its actions, unless
confined to its own internal affairs, are therefore limited. 74
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's argument that the NLRA should
not be read to prevent public employers from engaging in the same
bargaining activities as private employers is illogical. The question
of whether Congress intended to include public entities in the con-
struction industry exception is unclear. 75 While § 2(2) of the NLRA
excludes states from the NLRA's definition of "employer," the con-
struction industry exceptions appearing in sections 8(e) and (f) use
the word "employer."70 Thus, Congress implicitly limited the pre-
hire exceptions to private contractors only. 77 The Seward court is
caught in this semantic trap, arguing both that the states are free
from the NLRA's limitations on employers and that the City should
be permitted to act as a private employer. 78 This statutory contra-
diction was raised by the First Circuit in Boston Harbor." The United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on Boston Harbor and
may deliver a definitive answer on this issue this term.80
II.. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
A. *Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act: Wooddell v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers'
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Har-
tley) Act ("LMRA") gives federal courts the authority to enforce
collective bargaining agreements entered into by labor unions. 2 In
74 See Gould, 475 U.S. at 290, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
"But see, e.g., Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 357, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2258; Glenwood Bridge,
940 F.2d at 371, 137 L.R.R.M. at 3004 (enjoining city from rejecting contractor's low bid and
awarding contract to another contractor who agreed to enter a labor stabilization agreement
due to NLRA preemption).
76 See 29 U.S.C. H 152(2), 158(e)—(f) (1988).
" See Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 357, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2258.
" 966 F.2d at 497, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2542.
76
 See Boston Harbor, 935 F.2d at 358, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2259.
60
 112 S. Ct. 293 (1992).
* By Cynthia A. Bailey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 112 S. Ct. 494, 138 L.R.R.M. 2881 (1991).
2 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1992).
Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
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the years following its enactment, the United States Supreme Court
decided that § 301(a) created a new area of federal substantive law, 5
and that this federal law preempted state court interpretation of
the statute. 4 The specific definition of what constituted a valid
§ 301(a) claim, however, remained unclear. 5 The Court left unre-
solved whether individual workers could bring a § 301(a) claim, 8
and what type of disputes fell within the § 301(a) meaning of
contract."7
The United States Supreme Court resolved the first of these
issues in a 1961 case, Smith v. Evening News, by holding that individ-
ual union members, not just labor unions and employers, had stand-
ing to sue under § 301(a). 8 In Smith, the Court permitted a news-
paper worker to sue his employer for unfair labor practices. 9 The
Court reasoned that individual claims are often at the heart of
collective bargaining contracts.'° The Court stated that limiting
§ 301(a) to disputes between unions and employers was overly re-
strictive and would frustrate the congressional policy establishing
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
Prior to this legislation, it was difficult to sue labor organizations because many state
statutes did not recognize such organizations as legal entities. United Ass'n of Journeymen
v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 624, 107 L.R.R.M. 2715, 2718 (1981). Congress enacted § 301(a)
to promote labor stability by holding labor unions accountable for their collective bargaining
agreements with employers. Id. See also CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
875 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
3 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, 40 L.R.R.M. 2113, 2116 (1957).
In Lincoln Mills, the United States Supreme Court held that a union could bring a federal
cause of action against an employer under § 301(a) for violating an arbitration provision
within the collective bargaining agreement between the two parties. Id. The Court ruled that
instead of construing § 301(a) as merely procedural, the federal courts were to fashion
substantive law from the policy of the national labor laws. Id.
' See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2721
(1962) (reaffirming that claims litigated under § 301(a) would follow federal law); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507, 49 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2621 (1962) (cautioning
if state courts interpreted § 301(a) differently from the federal courts, resulting inconsisten-
cies would disrupt national labor market).
5 See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 51 L.R.R.M. 2646, 2648 (1962);
Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 619-21, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2617-18.
6 See Smith, 371 U,S. at 200, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
7 Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 619-21, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2717-18.
Smith, 371 U.S. at 200-01, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2648-49.
9 Id. at 195-96, 200, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2646-47, 2649. The employer violated a collective
bargaining agreement by preventing all union employees from reporting to work during
another unrelated union strike. Id. at 195-96, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2646-47.
Id. at 200, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2648.
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uniform labor law." Suits brought by individual union members
would be governed by state law, for example, while actions litigated
by the union for the very same breach would be controlled by federal
law.' 2 Consequently, the Court reasoned that the meaning of specific
contract terms would differ depending on who instituted the ac-
tion." The Court concluded, therefore, that such a consequence
would confuse the negotiation and administration of collective bar-
gaining agreements and would thus disrupt labor stability."
In 1981 the Supreme Court resolved the question of what type
of disputes fall within the § 301(a) meaning of "contract"" in United
Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334. In Journeymen, the Court held that
valid § 301(a) disputes were not limited to breaches of contract
involving collective bargaining agreements." The Court determined
that the term "contract" within the statute also extended to viola-
tions of union constitutions.' 7 The Court reasoned that union con-
stitutions hold labor organizations legally accountable to each
other" and are therefore agreements within the § 301(a) meaning
of "contract." 19 Consequently, the Court determined that the statute
allowed a local union to sue its international parent in federal court
for a violation of the international's constitution." The Court found
such an interpretation consistent with the legislative intent of
§ 301(a) because enforcement of union constitutions contributed to
the achievement of labor stability. 2 '
The Journeymen decision, however, did not resolve whether in-
dividual union members could sue under a union constitution. 22
Id., 51 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
" Id, at 200-01, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
" See 371 U.S. at 200, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2648-49.
14 See id. at 200-01, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
18 See Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 624, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2719.
le Id. at 627, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2719-20.
" Id., 107 L.R.R.M. at 2720.
18 Id. at 624, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2718. The Court inferred that this accountability stems
from the fact that union constitutions detail the relationship between local union affiliates
and their international parents. Id.
19 1d., 107 L.R.R.M. at 2718-19.
" 452 U.S. at 616-17, 627, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2715, 2720.
21 Id. at 624, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
88 Id. at 627 n.16, 107 L.R.R.M, at 2719 n.16. Nonetheless, most circuit courts have
interpreted the Journeymen and Smith decisions liberally and have granted these types of intra-
union actions federal jurisdiction under 301(a). See DeSantiago v. Laborers Intl Union,
Local 1140, 914 F.2d 125, 128, 135 L.R.R.M. 2419, 2421 (8th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 771, 826 F.2d 1310, 1314, 126 L.R.R.M. 2030, 2034 (3d Cir.
1987); Kinney v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229, 109 L.R.R.M.
2779, 2784 (9th Cir. 1981); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1248, 75 L.R.R.M.
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Prior to Journeymen, in Trail v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
actions brought by an individual union member for violation of a
union constitution were not within the purview of § 301(a). 23 The
Trail court emphasized that the statute was expressly limited to
disputes between an employer and a labor organization or between
labor organizations. 24 The Trail court determined that Smith did not
control because, in Smith, individual workers sued under a collective
bargaining agreement and not a union constitution. 25 In addition,
the court reasoned that disputes between union members and their
unions were essentially internal matters outside the scope of the
LMRA. 26
 Because Congress never intended the courts to use the
LMRA to police intra-union conflict, the court concluded that the
application of § 301(a) to this dispute was inappropriate. 27
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court held
in Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers that a suit
by an individual union member that alleges a violation of a union
constitution is within the subject matter jurisdiction created by
§ 301(a) of the LMRA. 28 Wooddell involved an allegation by an
individual union member that his local union breached a collective
bargaining agreement to his detriment and thus violated the inter-
national constitution. 29 The Supreme Court reasoned that intra-
union disputes disrupt labor stability as much as inter-union suits, 3°
and therefore Congress must have intended such matters to be
within the purview of § 301(a). 3 '
2736, 2746 (2d Cir. 1970); Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 917,
52 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2304 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976, 52 L.R.R.M. 2943 (1963).
23 Trail v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 965, 93 L.R.R.M. 3076, 3078
(6th Cir. 1976). The plaintiffs were unionized truckers who initiated an unfair labor practices
suit under § 301(a) against their local unions and the International Brotherhood of Teams-
ters. Id. at 964, 93 L.R.R.M. at 3077. The plaintiffs alleged that the unions failed to properly
ratify the collective bargaining agreement that controlled their compensation. Id.
21 See id. at 967, 93 L.R.R.M. at 3079.
23 Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 3080.
26
 Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 3079-80.
Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 3079.
sb Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 501, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2884. In an alternate holding, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its recent decision in Teamsters, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573,
133 L.R.R.M. 2793, 2798 (1990), upholding the right of a jury trial for employees seeking
injunctive relief and monetary damages on an LMRA claim. Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 498, 138
L.R.R.M. at 2882. Consequently, the plaintiff in Wooddell was granted a jury trial on remand.
Id. See generally Susan M. Landers, The Right to a July Trial in a Duty of Fair Representation
Suit: Teamsters, Local 391 v. Terry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 307, 309 (1992) (reviewing the Terry
decision and the right to a jury trial under the LMRA).
29
 Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
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The petitioner in Wooddell was a member of Local 71 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"). 32 He
claimed that the local union did not give him job referrals in accor-
dance with the union's collective bargaining agreement with elec-
trical contractors." As a consequence, the petitioner instituted this
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio." He alleged that the union was in violation of the IBEW
constitution and the bylaws of Local 71, and that this violation
constituted a breach of contract under § 301(a) of the LMRA. 35
The district court ruled in favor of Local 71's motions for
summary judgment, and dismissed the petitioner's claims." Relying
on its decision in Trail, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
ruling and held that § 301(a) did not authorize a breach of contract
action brought by an individual union member." The Sixth Circuit
stated that the Supreme Court decision in Journeymen was limited
to suits between union organizations, leaving open the issue of
whether an individual union member could sue under a union
constitution." The court also reasoned that internal union conflicts
did not share the same contractual nature as relationships between
separate union organizations." Therefore, § 301(a) was not appli-
cable in these circumstances.4°
The United States Supreme Court granted the union member's
petition for certiorari and reversed the Sixth Circuit decision. 4 '
Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that § 301(a) subject
matter jurisdiction may be properly asserted if the suit alleges either
a violation of a contract between labor organizations or a contract
32 Id. at 497, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2881.
"Id. Before this suit was initiated, the local union president, who was also the petitioner's
brother, filed internal disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Wooddell v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, No. 88-4049, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899 at *1 (6th Cir. June
27, 1990). The disciplinary measures allegedly stemmed from the petitioner's opposition to
increases in union dues and the appointment of. the president's son-in-law to the business
manager position. Id. Although no conclusion was ever reached regarding these disciplinary
matters, the petitioner asserted that he was denied referrals because of these proceedings.
Id. at *2.
34 Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 762 F. Supp. 747, 135 L.R.R.M.
2926 (S,D. Ohio 1988).
"Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
Id.
"Id. at 497 n.2, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2882 n,2.
Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec, Workers, No. 88-4049, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS




Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 501, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2884.
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dispute between a labor organization and an employer. 42 In addi-
tion, the majority determined that § 301(a) jurisdiction was not
limited to suits brought by the actual contracting parties."
The Supreme Court determined that because Local 71 and the
IBEW were labor organizations within the meaning of the statute, 44
jurisdiction would exist if a union constitution fell within the stat-
ute's meaning of the term "contract." 45 Relying on its decision in
Journeymen, the Wooddell Court reasoned that union constitutions
were within the § 301(a) meaning of contract." The Court therefore
concluded that § 301(a) governed this intra-union dispute founded
upon a union constitution. 47 Furthermore, because the enforcement
of union constitutions promoted labor stability, the Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Journeymen that Congress had intended the
statute to encompass such constitutions." The Court reiterated that
union constitutions were among the most common form of contract
when the statute was enacted and emphasized that Congress in-
tended the language of § 301(a) to include constitutions."
The Court next focused its analysis on whether the union ac-
tually violated the IBEW constitution. 50 The Court noted that the
IBEW constitution required local unions to honor collective bar-
gaining agreements, 51 and Local 71 agreed to comply with those
terms. 52
 Because the petitioner alleged that Local 71 had breached
the collective bargaining agreement by not giving him job referrals,
the Court found that the petitioner's suit appropriately alleged a
violation of a contract under § 301(a). 53
The Court also rejected the union's argument that § 301(a)
jurisdiction did not extend to third parties seeking to enforce a
violation of the contract." Relying on its decision in Smith, the Court
maintained that individuals are often beneficiaries of agreements
42 Id. at 498, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
45 Id.
44 Id. at 499 n.5, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883 n.5. Both entities are labor organizations in an
industry affecting commerce. Id.
45 See id. at 499, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883.






 112 S. Ct. at 499, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
52 Id,
" Id.
54 Id. at 499, 500, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883-84.
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between unions.55 The Court consequently reaffirmed that these
individuals have standing to sue. 56
The Court also reasoned that the preclusion of suits initiated
by union members would create discrepancies in the application of
labor laws. 57 For example, the Court noted that Local 71 and the
IBEW could bring a constitutional dispute to federal court." If a
dispute arising out of the same contract, however, had to be remit-
ted to state court and to state law merely because it was not initiated
by Local 71 or the IBEW, then it might be interpreted differently
based solely upon the identities of the parties. 59 The Court con-
cluded that this kind of inconsistency would be the type of disrup-
tive influence on the collective bargaining process that Congress
specifically sought to avoid.°
In one sense, Wooddell v. IBEW merely promotes liberal inter-
pretations of § 301(a). The decision represents a simple combination
of the Smith and Journeymen holdings. Smith gave individual workers
the right to sue under § 301(a); 61 in Journeymen, the Court recog-
nized union constitutions as contracts within the meaning of
§ 301(a). 62 Applying these holdings simultaneously to a fact situation
involving a union member bringing suit under a union constitution
is merely logical. This logic, however, was not adopted by the Sixth
Circuit as evidenced by its holding in Woodde11. 63 The Sixth Circuit
was not persuaded by either the Supreme Court's prior interpre-
tations of § 301(a), 64 or indeed, the weight of contrary decisions in
other jurisdictions. 65 By rejecting this strictly literal approach, the
Supreme Court appears to encourage a liberal interpretation of
§ 301(a) and invites the lower courts to read this statute more
broadly.
" Id. at 499, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2883.
56




50 Id. The Court also rejected the argument that its ruling would significantly burden
the federal courts. Id. The Court noted that the federal courts that extended the application
of § 301(a) did not experience overcrowding. Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that even if
such overcrowding occurred, its interpretation of the statute would not necessarily be altered.
Id.
61 Smith, 371 U.S. at 200-01, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
"Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 627, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2719-20.
"See Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 497 n.2, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2882 n.2.
84 Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 627, 107 L.R.R.M, at 2719-20; Smith, 371 U.S. at 200-01, 51
L.R.R.M. at 2649.
65 See supra note 22 and cases cited therein.
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Consequently, the decision has important implications for the
future course of labor negotiations. The ability of union members
to bring suits under § 301(a) provides them with a certain leverage
and bargaining strength that they did not previously enjoy. The
decision empowers individual workers by giving them a role sepa-
rate from their representative unions, and consequently, this in-
crease in worker autonomy will significantly alter the traditional
union-management dialogue.
The decision also promotes greater uniformity of federal labor
law. By permitting § 301(a) to govern disputes between members
and their unions, individual workers are assured consistent results
even if they elect to bring their claim to a state court. Because
§ 301(a) is substantive and not merely procedural, 66 state courts are
compelled to yield to federal interpretations of this law. If § 301(a)
did not control, a wide variety of state interpretations would result.
Extending the reach of § 301(a) forces union accountability not
only to management, but also to constituent union members. This
additional accountability may require a more straightforward and
honest approach from labor unions in their negotiations with other
labor organizations and management. To the extent that more
forthright negotiations decrease litigation and internal union strife,
the decision advances Congress's stated policy of promoting greater
labor stability.67
Conversely, the decision also has the potential to disrupt labor
stability. Unions are organized specifically to meet the needs of their
members. The strength and power of a union rests almost entirely
upon its ability to serve as the collective voice of workers. By allow-
ing individual workers to further circumvent this established union
role, this decision potentially undermines the effectiveness of
unions. Organized unions have played an integral role in labor
relations for almost six decades. 68 This decision may undercut their
position by allowing workers to, in effect, represent themselves. In
this way, this decision might have a destabilizing effect on the cur-
rent relationship between labor organizations and their members.
In conclusion, Wooddell v. IBEW establishes that federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over claims asserted by individual
union members regarding a violation of an intra-union constitu-
66 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456, 40 L.R.R.M. at 2116.
67 See, e.g,,Journernen, 452 U.S. at 624, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2718.
co The first national labor legislation of real significance was enacted in 1935 with the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act. MORRIS, supra note 2, at 27.
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tion. 69
 This outcome is entirely consistent with the Court's earlier
decisions in Smith and Journeymen. The decision promotes labor
stability by ensuring that individual workers have some voice in the
labor process, and it promotes uniformity of labor law by guaran-
teeing that federal law will control. After Wooddell, § 301(a) of the
LMRA recognizes an individual union member's claim to bring suit
against his or her union regarding a violation of the union consti-
tution."
B. *Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act Does Not
Cover Extraterritorial Disputes: Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v.
Pico Products, Inc.'
Section 30I(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Har-
tley) Act ("LMRA") 2
 effectively places all labor relations disputes
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and federal labor law.s
The LMRA seeks to promote industrial peace and security by en-
suring the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements
("CBAs") in federal courts under a uniform and predictable na-
tional labor policy. 4 In delineating § 301(a)'s appropriate scope, the
courts primarily focus on the nature of the contract and its relation
to preventing labor strife in the United States.' Thus, the United
64 Wooddell, 112 S. Ct. at 501, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2884.
7D Id.
* By John T. Haggerty, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 968 F.2d 191, 140 L.R.R.M. 2697 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 493, 141
L.R.R.M. 2784 (Nov. 16, 1992).
2
 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)
states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. 185(a).
3 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102, 49 L.R.R.M. 2717, 2720
(1962) (federal labor law preempts incompatible local law doctrines); LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic
Transp. Co., 865 F.2d 119, 120, 130 L.R.R.M. 2301, 2302 (7th Cir. 1988) (§ 301(a) occupies
entire field of disputes over CBAs); cf. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
507, 49 L.R.R.M. 2619, 2621 (1962) (state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over § 301(a) matters).
4 Dowd Box, 368 U.S. at 509, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2621; Painting and Decorators Contractors
Ass'n v. Painters and Decorators Joint Comm., 717 F.2d 1293, 1295, 114 L.R.R.M. 2984,
2986 (9th Cir. 1983); District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n—Assoc. Maritime Officers v.
Grand Bassa Tankers, 663 F.2d 392, 396, 108 L.R.R.M. 2873, 2875 (2d Cir. 1981).
' See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 118 L.R.R.M. 3345, 3352-53
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States Supreme Court has declined to extend the LMRA to disputes
with little connection to domestic labor relations.6
In 1957, in Benz v. Companiera Naviera Hidalgo S.A., the Su-
preme Court upheld a lower court ruling that Congress did not
intend the LMRA to cover labor disputes between foreigners even
though the conflict erupted in U.S. territory.? While temporarily
docked in Portland, Oregon, foreign seamen went on strike seeking
more favorable working conditions from their employer, a foreign
ship.8
 Emphasizing the dispute's tenuous connection to the United
States,9
 the Court noted that nothing in the Act itself, or in its
legislative history, indicated a congressional intent to include con-
tractual relations established under foreign laws within the purview
of the LMRA.'° To the contrary, the Court determined that con-
cerns over industrial strife in American labor relations apparently
occupied the entire legislative history of the LMRA." According to
the Court, policy decisions such as this one, with ramifications on
the "delicate field of international relations," more properly be-
longed with Congress.' 2
 Thus, the Court concluded that the judi-
(1985) (state tort law claim, which would require construction of certain provisions in CBA,
must be adjudicated under federal law via 301(a) because otherwise the resulting varying
interpretations would subvert the congressional goal of unified body of labor-contract law);
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local Unions Nos. 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S.
17, 28, 49 L.R.R.M. 2670, 2674 (1962) (strike settlement agreement between employer and
labor union resolving controversy arising from employment relationship was aimed at pro-
moting peace between the parties similar to more traditional CBAs and thus qualified as
"contract" within meaning of § 301(a)); cf. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399, 407, 128 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2524, 46 FEP Cases 1553, 1556 (1988) (state tort remedy not
preempted by § 301(a) because does not require construing CBA and thus poses no threat
to uniformity in interpreting labor relations).
6 See Benz v. Companiera Naviera Hidalgo S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 138-39, 39 L.R.R.M.
2636, 2636 (1957) (LMRA not fashioned to resolve labor disputes between foreign nationals
operating ships under foreign law); cf. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416, v.
Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 199-200, 73 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2626-27 (1970), on remand,
233 So. 2d 650, 74 L.R.R.M. 2559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. 151 (1973), applied to American residents hired to work on American docks).
353 U.S. at 138-39, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2636.
8 Id. at 139, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2636.
9 See id. at 142, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2638.
,0 Id. at 142, 143-44, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2638.
" See id. at 143-44, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2638.
12 Benz, 353 U.S. at 147, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2639-40. The Benz Court had previously noted
the "storm of diplomatic protest," from Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Germany and Canada, that greeted Congress's attempt to extend coverage of
the Seaman's Act to foreign vessels in foreign ports following its earlier decision in Jackson
v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928), not to do so judicially. Benz, 353 U.S. at 145-46,
39 L.R.R.M. at 2639.
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ciary should avoid encroaching on another country's national sov-
ereignty without a clear mandate from Congress."
The issue of extraterritorial application has arisen more often
in disputes involving U.S. labor laws other than § 301(a) of the
LMRA." For example, in 1949 in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, the
United States Supreme Court held that a law requiring that con-
tracts entered into by the United States must compensate employees
at time and a half for work in excess of eight hours per day did not
apply in territories over which Congress had no legislative 'control."
In Foley, the defendant, an American company, contracted with the
U.S. government to build public works in the Middle East." The
plaintiff, an American citizen hired as cook, sued the company
seeking additional compensation for hours worked in excess of eight
per day." The Foley court reasoned that, without a clearly expressed
legislative intent, U.S. labor law applied solely within U.S. territory."
According to the Court, the legislative history of the eight hour law
concerned only domestic labor conditions.' 9 The Supreme Court
concluded, therefore, that the eight hour law only applied where
the labor conditions of employees are probable concerns of Con-
gress. 20
During the Survey year, in Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico
Products, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that § 301(a) does not extend the LMRA's effect outside
13 See id, at 147, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2639-40,
14 See,	 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, I11 S. Ct. 1227, 1229, 55 FEP Cases 449,
449 (1991) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. H 2000a-2000h-6 (1988),
does not apply to dispute between American company and American employee working in
Saudi Arabia); Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Intl Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407,
414, 92 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1976) (employee's predominant job situs triggers operation of
§ 14(b) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 13, 52 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2427 (1963) (NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 151 does not extend to maritime operations of foreign flag ships employing alien
seamen); New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisolm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925) (Federal Employer's
Liability Act of 1908 c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 as amended 1910 C. 143, 36 Stat. 291 presumed to be
effective domestically); Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, 932 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 1991) (Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1978), does not apply to Filipino sailors on Kuwaiti
oil tankers temporarily reflagged under United States flag).
" 336 U.S. 281, 290 (1949) (interpreting eight hour law, 40 U.S.C. H 324, 325a, repealed
by 40 U.S.C. §§ 328-30 (1982)).
16 1d. at 281, 283.
17 Id. at 283.
is
	 at 285.
19 See id. at 286, 287.
"Foley, 353 U.S. at 286. In doing so, the Court relied on the lack of a distinction between
alien and American employees in the statutory scheme. Id.
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the territorial boundaries of the United States absent a clear ex-
pression of intent by Congress." The appellant, a South Korean
labor union (the "Union"), sued the parent company of its employer
for breaching their CBA by causing the shutdown of the Korean
operation.22 The court reasoned that Congress did not make "un-
mistakably clear" that it intended the LMRA to cover such foreign
disputes.23 Thus, the Court concluded that the action could not be
brought under U.S. labor law. 24
In 1985, Pico Macom, Inc. ("Macom"), the wholly owned sub-
sidiary of the appellee, Pico Products, Inc. ("Pico Products"), incor-
porated Pico Korea, Ltd. ("Pico Korea"), for the purpose of making
electronic components in South Korea. 25 The employees of Pico
Korea organized the Union and subsequently succeeded in obtain-
ing a CBA with Pico Korea. 26 Shortly thereafter, Pico Products
ceased providing working capital to Pico Korea thereby effectively
forcing the South Korean subsidiary•to close. 27
The appellant union then sued Pico Products in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, claim-
ing that the appellant's role in the demise of Pico Korea amounted
to a breach of contract, or, alternatively, tortious interference with
an advantageous contractual relationship." The district court re-
jected the appellant's initial attempt to have the dispute adjudicated
under federal labor law via § 301(a). 29 The district court concluded
that Congress intended § 30I (a) to apply solely to domestic work-
ers. 3°
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court decision that U.S. federal labor law
did not govern the dispute between the Union and Pico Korea."
21
 968 F.2d at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
22 Id. at 192-93, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2697-98.
23 Id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
" Id. at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
23 Id, at 192, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2697.
28 Pico, 968 F.2d at 192, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2697-98. All of the Union's members were
"citizens and domiciliaries of South Korea." Id. at 192, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2697.
27 Id. at 193, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2698.
28 Id. at 193, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2698. The lower court opinion is unpublished.
29 Id.
'° Id. Proceeding under New York state law, the district court held that the appellee
possessed insufficient control over Pico Korea to be liable for its role in the subsidiary's
demise. Id. The court found that the appellee was fully aware of the valid contract between
the plaintiff and Pico Korea and of the effect of its actions on the CBA. Id. The court
emphasized that the appellee acted on reasonable business grounds and not maliciously. Id.
31 Pico, 968 F.2d at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
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Conceding that Congress possessed the power to broaden the scope
of § 301(a) to include extraterritorial disputes, 32 the court reasoned
that such a motive was not made unmistakably clear." The court
concluded that the disputed CBA was not the type of contract
Congress intended to cover by enacting § 301(a). 34
The Second Circuit dismissed both of the appellant's arguments
regarding statutory intent as misplaced." The appellant first con-
tended that the statutory phrase, "without regard to the citizenship
of the parties,"" allowed the Union to sue under § 301(a) despite
its South Korean citizenship." According to the court, however, the
issue was not standing to sue, but whether contracts of this nature
fell within the province of § 301(a). 38 The appellant next argued
that § 301(a) applied because the parties qualified as working in an
industry "affecting commerce."" Although the court assumed that
the parties satisfied the affecting commerce standard, the court
explained that the argument still failed to address whether Congress
intended to extend § 301(a) to cover disputes outside U.S. borders. 4°
Consequently, the court determined that the statute did not indicate
that Congress intended § 301(a) to cover CBAs outside U.S. terri-
tory.'" Such an intent, the court reasoned, must be made unmistak-
ably clear in order to be effective. 42
52 Id. at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699. See Arabian American, 111 S. Ct. at 1230, 55 FEP
Cases at 450.
"Pico, 968 F.2d at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700. The court noted that the plaintiff bore
the burden of overcoming the general presumption that acts of Congress only operate within
territories subject to U.S. control, absent a clear indication of contrary intent. Id, at 194, 140
L.R.R.M. at 2698.
51 1d. at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700,
" Id. at 194, 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700.
" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
"Pico, 968 F.2d at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2698-99.
38 Id. at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699. The court concluded that the statute's language
simply established federal question jurisdiction for labor contracts already within the scope
of 1 301(a). Id.
39 Id. For purposes of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1973) defines commerce as:
. .. trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the
United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country
and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of
Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through
any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign
country.
29 U.S.C. 1 152(6).
4 ° Pico, 968 F.2d at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
't Id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
44 Id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286
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Next, the court noted that Supreme Court precedents bolstered
the view that Congress did not intend § 301(a) to apply extraterri-
torially." Specifically, the Pico court pointed out that the Supreme
Court, in Benz v. Companiera Naviera Hidalgo S.A., elected not to
apply the LMRA to the foreign seamen's dispute with their foreign
ship because of the conflict's small connection to U.S. labor condi-
tions." Similarly, the Pico court cited the Foley court's refusal to
apply the eight hour law extraterritorially based on the presumption
that labor conditions in foreign countries did not concern Con-
gress." Thus, the court determined that § 301(a) should not govern
the Pico dispute because of its comparable degree of estrangement
from U.S. labor conditions."
Finally, the court applied the policies underpinning the Su-
preme Court precedents to the present controversy. 47 Viewing the
conflict as essentially a South Korean dispute,'" the court reasoned
that the mere fact that the employer was the subsidiary of an Amer-
ican company could not, by itself, place the disagreement within
the probable concern of Congress." Likewise, the fact that the
employees might have affected commerce within the United States
did not sufficiently link the dispute to congressional concerns for
domestic labor strife, especially when placed in the context of the
present global economy." Furthermore, the court reasoned that
expanding § 301(a)'s scope to cover the Pico conflict would likely
create problems in the foreign policy arena. 5 ' The court cited con-
cerns for "inevitable embarrassment" and the practicability of en-
forcing federal labor law outside U.S. borders as reasons to rein in
(1952) (Congress clearly intended Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988) patent in-
fringement statute to apply to U.S. citizens abroad). In fact, Congress has amended 42 U.S.C.
2000e to legislatively overturn the Court's ruling in Arabian American. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991, § 109(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1992) (added sentence providing, "With respect
to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States."). See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1304, 57 FEP Cases
1445, 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (§ 109 of Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturns Arabian American).
"Pico, 968 F.2d at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
44 1d. at 194-95, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699. See supra notes 7, 9-13 and accompanying text.
" 968 F.2d at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699. See supra notes 15, 18-20 and accompanying
text. The Pico court noted that § 30I(a), like the eight hour law, drew no distinction between
alien and citizen labor. Id. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
46 See Pico, 968 F.2d at 194, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
" See ed. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700.
18 See id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
49 Id.
511 See id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700.
51 Pico, 968 F.2d at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700. The court stressed that the lawfulness of
an act should be determined under the law of the country in which it occurred. Id.
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§ 301(a).52 Thus, the court concluded that § 301(a) did not cover
the CBA between the foreign union and its foreign employer. 53
Although apparently a novel issue," the Pico court's decision
not to apply § 301(a) extraterritorially stands on strong foundational .
grounds and is unlikely to be overturned." The Pico holding con-
forms to previous judicial decisions, even to those outside labor law,
that confine congressional acts to U.S. territory absent a clear ex-
pression of contrary intent. 56 Moreover, the practical difficulties of
enforcing U.S. law on foreign soil, combined with the potential
foreign relations consequences from encroaching on another na-
tion's sovereignty, reinforce the wisdom of limiting § 301(a) to U.S.
territory without a congressional finding of special circumstances."
Conversely, the United States courts could apply § 301(a) to
govern conduct outside its borders that has substantial effects within
the United States. 58 Already the effects of the increasingly global
economy have rippled through the U.S. labor market." An outcry
might be heard for U.S. labor law to be imposed as a stabilizing
force.
52 See id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
53 Id. at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
5.4 Id. at 193, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2698.
55 See, e.g., Arabian American, 111 S. Ct. at 1230, 55 FEP Cases at 450; Benz, 353 U.S. at
147, 39 L.R.R.M. at 2639-40; Foley, 336 U.S. at 285.
56 See, e.g., Arabian American, 111  S. Ct. at 1231, 55 FEP Cases at 450 (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988)); Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping,
932 F.2d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 1991) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1978)). For
cases outside of labor law, see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d
487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (7 U.S.C. § 15 (1980) does not empower Commission to serve
subpoenas on foreign nationals in foreign countries); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996,
1004-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988), inappli-
cable beyond that territory which Congress clearly intended to cover).
33 See FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Cobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (enforcing rule without proper jurisdiction violates international law and gives
rise to claim by affected state); Nahas, 738 F.2d at 494 (Brazil formally protested service of
process as significant intrusion on Brazilian sovereignty); Frank J. Prial, U.N. Votes to Urge
U.S. to Dismantle Embargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at A 1 (American allies in
United Nations voted against United States to signal anger at new American law that extends
U.S. jurisdiction beyond boundaries of United States to cover foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies).
Conapagnie De Saint-Gobain, 636 F.2d at 1316.
" See Thomas J. Lueck, Trade Pact with Mexico Expected to Have Mixed Impact on Employers,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1992, at 135 (New York garment industry declined as companies moved
to other nations); Peter T. Kilburn, WORKING NIGHTS: A Special Report; Lives Upside Down
to Help a World Go Round, N.Y. Timm, May 16, 1992, at Al (growth in shift work, part-time
and temporary jobs, result of labor force that has to accommodate round-the-clock global
economy); Jonathan P. Hicks, Few Strikers Return to Their Jobs as Caterpillar's Deadline Passes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at A 1 (pattern bargaining is outdated concept that makes no sense
in global economy).
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Extending the reach of U.S. labor law, however, would not solve
the problems that emerge as economic actors find themselves, more
and more, performing on an international stage. The rapidly ex-
panding flow of the "factors of production" between countries,
effectively renders national borders moot for economic purposes. 6°
In seeking to establish a single continental market, the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") 6' creates the potential for
labor conflicts that transcend national boundaries. 62 While the psy-
chological barriers that separate workers in different countries may
diminish, disparate treatment will persist due to the differences
between bodies of governing labor law. 65 At the very least, workers
will find it easier to compare labor conditions, thus planting the
seeds of dissatisfaction." Likewise, the lingering framework of dis-
crete legal systems over labor relations will frustrate corporations,
who increasingly are shedding national allegiances and assuming
multinational characteristics. 65
The reasons for enacting § 301(a) anticipate problems likely to
arise from the tension between these discrete national systems of
labor relations coexisting and a continent-wide economy. Congress
enacted the LMRA to minimize disruption of national commerce
resulting from the evolution of a patchwork of inconsistent state
rules governing labor relations. 66 Most likely, pressure will mount
from both employers and employees to establish uniformity and
predictability in industrial relations across the continent and possi-
bly the globe. Even against the backdrop of a continent-wide econ-
omy, however, the reasons underpinning the Pico court's concern
6° See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 8 (1991).
Gi Keith Bradsher, President and Congress Square Off on the North American Trade Accord,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at A1. Announced on August 12, 1992, the agreement "would
eventually eliminate customs duties and most other restrictions on the sale of goods and
services across ... borders." Id. The leaders of the three nations signed NAFTA on October
7, 1992. Gerald F. Seib, North American Leaders Initial Free-Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8,
1992, at A2.
62 See Dennis Farney, Even U.S. Politics Are Being Reshaped by a Global Economy, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 1992, at Al, Al2.
" See Farney, supra note 62, at Al2 (global market undermining nation-state as socially
integrating force).
64 See Henry Kamm, Glasnost Debate Divides East Germany's Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1989, at A6 (80-90% of East German population influenced by Western television).
65 REICH, supra note 60, at 8, 110.
" See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2721 (1962) (uniformity necessary
to eliminate "disruptive influence" of two systems of law governing CBAs); Retail Clerks, 369
U.S. at 27, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2674 (minimize disruption of interstate commerce by ending
inconsistencies between jurisdictions).
March 1993]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 359
for political borders cannot be dispelled so easily. Hence, the likely
solution to unpredictable and inconsistent labor laws will probably
be hammered out among nations through more traditional inter-
national law mechanisms rather than the expansion of U.S. labor
law beyond areas of predominant U.S. concern.
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held, in Labor Union of Pico
Korea v. Pico Products, Ltd., that, lacking any clear expression of
congressional intent, § 301(a) of the LMRA did not extend federal
labor law over the CBA dispute between the Union and Pico Prod-
ucts.67 Emphasizing its "essentially foreign" nature, the court deter-
mined that the dispute's tenuous connection to U.S. labor conditions
placed it outside the intended parameters of § 301(a). 68 In its rea-
soning, the court relied on analogous precedents and a general
policy presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 69
Thus, the Pico decision confined the scope of § 301(a) of the LMRA,
and federal labor law, to primarily domestic labor disputes."
III. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
A. *Demanding Rationality in NLRB Deference to Pre-Arbitration
Settlements: Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 520 v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), passed by Con-
gress in 1935, encourages the voluntary settlement of labor disputes
by private parties. 2 The intent of Congress was to promote the
integrity of the collective bargaining process through private dis-
pute resolutions such as pre-arbitration settlements. 3 The authority
of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") to
choose to defer to such private dispute resolutions furthers this
goal.4
22 See Pico, 968 F.2d at 195-96, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2679.
" See id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
59 Id. at 194-95, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2699-700.
1° See id. at 195, 140 L.R.R.M. at 2700.
* By Rosemary H. Ratchff, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE Lux REVIEW.
1 955 F.2d 744, 139 L.R.R.M. 2457 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2 See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 704, 112 L.R.R.M. 3265, 3269
(1983); Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547, 118 L.R.R.M. 1202, 1203, (1985), pee.
denied sub nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 124 L.R.R.M. 2762 (9th Cir. 1987); Spielburg
Mfg. Co. and Harold Gruenberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955).
3 Spielburg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
4 See Local 520, 955 F.2d at 745, 139 L.R.R.M at 2458; Spielburg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082,
36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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In the 1955 case of Spielburg Manufacturing Co. and Harold
Gruenberg, the NLRB established that the Board is not bound by
arbitration awards made under a collective bargaining contract. 5
Furthermore, the Board held in Spielburg that the NLRB can ex-
ercise jurisdiction in unfair labor practice cases if the Board decides
that interference in the private dispute resolution process is neces-
sary to protect public rights under the NLRA.G In Spielburg, the
NLRB delineated the criteria for when it is appropriate to defer to
an arbitration award, and dismiss a concomitant statutory claim,
such as an unfair labor practice claim.' Under the Spielburg stan-
dard, deferral is appropriate if (1) the arbitration proceedings ap-
pear to have been fair and regular; (2) all parties agreed to be
bound; and (3) the decision reached was not "clearly repugnant" to
the purposes and policies of the NLRA. 8
The Board later revised this doctrine in Olin Corp. and Local 8-
77, refining the third criterion, which prohibits a result clearly
repugnant to the NLRA, and adding a fourth criterion. 9 In revising
the third criterion, the Board stated that it would find an arbitrator's
decision was clearly repugnant to the NLRA if it was "palpably
wrong." 11 ° A decision is palpably wrong if no interpretation of the
decision would be consistent with the NLRA." In Olin, the Board
established a fourth criterion that, in order for deference to be
valid, the arbitrator must have considered the claim brought under
the NLRA," This criterion is satisfied when the contractual and
statutory issues are factually parallel, and the decisionmaker is gen-
erally aware of the relevant facts."
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded Darr v. NLRB, in which the Board had de-
ferred to a grievance award providing reinstatement without back
5 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
" Id. at 1081-82, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153 (citing NLRB v. Walt Disney Prod., 146 F.2d 44,
48, 15 L.R.R.M. 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1944), cm. denied, 324 U.S. 877, 16 L.R.R.M. 918 (1945)).
7 Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
0 Id.
9 Olin Corp. and Local 8-77, Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 268 N.L.R.B.
573, 574, 115 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1058 (1984). In Olin, the Board also revised its deferral doctrine





15 See id.; United States Postal Serv. and McCullough, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 7
(Sept. 28, 1990).
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pay, even though the Board would have awarded make-whole relief
including back pay upon the same facts." The court stated that
judicial review required the Board to articulate not only its general
theory of deference, but also how it was applied in a particular
case. 15 In Darr, the court held that the Board had failed to explain
its theoretical basis for deferring under the third criterion that the
decision not be clearly repugnant to the NLRA, when the Board
itself would have ordered a substantially different award under the
NLRA. 16 In a 1990 case, United States Postal Service and McCullough,
the Board clarified its approach, stating that it does not require
make-whole relief in settlement agreements.' 7
In the 1987 case of Alpha Beta Co., the Spielburg101in doctrine
was expanded by the NLRB to apply to pre-arbitration grievance
settlements.' 8 In Alpha Beta, the Board also established a "conces-
sions test" for the third criterion, holding that a pre-arbitration
settlement is not palpably wrong, provided both parties have made
concessions during the pre-arbitration process. t9 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
that it would reverse the Board's decision to defer only if the Board
had abused its discretion in developing and applying its standards
for deferra1. 2°
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia considered whether the NLRB may defer
to a pre-arbitration grievance settlement reached by an employer
and a union that disposed of a contract dispute between the em-
ployee and employer. 2 ' In Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No.
' 4 801 F.2d 1404, 1405, 1407, 123 L.R.R.M. 2548, 2548, 2550 (D.C. Cir. 1986), amended,
123 L.R.R.M. 3051.
15 1d. at 1409, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2552.
16 1d. at 1407, 1408, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2550, 2551.
17 300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 7.
18 Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1203. "[T]he deferral principles
apply equally to settlements arising from the parties' contractual grievance/arbitration pro-
cedures because they further the national labor policy which favors private resolutions of
labor disputes [citation omitted]." Id,
19 Id. at 1547, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1204. The Board, however, has accepted the position that
employee consent is not necessary for deferral to settlement agreements (as opposed to
awards), provided the employee's designated bargaining representative consented. Upon
such appointment, a union may bind an employee to a settlement and waive his or her
statutory rights. See McCullough, 300 N.L.R.B. slip op. at 5-6 & n.10 (Board deferred to
grievance settlement entered into by union and employer over employee's objection); Mahon
v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1345, 124 L.R.R.M. 2762, 2765 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
"Mahon, 808 F.2d at 1346, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2765.
Local 520, 955 F.2d at 745, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2458.
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520 v. NLRB, the court held that the Board's policy of deference
constituted a permissible construction of the NLRA, and that the
Board did not abuse its discretion by deferring to a pre-arbitration
settlement, even though the grievant objected to the final result. 22
The court, nonetheless, rebuked the Board for failing to present a
coherent theory for the clearly repugnant criterion in its deference
policy." While the D.C. Circuit did not remand the case because it
found that the four criteria validating deference were met, the court
threatened to remand future cases if the NLRB failed to develop a
theoretical underpinning for its current deferral poi icy. 24
In Local 520, UE&C-Catalytic, Inc. ("Catalytic") fired Garland
Berry, a union steward of the petitioner, Plumbers and Pipefitters
Local Union No. 520 ("Local 520"), for gross insubordination in
connection with a threatened work stoppage." Catalytic had been
hired by the Philadelphia Electric Company ("PECO") to remove
the large shock absorbers, called "snubbers," at a nuclear power
facility. 26
 The work was to be performed by Catalytic's pipefitters,
who were members of Local 520. 27
 Because of PECO's past dissat-
isfaction with Catalytic's pipefitters, PECO awarded the contract for
the repair of the snubbers to another contractor.28
 Local 520 ob-
jected to PECO's decision not to award the full removal and repair
contract to Catalytic. 29
Catalytic management informed Berry, Local 520's union stew-
ard, that he and the seven other pipefitters assigned to the snubber
removal job were to split the work shifts, with four working the
usual day shift and four working the second shift." Local 520's
business manager advised Berry to tell the seven other pipefitters
that Local 520 objected." Berry told the other pipefitters to report
only for the usual day shift." When one of the workers asked Berry
if he should ignore the foreman's instructions, Berry stated that the
union's instruction should be obeyed."
"Id. at 746, 753, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2458, 2462.
" See id. at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
24 Id. at 757,-139 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
23 Id. at 745-46, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2458.





31 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 747, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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Upon learning of Berry's actions, the Labor Relations Manager
for Catalytic contacted Local 520's international union, the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada ("United
Association"). 34 Based on Catalytic's promise to hold a meeting to
discuss the dispute over the snubber repair job, the United Asso-
ciation representative agreed to staff both shifts." The affected
pipefitters were notified, they reported for work as directed, and
thus no work stoppage occurred." The meeting regarding the snub-
ber dispute was held, but the discussion focused on Berry, who was
accused of threatening a welding inspector and of being a troub-
lemaker." Although it was proved that Berry did not threaten the
inspector, Catalytic fired him for gross insubordination based on
his instruction to the pipefitters to ignore management's directions
regarding the split shifts."
Local 520 filed both an unfair labor practice claim as well as a
grievance under its collective bargaining agreement with Catalytic,
the General President's Project Management Agreement
("GPPMA")." The GPPMA provided for a four-step settlement
process for disputes arising under the contract. 4° Step one consisted
of a meeting between the employee and the supervisor.'" If no
resolution was reached at step one, step two consisted of a meeting
between a local union representative, an international union rep-
resentative and the employer's labor relations manager. 42 At step
three, the employer and international union representatives could
present oral and written testimony to a grievance board consisting
of international union representatives. 45 If the parties and the board
did not reach an agreement, either the employer or the interna-
tional union could invoke step four: binding arbitration.'"
" Id.
as Id.
'el Local 520, 955 F.2d at 747, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459.
37 Id., 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459-60.
" Id.
"Id. at 747-48, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2460. The GPPMA is negotiated on a nationwide basis
and contains a no-strike provision prohibiting work stoppages by the covered unions and
employees. Id. at 746-47, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459. It also contains a management rights clause
that authorizes management to discharge or discipline employees for proper cause. Id. at
747, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459.
40 Id. at 748, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2460.
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After reaching no resolution at steps one and two, United
Association invoked step three. 45 A board of international union
representatives reviewed the grievance. 46 Berry and Local 520 rep-
resentatives were not present, but a United Association represen-
tative, who had records of the prior meetings, presented oral and
written statements of the union's position. 47 The grievance board's
position was that Berry should be rehired without back pay. 48 United
Association and Catalytic management accepted this conclusion,
making the decision final under the contract.49
Local 520 objected to the decision, believing Berry should be
reinstated, as opposed to rehired, and should receive back pay. 50
Local 520 requested that United Association invoke step four, but
United Association refused."
More than a year after the grievance decision, a hearing was
held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on the unfair
labor practice claim. 52 The ALJ declined to defer to the result of
the grievance board on the grounds that Berry and Local 520
objected to the decision. 53 The ALJ found that Berry should be
reinstated with back pay. 54 The NLRB subsequently reversed the
ALJ, stating that deferral was appropriate, and the local union
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 55
In an opinion written by Judge Edwards, the court's discussion
of the validity of the Board's decision was divided into three parts. 56
First, the court discussed whether the policy of deference is a per-
missible construction of the NLRA. 57 Second, the court discussed
whether the Board had abused its discretion in deferring in this
case. 58 Finally, the court discussed how the Board's current policy
lacks a theoretical basis. 59
45 1d.
46 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 748, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2460.
4' Id.
48 Id. at 749, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2460.
"Id., 139 L.R.R.M. at 2461.
5g Id.; Catalytic, Inc. and Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520, 301 N.L.R.B. No.
44, slip op. at 6 (fan. 28, 1991).




55 Id. at 749-50, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2461-62.
" Local 520, 955 F.2d at 750-57, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2462-67.
57 Id. at 750-52, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2462-64.
"Id. at 752-55, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2464-66.
59 Id. at 755-57, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466-67. The court noted that the following issues,
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Judge Edwards determined that the Board's policy of deference
to grievance settlements was plainly consistent with the NLRA. 61)
Noting that an employee's statutory right is waived by agreement
to a grievance process under a collective bargaining contract, the
court found no facts to indicate that deference to grievance settle-
ments was invalid under the NLRA.61 The court stated that such
deference effects a primary goal of the national labor policy by
promoting the integrity of the collective bargaining process. 62
The court further explained that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in deferring in this case because the four deference cri-
teria were satisfied. 63 Under the first criterion, Local 520 contended
that the process was not fair and regular because Berry was not
permitted to be present and the decision-making body issued no
written decision. 64 The court disagreed, reasoning that fairness re-
quired only the presence of the parties to the original contract, as
they bore the obligation of carrying out the grievance process and,
further, that the United Association representative was fully ap-
prised of Berry's position. 65 The court also concluded that the lack
of a written opinion by the decision-making body was not disposi-
tive.66
The court dismissed Local 520's contention that the second
criterion was not met, and held that all parties had agreed to be
bound by the settlement agreement. 67 The court concluded that
central to some cases, were not in dispute; Berry's termination was an issue covered by the
collective bargaining contract, and his right to engage in a strike or work stoppage was
waivable under the contract or through grievance procedures. Id. at 750-51, 139 L.R.R.M.
at 2462. The court stated that rights can be appropriately waived through the grievance
process because such procedures form "an integral part of the collective bargaining process."
Id. at 751 n.6, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2463 n.6.
60 1d. at 752, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2463.
61 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 752, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2463. Although Berry's right to engage
in work stoppage was within the class of "waivable" rights, the court discussed the waivability
doctrine, clarifying the appropriateness of waiver by contract. See id. at 751, 139 L.R.R.M.
at 2462-63 (citing Metropolitan, 960 U.S. at 705-07, 112 L.R.R.M. at 3270-71; American
Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 832, 119 L.R.R.M. 3513, 3515-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
" Id. at 752, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2463-64.
63 Id. at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
a4 Id. at 753, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2464.
65 Id.
66 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 753, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2464 (citing United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598, 46 L.R.R.M. 2423, 2425 (1960) (arbi-
trator not obligated to give reasons for award); Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1020, 102
L.R.R.M. 2082, 2086 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (deference appropriate despite fact that decision not
set out in detailed written form)).
67 Id. at 753-54, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2464-65.
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United Association was empowered to bind Berry under the collec-
tive bargaining contract. 68 The contract designated the international
union as the bargaining representative and signatory to the con-
tract.°
The court also found that the settlement result, directing Cata-
lytic to rehire Berry without back pay, was not repugnant to the
NLRA. 7° Local 520 argued most strenuously that this third criterion
had not been met, on the basis that Berry was not made whole by
the final settlement and that the agreement was therefore palpably
wrong. 7 ' The court disagreed, however, and concluded that the
decision was not clearly repugnant to the NLRA under the palpably
wrong test because Berry's statutory right to encourage a work
stoppage was waived under the collective bargaining contract's no-
strike and termination for proper cause provisions. 72 The court
reasoned that Berry and Local 520 retained no separate statutory
claim for an unfair labor practice because the statutory right was
"merged" into the contract provisions." In support of its conclusion,
the court stated that it would be a fallacy to find a separate statutory
issue when the matter was covered by the collective bargaining
contract. 74 Furthermore, the court reasoned that less than make-
whole relief had been granted in previous Board decisions."
Finally, the court found that the fourth criterion, requiring that
the parties to the grievance process fully consider the statutory issue,
was satisfied. 76 Local 520 argued that the contractual claim and the
statutory claim were separate issues, and that United Association
had specifically disclaimed any interest in resolving the statutory
issue. 77
 Local 520 contended that this lack of interest had prevented
the parties from fully considering the unfair labor practice issue. 78
Initially reasoning that this point was moot because Berry had
" Id. (citing Metropolitan, 460 U.S. at 705-07, 112 L.R.R.M. at 3270-71; Mahon, 808 F.2d
at 1345, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2765; Energy Coop. and Julius Sako, 290 N.L.R.B. 635, 637, 129
L.R.R.M. 1256, 1258 (1988)).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 754, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2965.
7 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 754, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2465.
72 Id.
7' Id.
7" Id. (quoting American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 832, 114 L.R.R.M.
3513, 1315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
7' Id. (citing Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1203; McCullough, 300
N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 4, 7).
76 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2465.
77 1d. at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
78 See id.
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waived his statutory right, the court addressed whether the statutory
claim had been adequately "considered" by the grievance board, 79
The court found that the "considered" test was satisfied because
(1) the contractual and statutory issues were factually parallel, and .
(2) all parties were generally aware of the facts relevant to resolving
the unfair labor practice issue because Berry's defense to each was
the same." The court rejected as "simply wrong" Local 520's con-
tention that United Association had disclaimed interest in resolving
the statutory issue." The court relied on the record, which indicated
that the international union had pursued the issue to the third step
of the grievance process. 82
The final part of the court's discussion criticized the Board for
failing to provide a coherent theory for deferral in this case."
Noting that this case did not require remand because the facts
satisfied the Spielburg101in test as developed in prior cases, the court
expressed particular concern regarding the third criterion, which
required that a decision not be clearly repugnant to the NLRA. 84
In deciding whether the result of the grievance process was clearly
repugnant to the NLRA, the Board had reviewed the facts in light
of the concessions test for whether a decision is palpably wrong. 85
The Board found that both sides had made concessions during the
grievance process, and thereby concluded that the result was not
clearly repugnant to the NLRA. 86
The appeals court found unpersuasive the Board's rationale
for the NLRB's use of the concessions test." Although the facts
clearly met the criteria established under the contractual waiver
doctrine, because the right at issue was waivable, the court objected
to the Board's use of the concessions test because it appeared to
give the Board discretion that precedent did not allow. 88 The court
found no basis for the Board to choose not to defer to a settlement
7° Id., 139 L.R.R.M. at 2465-66. See also McCullough, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 7;
Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1020-21, 102 L.R.R.M. 2082, 2086-87 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8° Local 520, 955 F.2d at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2465-66.
Id. at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
"Id.
88 Id.
"Id. at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
85 See Local 520, 955 F.2d at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
"" Id. at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467. See also Alpha Beta, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1547, 118 L.R.R.M.
at 1202 (1985) (discussing the "concessions test"); McCullough, 300 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op.
at 7 (settlement not palpably wrong because parties compromised).
" Local 520, 955 F.2d at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
as
	 id. at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
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involving a waivable right, and hence rejected the use of the conces-
sions test as a "veritable recipe for arbitrary action."89 The court
reprimanded the Board for using a test designed to permit the
Board to defer when it approved of a settlement result, but to
intervene when it did not. 9° The court threatened reversal of "less
clear-cut" cases, which would not so clearly fulfill the Spielburg101in
criteria, if the Board did not clarify its standard under the clearly
repugnant criterion.91
Although the court's reprimand of the NLRB for failing to
present a coherent stan&rd for its clearly repugnant criteria ap-
proaches the level of a judicial directive to the Board, its failure to
remand the current case evinces an inconsistency at the appellate
level. In 1986, the same court remanded Darr v. NLRB for a similar
failure to delineate the elements of the deferral doctrine. 92 The
facts in Darr also arguably fulfilled the Spielburg101in deferral cri-
teria. 93
 The court stated in Local 520 that the Board's deferral in
Darr "might have been justified" under the contractual waiver doc-
trine, but that remand was appropriate because the Board had
"failed clearly to espouse that, or any other, theory of deference." 94
The court began its decision in Local 520 by stating that remand
was not necessary because "deference to the settlement agreement
was clearly permissible on the record."95 Deferral was also arguably
permissible in Darr because the right at issue was waivable. 96 The
court, however, refused to perform a similar assessment of the facts
in Darr to determine whether deferral was ultimately permissible
and chose instead to remand the case for the Board's further con-
sideration. 97
In Local 520 the court stated that it may reverse the Board's
decision to grant deference in a particular case only for an abuse of
discretion. 98 Although the court held in this case that deferral to
" Id. at 756-57, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467. Under the contractual waiver doctrine, the Board
is prohibited from deferring to settlements affecting non-waivable statutory rights. Id. at 756,
139 L.R.R.M. at 2467. Non-waivable rights are identified as those that constitute public
rights. See Darr, 801 F.2d at 1406, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2551.
go Local 520, 955 F.2d at 756-57, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
9 ' Id. at 757, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
" See Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408-09, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2550-52.
" See id.
" 955 F.2d at 755-56, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
"Id. at 746, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2459.
96 See Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2551.
97 See ed. at 1409, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2552.
98 Local 520, 955 F.2d at 750, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2462 (citing Bakery, Confectionery &
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settlements in cases where the facts may be construed to meet the
four criteria is not an abuse of discretion by the Board, the same
court reversed Darr on facts that arguably satisfied the same crite-
ria. 99 Furthermore, the court did not believe that the doctrinal
problems identified in Darr had been resolved in Local 520, sug-
gesting that the rationale for remand of Local 520 was the same as
that in Darr.'°°
In reprimanding the Board for theoretical inconsistency in its
deferral doctrine, the court's own application of a doctrine for
deferral to Board decisions is inconsistent. In attempting to provide
clearer guidance to the Board regarding what must be included in
Board opinions in grievance deference cases, the court has undercut
itself by presenting an inconsistent deferral doctrine of its own.
This inconsistency leaves the Board and future litigants without a
clear indication of the standards to be applied upon appeal of NLRB
decisions.
In Local 520, the court held that the deferral doctrine consti-
tuted a permissible construction of the NLRA and that the Board
did not abuse its discretion in deferring to a .grievance settlement.'°'
The court appropriately criticized the Board's reasoning for its
inconsistency with the standard evinced in prior cases)" Upon
review, the court found the facts of the case met the necessary
criteria and that remand was therefore unnecessary. 103 In so decid-
ing, the court itself evinced an inconsistent doctrine of deferral to
Board decisions and failed to provide the clarity it demands of the
Board.
B. *Reinstating Union Contracts in Effect Under Company's Prior
Owner—Remedial or Punitive?: U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB.'
Under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
Tobacco Workers Int'l Union 25 v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 812, 813, 115 L.R.R.M. 3390, 3391
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
" See id. at 755, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466; Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408-09, 123 L.R.R.M. at
2550-52.
'" See Local 520, 955 F.2d at 756, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466.
101 /d. at 746, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2458.
102 Id. at 755-57, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2466-67.
1°3 Id. at 757, 139 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
* By Christopher R. Stone, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 944 F.2d 1305, 138 L.R.R.M. 2361 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474, 139
L.R.R.M. 2808 (1992).
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to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees. 2
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") has
established, and the United States Supreme Court has upheld, the
rule that this bargaining obligation extends to a purchaser of a
unionized company, if that purchaser is deemed to be a "successor"
employer. 3 Furthermore, such a successor employer violates section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA if it makes discriminatory hiring decisions and
refuses to employ a predecessor's employees in order to avoid this
obligation.4 Thus, when a violation of the NLRA occurs, the Board
may impose a proper remedial remedy to restore the situation to
what it would have been absent the violation. 5 The Board, however,
may not impose a remedy that is punitive in natures
In 1972, in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, the
United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a succes-
sor's obligation to bargain with a predecessor's union.? The Burns
Court sustained the Board's order that the successor company bar-
gain with the predecessor's union, where a majority of the employ-
ees hired by the successor were employees of the predecessor and
had been represented by a certified bargaining agent. 8 The Court,
however, refused to enforce the Board's order that the successor
honor the substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement
that the union had negotiated with the predecessor. 9 In making this
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41, 125 L.R.R.M. 2441,
2447 (1987); NLRB v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 278-79, 80 L.R.R.M. 2225,
2227 (1972). In determining successorship and whether a purchasing employer is obligated
to bargain with the predecessor's union, the Board and the reviewing court consider whether
the purchaser continues the predecessor's business in substantially the same manner and
retains enough employees of the predecessor to comprise a majority of its own workforce.
See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446; Burns, 406 U.S. at 281, 80 L.R.R.M. at
2228.
4 See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2446; Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit
Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 262 n.8, 86 L.R.R.M.
2449, 2454 n.8 (1974); Burns, 406 U.S. at 280-81 n.5, 280-81, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2228 n.5,
2228.
5
 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); Systems Mgmt., Inc.
v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297, 306-08, 134 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2008-09 (3d Cir. 1990), enforcing in
relevant part, Systems Mgmt., Inc. v. NLRB, 292 N.L.R.B. 323 (1987).
See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 359, 70 L.R.R.M. 2100, 2100-01 (1969). Section
10(c) of the NLRA empowers the Board, when adjudicating an unfair labor practice, to issue
"an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair practice, and to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay," as
will effectuate the policies of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. 160(c).
7
 Burns, 406 U.S. at 274, 277, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2225-27.
8 Id. at 281, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2228.
Id. at 281-82, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2228-29.
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determination, the Court reasoned that the legislative history of the
labor laws and the explicit language in section 8(d) of the NLRA
made such an order inconsistent with the policies behind the NLRA,
among them the protection of freedom of contract.m
Thus, under Burns, although a successor may be required to
bargain with the predecessor's union, it is not bound by the pre-
decessor's collective bargaining agreement." The Burns Court, how-
ever, also carved out an exception as to when a successor may not
be allowed to set these initial terms and conditions.' 2 The Court
noted that "there will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that
the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit
and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with
the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms.""
The interpretation of this "perfectly clear" exception is impor-
tant in determining whether the Board has imposed a proper re-
medial remedy because such a remedy must restore the situation,
as nearly as possible, to what it would have been absent a successor's
unfair labor practice." Thus, while a status quo ante remedy is
proper, the Board may not impose a remedy that is punitive in
nature. 15 In interpreting this perfectly clear exception, however,
some circuits have concluded that an order that requires a successor
to accept its predecessor's agreement goes beyond remediation,
because the successor's only obligation is to bargain with the pre-
decessor's employees even when it is perfectly clear that substantially
all of them will be rehired.' 6
During the Survey year, in U.S. Marine Carp. v. NLRB, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
where a successor employer illegally refused to bargain with a pre-
decessor's union, the Board's order to reinstate the contract in effect
under the predecessor was a proper status quo ante remedy.' 7 The
U.S. Marine court concluded that this was a proper remedy because,
under the perfectly clear exception delineated in Burns, a successor
20 Id. at 282-84, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2229.
11 Id. at 284, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2229.
12 Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2233-34.
" Id.
14 See, e.g., Phelps, 313 U.S. at 194; Systems Mgmt., 901 F.2d at 306-08, 134 L.R.R.M. at
2008-09.
" See Strang, 393 U.S. at 359, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2100-01.
16 See Katlmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102-03, 107 L.R.R.M. 2011, 2017-18 (9th
Cir. 1981); Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 687-88, 105 L.R.R.M. 3274, 3278-79 (2d
Cir. 1980).
17 944 F.2d 1305, 138 L.R.R.M. 2361, 2375 (7th Cir. 1991).
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that would have retained all or substantially all of the predecessor's
employees, absent its discriminatory hiring practice, "loses the right
to set the initial terms and conditions of employment and violates
the Act if it unilaterally alters the predecessor's terms without first
consulting the union.'" Consequently, after U.S. Marine, there is
disagreement among the circuits as to whether a successor employer
may still set the initial terms and conditions of employment where
all or substantially all of a predecessor's employees would have been
hired by a successor but for the successor's unfair labor practice. 19
U.S. Marine involved the rights and responsibilities of U.S.
Marine Corporation as a result of its purchase of Chrysler Marine
Corporation. 2° Prior to the purchase, the International Union, Al-
lied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and Local 879
("Union") represented Chrysler's production and maintenance em-
ployees.2 ' The most recent collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and Chrysler was in effect from July 1, 1983, to June
30, 1984. 22 During the course of negotiations, U.S. Marine made
clear that it was only going to hire the most qualified applicants,
that it anticipated hiring at least eighty-five percent of the former
Chrysler employees, that it would not recognize the Union, and
that it planned to hire employees under its own wage plan and
working conditions and thus would not observe the terms set under
the collective bargaining agreement with Chrysler. 23
Based on U.S. Marine's stipulations regarding its anticipated
hiring process, the Union sought to enjoin the sale. 24 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin initially
granted a preliminary injunction; the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, however, granted a stay and eventually
reversed the injunction. 25 After completion of the sale to U.S. Ma-
rine, Chrysler laid off its entire workforce of 262 production and
maintenance employees. 26
" Id. at 1320, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
" Compare U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1322, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2375 (restoration of previously
existing employment terms .is an appropriate remedy) with Kallman, 640 F.2d at 1103, 107
L.R.R.M. at 2018 (successor employer has no obligation to accept predecessor's labor agree-
ment); Saks, 634 F.2d at 687, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3278 (same).
21' U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1308, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2362.
21 Id. at 1309, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
22 Id. at 1309 n.3, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2363 n.3.
U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1309, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
Id.
25 Id. at 1310, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
Id.
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U.S. Marine wanted to reopen the plant as quickly as possible
and therefore required a skilled labor force made up of employees
who had experience in the operations of the plant. 27 Consequently,
U.S. Marine began hiring and a week later, the plant was reopened
with a staff of 219 workers, all of whom were former Chrysler
employees.28
 During this time, U.S. Marine had projected that it
would require 396 employees actually on the job by June 1984. 29
By January, U.S. Marine had hired all but 34 of the nearly 262
former Chrysler employees who applied for work. 3°
Two days after the plant reopened and when 222 of the 231
U.S. Marine employees were former Chrysler workers, the Union
requested to be recognized by the new management. 31
 U.S. Marine
did not immediately respond to the request and subsequently mod-
ified its hiring projection figures from 396 to 460 workers required
by June 1984. 52
 In February, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that U.S.
Marine had unlawfully refused to bargain with it." The Board
sought a temporary injunction, and U.S. Marine contended that it
was not required to recognize and bargain with the Union because
it did not expect to retain its entire workforce until June 1984. 34
Additionally, U.S. Marine argued that because the entire workforce
would consist of 460 employees, it had no legal obligation to rec-
ognize the Union because less than half of those employees would
be former Chrysler employees." The district court rejected U.S.
Marine's arguments and granted a temporary injunction ordering
U.S. Marine to recognize and bargain with the Union. 36
Pursuant to - the district court's order, U.S. Marine began to
recognize and bargain with the Union." In October 1984, U.S.
Marine presented a contract proposal to the Union and the Union
rejected it." At that point U.S. Marine declared that it was at an
27
 Id. at 1310, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
28 U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1310, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2363-64.
" Id. at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
"Id. at 1310, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
31 Id. at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
"Id.
" U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364.
"Id. at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2364-65.
" Id. at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2365.
" Id.
" Id.
" U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1311, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2365.
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impasse with the Union on several issues and, in January 1985,
implemented the contract it had proposed in October. 39
Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the court was faced with two major issues. 40 First,
U.S. Marine challenged the Board's conclusion that the company
had violated the NLRA by making discriminatory hiring decisions
when it refused to hire the thirty-four former Chrysler employees.'"
Second, U.S. Marine challenged the Board's remedial order by
requiring it to offer to hire the thirty-four former Chrysler em-
ployees with back pay and ordering that U.S. Marine reinstitute the
terms and conditions of employment that were in effect under
Chrysler.42
 In addition, the court considered the Union's appeal
that the remedial order did not include a visitorial clause allowing
the Board to have access to U.S. Marine's records and statements
and that it failed to award litigation expenses. 43
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Board's determination that
U.S. Marine refused to hire the thirty-four employees to avoid
having to bargain with the Union, thereby violating section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. 44
 In support of its decision, the court noted that there
was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that U.S.
Marine acted with a discriminatory motive toward the Union,45 and
that the hiring process was designed to prevent Chrysler's employ-
ees from being hired as a majority, thereby avoiding being deemed
a successor and having to bargain with the Union. 46 The court relied
on the Board's finding that U.S. Marine falsely inflated the pro-
jected workforce figures in order to avoid the obligation to negotiate
with the Union.'" Thus, once the projection was set at 460 employ-
ees, U.S. Marine had to hire fewer than 231 former Chrysler em-
ployees to stay below the fifty-percent level and avoid incurring an
obligation to bargain as a successor. 48
" Id. at 1311-12, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2365.
40 See id. at 1315, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2368.
4 ' Id.
42 Id.
'3 U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1324, 1325, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2375, 2376.
44 Id. at 1318, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
45 Id. at 1316, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2369. Section 10(e) of the NLRA stipulates, "On review,
the Board's factual findings are 'conclusive' if they are supported by 'substantial evidence on
the record as a whole." 29 § 160(e).
46 U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1318, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
47 Id. at 1317, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2369.
4" See id. at 1318, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
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In addition, the court noted, there was substantial evidence
supporting anti-union animus insofar as U.S. Marine made clear
from the beginning that it would not deal with the Union. 49 More-
over, after the Union requested to be recognized, U.S. Marine's
hiring continued, yet it declined to hire any of the thirty-four for-
mer Chrysler employees that were as qualified as those it had al-
ready hired.5° Because there was sufficient evidence that U.S. Ma-
rine's actions were taken to avoid bargaining with the Union, the
court upheld the Board's conclusion that U.S. Marine made dis-
criminatory hiring decisions in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.5 '
The U.S. Marine court also upheld the Board's "make whole"
remedy to reinstate the terms and conditions of employment that
were in effect under Chrysler. 52 The court flatly rejected U.S. Ma-
rine's contention that such an order was improperly punitive." The
court reasoned that, under the perfectly clear exception set forth
in Burns, a successor loses its right to set the initial terms and
conditions of employment where all or substantially all of the pred-
ecessor's employees would have been hired had the successor not
engaged in unlawful hiring discrimination. 54 Thus, where such an
employer unilaterally alters the predecessor's terms before consult-
ing the union, it violates the NLRA.55 The court noted that had
U.S. Marine not engaged in unlawful discriminatory hiring conduct,
it would have hired substantially all of Chrysler's employees, ren-
dering it obligated to bargain with the Union before setting the
initial terms and conditions." According to the court, reinstating
the terms and conditions that were in effect under Chrysler restored
the situation to what it would have been if U.S. Marine had not
engaged in an unlawful labor practice and had permitted the bar-
gaining process to get under way."
Furthermore, the court rejected U.S. Marine's argument that,
under Burns, it was never perfectly clear that it intended to hire all
"Id. at 1316, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2369.
B° Id. at 1317, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2370.
51 See U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1319, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
" See id.
" See id.
" Id. at 1320, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
" Id.
30 U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1320, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
57 Id. at 1323, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
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of Chrysler's former employees. 58
 The court, however, reasoned
that it was U.S. Marine's unlawful conduct that created uncertainty
as to whether substantially all of Chrysler's former employees would
have been hired.59
 Because U.S. Marine may not benefit from its
discriminatory conduct, the uncertainty must be resolved against
it. 6° The court thus concluded that the order remedied violations
of the NLRA and was not punitive. 6 '
Judge Easterbrook, joined by four other judges, concurred in
party and dissented in part to the court's opinion. 62
 Judge Easter-
brook only disagreed with that part of the majority's opinion that
enforced the Board's order to restore the terms and conditions of
the contract in effect under Chrysler. 65
 Judge Easterbrook argued
that such a remedial order is, in actuality, punitive in nature and
therefore not proper." He reasoned that a bona fide sale of a
business enables the successor to impose its own terms because such
change may be the only way to revive the acquired business.65
 Fur-
thermore, denying a successor the right to establish its own terms
and conditions when it is likely it will hire substantially all the
predecessor's employees would discourage successors from making
generous offers to labor. 66
 Judge Easterbrook argued further that
when such a generous offer is made the predecessor's employees
will want to be hired; because the NLRA forbids discrimination the
successor will be forced to restore the preexisting contract once they
are hired.67
 Alternatively, an unattractive offer will avoid the risk
of having to reinstate the terms of a preexisting contract, but may
also deprive the successor of the necessary skilled workers. 68
Judge Easterbrook relied on decisions in other circuits to fur-
ther support his position. 69 He noted that these circuits have con-
88 Id. at 1321, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2372-73.
/d. at 1321, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2373.
Id.
"I See U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1322, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
"Id. at 1327, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2378 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
" id. at 1328, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2378.
64 See id.
68 !d.
66 U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1328, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2378.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 1328-29, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2379 (citing Kallmann, 640 F.2d at 1102-03, 107
L.R.R.M. at 2017-18; Saks, 634 F.2d at 687-88, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3278-79; International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 664, 672-76, 98 L.R.R.M. 2787, 2792-95 (D.C. Cir.
1978); NLRB v. Spruce Up Corp., 529 F.2d 516, 516, 90 L.R.R.M. 2525, 2525 (4th Cir.
1975)).
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cluded that a successor may set its own terms and conditions
whether or not it expects a substantial number of its predecessor's
employees to be hired. 7° Judge Easterbrook reasoned from this
conclusion that the perfectly clear exception in Burns only imposes
a duty on the successor to "consult" with the Union before it sets
the initial terms and conditions of employment. 7 ' He noted that the
duty to consult with the Union does not imply an obligation to
accept the old terms of employment. 72
Judge Easterbrook determined that the remedy for discrimi-
nating against the thirty-four former Chrysler workers would be to
hire them. 73 He noted that it would go beyond mere remediation
to impose the prior terms under Chrysler because U.S. Marine
would have had the right to set its own terms had it hired those
employees initially. 74 Consequently, Judge Easterbrook concluded
that because U.S. Marine violated its obligation as a successor to
bargain once it expected a majority of its workers to come from
Chrysler, the proper remedy is a bargaining order, not reinstate-
ment of the contract that existed under the prior owner."
By enforcing the Board's order of reinstating the prior union
contract, the U.S. Marine court has, for the first time, denied the
right of a successor company to set its own initial terms and con-
ditions of employment. The strength of the decision, however, is
questionable and its reasoning is subject to criticism. First, in reach-
ing its decision, the Seventh Circuit split six to five. What is more,
the majority's interpretation of the perfectly clear exception in Burns
is inconsistent with other circuits that have held that the exception
does not prevent a successor from setting the initial terms and
conditions of employment. Additionally, as Judge Easterbrook
noted in his dissenting opinion, forfeiture of a successor's privilege
to set initial terms and conditions of employment is punitive and
contrary to the policies behind the NLRA, including the freedom
of contract.
The court's decision is faulty because it seems to have misin-
terpreted Burns and upheld a remedy that was, in actuality, punitive
in nature. In determining that the remedy imposed by the Board
7° Id. at 1328, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2378 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
" U.S. Marine, 944 F.2d at 1329, 138 L.R.R.M. at 2379.
7R Id.





 I.EGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:309
was proper, the U.S. Marine court relied squarely on the perfectly
clear exception in Burns and concluded that a successor loses its
right to set initial terms when all or substantially all of a predeces-
sor's employees would have been hired but for the successor's un-
lawful labor practice. The loss of such a right, however, is actually
a penalty. A more accurate interpretation of the language and
rationale in Burns is that the perfectly clear exception only imposes
a bargaining obligation on the part of the successor—the interpre-
tation adopted by Judge Easterbrook in his dissent and by other
circuits. Thus, the obligation to bargain does not create an obliga-
tion to accept a predecessor's labor contract; rather it imposes a
duty on the successor to consult with the union before it sets its
own initial terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, just as
other circuits hold, because a successor is entitled to implement new
terms regardless of whether or not a majority of the predecessor's
employees will be hired, these terms establish the situation that the
Board is entitled to restore.
Not only is this interpretation of the perfectly clear exception
in Burns consistent with the holdings in the other circuits after Burns,
but it is also consistent with such policies as freedom of contract
and the need to resuscitate ailing business. In his dissent, Judge
Easterbrook noted that, when a company is acquired, change may
be necessary and the only alternative to keeping the company from
folding. A potential successor to such a company may only be willing
to take over if it can make certain changes. Denying a successor the
right to set its own terms and conditions may discourage acquisition
or hinder the successor's ability to resuscitate the ailing company
after acquisition. Thus, interpreting the perfectly clear exception
as a bargaining obligation, as opposed to a denial of a successor's
right to set terms when it engages in an unfair labor practice,
achieves the goal of forcing the successor to consult with the union
before setting these terms without improperly penalizing the suc-
cessor or discouraging acquisition and revitalization of failing con-
cerns.
In conclusion, in U.S. Marine, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 'Seventh Circuit held that a successor, who made dis-
criminatory hiring decisions and refused to bargain with the pre-
decessor's union, had engaged in unfair labor practices under
sections 8(a)(3) and (5) of the NLRA. In so holding, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the Board's order to reinstate the contract
in effect under the predecessor was properly remedial. By enforcing
the Board's order, the U.S. Marine court's interpretation of the
March 1993]
	
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 379
perfectly clear exception in Burns appears to be inconsistent with
the rationale in Burns as well as certain policies embedded within
the NLRA and others regarding successor ownership. Moreover,
the U.S. Marine court's decision creates a disagreement among the
circuits as to whether a successor employer may set the initial terms
and conditions of employment where all or substantially all of a
predecessor's employees are expected to be hired. Thus, in light of
the compelling arguments raised by the dissenters, the remedy
enforced by the U.S. Marine court appears to be improperly puni-
tive.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. *Retroactive Changes to Workers' Compensation Law and the
Contract Clause: General Motors Corp. v. Romeinl
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution pro-
vides, "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. . . . "2
 A conflict has existed among various state and
federal courts over whether retroactive amendments to state work-
ers' compensation laws violate this clause. 3
 Some courts have held
that such amendments are unconstitutional impairments of rights
arising from employment contracts. 4
 Other courts have held that
workers' compensation laws are incidental to employment contracts
and can therefore be changed retroactively without violating the
Constitution.5 The Supreme Court has provided little help, char-
acterizing workers' compensation law as both contractual and non-
contractual in nature, depending on the context. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
the 1987 case of Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Co., adopted the
* By Stephen Zamansky, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
' See, e.g., Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Co., 819 F.2d 1237, 1252 (3d Cir. 1987)
(changes to workers' compensation law violate the Contract Clause); Price v. All Am. Eng'g
Co., 320 A.2d 266, 339, 340 (Del. 1974) (changes to workers' compensation law do not violate
the Contract Clause).
See Mitchell v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 206 F. Supp. 489, 490 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) (changes to workers' compensation statute violate the Contract Clause); Schreiner v.
C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 465 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Joyce v. Lewis Bolt and
Nut Co., 412 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn. 1987)) (same); Cooper v. Wicomico County, Dept. of
Pub. Works, 366 A.2d 55, 57, 58 (Md. 1976) (same); Harris v. National Truck Serv., 321 So.
2d 690, 694 (Ala. Ct. App. 1975) (same); Miller v. Dunn Paper Co., 209 N.W.2d 519, 521
(Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (same); Noffsker v. K. Barnett & Sons, 384 P.2d 1022, 1023 (N.M.
1963) (same).
K-Mart Corp. v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 693 P.2d 562, 567 (Nev. 1985) (workers' com-
pensation is not contractual so its amendment does not violate the Contract Clause); Price,
320 A.2d 339, 340 (same); cf. Panzino v. Continental Can Co., 364 A.2d 1043, 1046 (N.J.
1976) (change in workers' compensation act does not implicate the Due Process Clause).
6 In Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., the United States Supreme Court held that
recovery in workers' compensation is based on contract rather than tort law, and that contracts
of employment imply workers' compensation provisions. 259 U.S. 263, 271 (1922). On the
other hand, in Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, the Court said that "workmen's
Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not that of implied contract." 263
U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
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view that retroactive amendments to workers' compensation laws
are unconstitutional violations of the Contract Clause.' The court
held that the application of a Virgin Island law barring the bor-
rowed employee doctrine to claims of workers injured prior to its
effective date violated the Contract Clause. 8 The Nieves court rea-
soned that the retroactive application of the statute substantially
impaired implied employment contracts between the borrowing em-
ployer and employees, as the employer had a reasonable expectation
that workers' compensation would cover them when they contracted
for employment. 9 The court also found that retroactive application
of the law was not a reasonable means of serving a legitimate public
purpose. u) Therefore, the Nieves court held that legislation that
retroactively altered workers' compensation law violated the Con-
tract Clause."
While the majority of courts that have addressed this issue have
adopted the Nieves position that retroactive amendments to workers'
compensation laws violate the Contract Clause,' 2 several courts have
adopted the contrary view, including the Delaware Supreme Court
in the 1974 case of Price v. All American Engineering Co.'s The Price
court ruled that a statute that increased workers' compensation
benefits for totally disabled employees, including those injured be-
fore the law came into effect, did not violate the Contract Clause."
The court reasoned that the workers' compensation act and the
employer-employee relationships it creates are "status-oriented,"
rather than grounded in contract." Thus, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that, as workers' compensation involves statutory rather
7
 819 F.2d at 1252.
8 Id. at 1252. The legislature passed a law that barred the application of the borrowed
employee doctrine to pending workers' compensation cases, regardless of when the accidents
which gave rise to the claim occurred. Id. at 1241. The court held that this law could not
apply to the cases of six employees borrowed by Hess, who had suits pending against Hess
for injuries allegedly caused by the company's negligence when the law was enacted. Id. at
1252.
9 1d. at 1248.
19 1d. at 1251.
11 Id. at 1252.
18 See cases cited supra note 4.
13 320 A.2d 336, 339 (Del, 1974). See also K-Mart, 693 1'.2d at 567; McAllister v. Board
of Educ., 191 A.2d 212, 218-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (duties under workers'
compensation statute do not rise to a "contract").
14 Price, 320 A.2d at 337-38, 339. Employers and their insurance carriers brought suit
claiming that it was unconstitutional to make them increase benefits For workers who became
totally disabled prior to the law's effective date. Id. at 337-38.
13 Id. at 339.
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than contractual rights and obligations, the Contract Clause does
not protect against changes to it, even if they have retroactive ef-
fects. 16
During the Survey year, in General Motors Corp. v. Romein, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
retroactive change to workers' compensation law violates the Con-
tract Clause.' 7
 The Court unanimously held that a law that retro-
actively changes workers' compensation benefits does not violate the
Contract Clause, because no contract existed regarding the workers'
compensation terms at issue. 18 Consequently, states can probably
alter their workers' compensation laws without violating the Con-
tract Clause, regardless of the effect the changes may have on
existing arrangements. 19
In Romein, the Court addressed a 1987 Michigan statute2° that
required employers to increase certain workers' compensation
awards, and reimburse any employees that were underpaid due to
the old benefit scheme. 2 ' This law was the result of a lengthy debate
that was carried out in both the courthouse and the legislative
chambers. 22
 In 1981 the Michigan Legislature passed workers' com-
pensation reform legislation allowing employers to decrease work-
ers' compensation benefits for those disabled employees eligible to
receive wage-loss compensation from other employer-funded
sources. 23
 The legislation did not specify whether this scheme,
known as "benefit coordination," should apply to workers injured
before its effective date of March 31, 1982. 24
Employers argued that the law allowed them to coordinate, and
thus reduce, workers' compensation benefits for workers injured
prior to the effective date. 25 The lower Michigan courts disagreed
and held that coordination was only allowed for employees injured
after that date. 26
 Supporting this interpretation, the Michigan State
' 6 Id. at 340.
17
 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1109 (1992).
18 Id. at 1110.
' 9
 See id. at 111-1-12.
"MICH. COMP. LAWS 418.354 (1991).
21 112 S. Ct. at 1109.




26 See, e.g., Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co., 332 N.W.2d 447, 449
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982), aff 'd in part & rev'd in part, 375 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1985).
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Senate and House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolu-
tion declaring that the legislature did not intend the coordination
provisions to apply retroactively. 27
Despite this resolution, in 1985 the Michigan Supreme Court, .
in Chambers v. General Motors Corp., held that the benefit coordination
provision applied to all payment periods after its effective date
regardless of the date on which the employee was injured." The
court stated that it had to follow the statute's "plain meaning" and
apply it retroactively, because it did not explicitly state that it did
not so apply. 29 The court also stated that because workers' compen-
sation benefits are "social-welfare income-maintenance benefits,"
which are not protected by the Constitution, and because the leg-
islature did not covenant not to make amendments to workers'
compensation law in providing for such benefits, subsequent
changes did not violate the Contract Clause." Thus, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that employers could apply the benefit coor-
dination provisions retroactively.''
This decision spurred employers who had not been coordinat-
ing benefits for workers injured before 1982 to begin doing so, and
to demand reimbursement from their workers who were overpaid
due to non-coordination.s2 On May 14, 1987, the legislature
amended the coordination statute's so that it applied only to workers
injured after the 1982 effective date." The amendment expressly
repudiated Chambers, declaring that the coordination provision did
not apply to workers injured before its effective date, and that
27 &mein, 112 S. Ct. at 1108.
" 375 N.W.2d 715, 727 (Mich. 1985). The Chambers case was brought by retired General
Motors workers who were receiving pension and other benefits as well as workers' compen-
sation. Id. at 719. General Motors' coordination of its benefits resulted in the elimination of
its weekly workers' compensation payments. Id. at 719-20.
29 Id. at 722.
9) Id. at 722-23.
3, Id. at 727.
52 Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1109.
" Mien. COMP. LAWS § 418.354 (1991).
" Section 418.354 provides in pertinent part:
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Franks v. White Pine Copper
Division, 422 Mich. 636 (1985) is declared to have been erroneously rendered
insofar as it interprets this section, it having been and being the legislative
intention not to coordinate payments under this section resulting from liability
pursuant to 351, 361, or 835 for personal injures occurring before March 31,
1983. It is the purpose of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and
curative amendment shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.
418.354(17).
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employers who had coordinated benefits for these employees must
reimburse them for all underpayments. 35
As a result, the petitioner-employers in Romein were ordered
to refund nearly $25 million. They brought suit, arguing that the
statute was unfairly retroactive and therefore violated the Contract
Clause.36 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the statute on the
basis that the employers had no vested rights in coordination for
Contract Clause purposes, and that the retroactive provisions fur-
thered a rational legislative purpose." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari" and affirmed the decision. 39
The United States Supreme Court held that the retroactive
provisions did not violate the Contract Clause because there was no
affected contract. 40 It stated that workers' compensation law was
not an implied term of employment contracts, and refused to rec-
ognize an implied right for employers to rely on past benefit periods
as closed.'" The Court also found that the amendment did not affect
the enforceability of the employment contracts.°
To determine whether the amendment violated the Contract
Clause, the Romein Court asked whether it had "operated a sub-
stantial impairment of a contractual relationship." 43 To answer this
question, the Court engaged in a standard three-part inquiry."
Under this inquiry, the Court first asked whether there was a con-
tractual relationship.45 If there was, the Court would determine
whether the change in law impaired that relationship." If it did,
sa Rmnein, 112 S. Ct. at 1109.
36 Id. The employers also argued that the retroactive provisions of the amendment
violated the Due Process Clause, but the Court rejected this claim. Id.
"Id. For the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion see Romein v. General Motors Corp.,
462 N.W.2d 555 (Mich. 1990).
38 General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
" General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1109 (1992).
4° Id. at 1110. The Court also addressed the issue of whether the amendment violated
the Due Process Clause and ruled that it did not. Id. at 1112. The Court stated that to satisfy
due process all that is needed is a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by a rational means.
Id. The Court asserted that this standard was satisfied as the retroactive payment provisions
of the statute were a rational means of meeting the legislative objective of correcting the
unexpected results of the Michigan Supreme Court's Chambers v. General M01013 Corp. opinion.
Id.
" Id. at 1110-11.
42 Id. at 1111.
43 112 S. Ct. at 1109 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244,
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the Court would complete the inquiry by determining whether the
impairment was substantial. 47 The Court only had to carry out the
first part of the inquiry, as it determined that there was no violation
of the Contract Clause because no contractual agreement existed
regarding the workers' compensation terms at issue."
The Court rejected the assertion that workers' compensation
law was an implied term of the employment contracts that the
parties entered into after collective bargaining. 49
 The Court noted
that the parties formed these contracts before the enactment of the
1981 law requiring benefit coordination and that they made no
express mention of workers' compensation benefits. 5" In fact, the
Court stated, the parties did not manifest assent to coordinate ben-
efit payments under the 1981 law in any way." Moreover, the Court
reasoned, there was no occasion in their bargaining for the parties
even to consider whether reduced benefits could later be restored
after the "benefit period" had closed. 52
The Court also rejected the argument that employers have a
right, "incorporated" into all employment contracts by law, to rely
on past payment periods as "closed."" Because the petitioners failed
to show that this right was part of Michigan law when they formed
their contracts,54 the Court applied the general rule that laws are
only considered implied terms of private contracts if they affect the
validity, construction or enforcement of the contracts. 55 The Court
reasoned that such laws receive Contract Clause scrutiny because
4'1 Id.
49 Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1110. While the Michigan Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion, the United States Supreme Court noted that it had to decide the issue on its own,
as the question of whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of Contract
Clause analysis. Id. The Court held that while they "accord respectful consideration and
great weight to the views of the state's highest court," they were ultimately "bound to decide
for [themselves) whether a contract was made." Id. (citing Indiana ex rd. Anderson v. Brand,
303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938)).
49 Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1110 (rejecting the employers' claim that they had the workers'






" Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1110. The Court therefore reasoned that the principle that "the
laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract . . . enter into and form
part of it" was inapplicable. Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
429-30 (1934)).
" Romein, 112 S, Ct. at 1111.
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they may impair the binding force of pre-existing contracts. 56 In
Romein, however, the Court determined that the statute at issue did
not affect the legal enforceability of the employment contracts. 57
Thus, because Michigan law did not specifically imply workers'
compensation terms into employment contracts, and because such
terms were not central to the bargained-for exchange between the
parties or to the enforceability of the contracts as a whole, the Court
refused to consider workers' compensation law as an implied term
of the parties' employment contracts. 58
The Court also addressed policy reasons for not treating work-
ers' compensation and other workplace regulations as implicit terms
of private contract agreements. 59 The Court reasoned that to do so
would extend the definition of a contract far beyond the Contract
Clause's purpose of enabling individuals to order their affairs as
they see fit. 6° Instead, the Court reasoned, adoption of the employ-
ers' position would greatly limit state legislatures' ability to amend
regulatory legislation. 6 ' Amendments would only affect matters that
private contracts did not provide for, and therefore parties could
avoid future regulation by entering into long-term contracts. 62
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court and held that the retroactive provisions of the
amendment were constitutional. 63
The Supreme Court's decision in Romein finally resolved the
issue of whether states can retroactively change workers' compen-
sation laws without violating the Contract Clause." Its decision rests
on certain factual findings, however, which may make it possible to
distinguish future cases.65 This is particularly important because the
history of the legislation at issue gave the Court reasons to uphold
it, which may not exist in other circumstances. 66 The decision never-
theless gives state legislatures more freedom to change workers'




58 Id. at 1110.
59 Id. at 1111-12.
Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1111.
61 /d.
sx Id. at 1111-12.
61 /d. at 1110, 1112.
6' Id. at 1112.
65 Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1108-09.
66 See id. at 1111-12.
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Due to the fact-specific nature of its holding, courts may be
able to distinguish future cases from Romein, The Court, for ex-
ample, reasoned that the workers' compensation provisions were
not central to the bargained-for exchange between the parties. 67
Courts may find, however, that the particular regulation they are
addressing is central to the employment agreement, and therefore
not open to retroactive change under the Contract Clause. 68
Such distinction may be likely because the history of the Romein
case made the Court particularly unsympathetic to the employers'
position. Workers' compensation law in Michigan had long been the
subject of bitter debate. 69 The Court seemed reluctant to change
this law which was the result of such a long and complex compro-
mise." Additionally, the Court believed that the statute remedied
an unfair situation in a logical way." It seems possible that other
courts may come to a different conclusion if a case arises where the
change is unfair and unforeseeable, rather than the result of a long
legislative process yielding an equitable result. On the other hand,
courts may be reluctant to do this due to the policy reasons that the
Court set forth in Romein. 72
The Court's holding is also limited in that its determination
that workers' compensation law is not an implicit part of employ-
67 Id. at 1111.
68 For an example of such a court, see supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text explaining
Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Co.
69 112 S. Ct. at 1108 (citing Robert VanderLaan & Richard K. Studley, Workers' Compen-
sation Reform: A Case Study of the Legislative Process in Michigan, 14 U. Mien. J.L. REF. 451,
452-54 (1981)).
7° See Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1112. The Court went so far as to note that the petitioners
knew of the distinct possibility that the courts or the legislature could resolve the issue to
their detriment and therefore took the risk. hi. The Court expressed this in the concluding
paragraph of the case saying:
In sum, petitioners knew they were taking a risk in reducing benefits to their
workers, but they took their chances with their interpretation of the 1981 law.
Having now lost the battle in the Michigan Legislature, petitioners wished to
continue the war in court. Losing a political skirmish, however, in itself creates
no ground for constitutional relief.
Id.
71 The Court found that the amendment
preserved the delicate legislative compromise that had been struck by the 1980-
81 laws—giving workers injured before 1982 their full benefits without coor-
dination, but not the greater increases given to subsequently injured workers.
Also, it equalized the payments made by employers who had gambled on the
Chambers decision with those made by employers who had not.
Id.
72 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of policy reasons for
not treating workers' compensation as contractual in nature.
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ment contracts applies only to the federal Contract Clause." State
courts have determined whether such laws are contractual in nature
for state-law purposes and will probably continue to do so regardless
of the Romein decision. 74 Nonetheless, while the holding only applies
to a specific constitutional challenge, it gives legislatures greater
freedom because they are now able to change their states' workers'
compensation scheme without risking a Contract Clause violation.
At the same time, this decision limits employers' and employees'
ability to predict future compensation rules that will affect them.
This, in turn, will make it more difficult for a due process or
equitable challenge to such a statute to succeed, as the parties will
no longer be able to argue that they relied on the law to remain
unchanged for past payment periods.
In sum, the Supreme Court, in General Motors Corp. v. Romein,
finally resolved the issue of whether a retroactive amendment to
workers' compensation law violates the Contract Clause." The
Court's holding that it does not, while subject to certain weaknesses,
represents the first uniform decision on this issue. The decision
gives legislatures the constitutional freedom to regulate this area of
law as they see fit, although their actions may be subject to court
challenges seeking to distinguish the particular law in question from
the one in this case, and to challenges based on state law.
II. INJURED WORKERS AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY
A. *Liability of State-Owned Railroads Under FELA: Hilton v. South
Carolina Public Railways Commission'
Section 51 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA")
provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging
in [interstate] commerce . . . shall be liable in damages . . ." to any
of its employees injured on the job due to the negligence of the
carrier, its officers, agents or employees. 2 Two issues arise under
23 See Romein, 112 S. Ct. at 1108.
24 See, e.g., In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Wyo. 1986) (workers' compensation law
found to be based on contract rather than tort, for decision that incarceration had no effect
upon benefits); M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney, 695 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky. 1985) (workers' compen-
sation law found to be contractual in nature in determination of which employers had tort
immunity).
75
 112 S. Ct. at WO.
* By Andrew J. Hachey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 112 S. Ct. 560 (1991).
2 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
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this statute when an employee of a state-owned interstate railroad
alleges that he or she has been injured as a result of the railroad's
negligence." The first issue is whether FELA creates a cause of
action against state-owned railroads enforceable in state court. 4 The .
second is whether FELA creates a cause of action against state-
owned railroads enforceable in federal court by excepting the car-
rier from the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity!'
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held in Parden v.
Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department that FELA au-
thorizes suits against state-owned railroads operating in interstate
commerce and that such suits could be brought in federal court.°
The plaintiffs in Parden were interstate railroad employees who had
been injured on the job allegedly due to the negligence of their
employer, an agency of the State of Alabama.' The action was
brought in district court, and the defendant moved to dismiss the
action on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment made the state
immune from suit in federal court unless it consented, which it had
not done. 8 On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
intended that state-owned railroads be liable under FELA. 9 The
Court based this conclusion on the plain language of the Act and
the fact that federal statutes regulating railroads generally apply to
both private and state operators."' The Court further decided that
Congress implicitly conditioned the right of a state to operate an
interstate railroad on the state's implied consent to suit in federal
court under FELA, thereby overthrowing its Eleventh Amendment
immunity."
In 1987, the Court partially overruled Parden in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways and Public Transportation.' 2 The Welch plain-
See Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 562-63.
4 See id. at 562.
See id. at 563. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. Xl.
6 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
7 Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 184-85, 186.
g Id. at 187-88.
10 Id.
" 377 U.S. at 192.
17 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987). The Welch Court actually held that the language of the Jones
Act (46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988)) was insufficient to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Id. at 476. Because the Jones Act applied the remedial provision of FELA to
seamen, the Court in Hilton stated that the legal analysis should be consistent. See id. at 471;
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tiff, an employee of the State Highway Department, was injured
during the course of her employment." She filed suit against the
state agency under the Jones Act in district court, and the agency
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the action." On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
modern understanding of the Eleventh Amendment led to the
conclusion that Congress must use "unmistakable language in the
statute itself" if it wishes to make states liable in federal court under
that statute." Accordingly, the Court stated that the Parden Court's
discussion of inferred congressional intent to negate Eleventh
Amendment immunity is no longer valid law. 16 The Welch Court
further held that the language in the Jones Act—and by implication
FELA—was insufficient to authorize suits against the states in fed-
eral court.° The Welch decision did not reevaluate the language in
the Jones Act to determine whether it authorized liability of state
agencies in state court actions."
In 1989, however, in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
the Court's standard of statutory interpretation raised questions
about the validity of that portion of the Parden decision that indi-
cated that state-owned railroads could be sued under FELA in state
court.' 9 In Will, the plaintiff filed suit against the state agency in
the Michigan state court system under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that he had been denied a promotion in the Michigan State Police
Department because some of his family members had been student
activists. 20
 The state court dismissed the suit because the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a state is not a "person" authorized to be
see also Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 564-65 n.2. Welch explicitly overruled those portions of Parden
applicable to the Eleventh Amendment analysis. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
" Id. at 471.
"Id,
15 1d, at 474 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
16 Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
IT /d. at 471, 476. See also Hilton, 112 S. Ct, at 564-65 n.2 (implying that the statutory
analysis of the Jones Act and FELA should be consistent).
'a See Welch, 483 U.S. at 495 (White, J., concurring). But see id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19
 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
20 1d, at 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. .. .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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sued under § 1983.21 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that a state is not included in the term "person,"
as used in § 1983 describing who may be held liable under the
statute. 22 The Court concluded that the term "person" fell short of
the "ordinary rule of statutory construction," that Congress must
make its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute
if it means to abrogate the states' general immunity from suit, even
in their own courts. 23 The state courts were thus left to decide
whether the implications of Will altogether prohibited FELA suits
against state-owned railroads, because the language of FELA did
not explicitly include state-owned railroads within its scope of cov-
erage as required by the rule of statutory construction used in Wi//. 24
During the Survey year, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways
Commission, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in part its
Parden decision by holding that FELA does create a cause of action
against a state-owned railroad which is enforceable in state court. 25
The Court also recognized that after Welch, the only available venue
for relief against a state-owned railroad under the federally created
FELA is the state court system. 26 As a consequence of the Hilton
decision, state courts cannot dismiss FELA suits against state-owned
railroads on the grounds that FELA does not authorize such an
action.27
In Hilton, Kenneth Hilton was injured during the course of his
employment with the South Carolina Public Railways Commission
("Commission"), an agency of the state. 28 Alleging that his injuries
were due to the negligence of the Commission, he filed a FELA suit
against his employer in the district court. 29 While the suit was pend-
ing, the United States Supreme Court decided We/ch." Hilton re-
alized that Welch prohibited entertaining a FELA action against a
state in a federal forum, so he withdrew his action and reified in
the South Carolina state court system."
21 Will, 491 U.S. at 61.
22 /d. at 61, 64.
28 Id. at 65.
24 See id.; see also Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 563.
25 Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 562.
28 See id. at 566.
24 See id.
28 Id. at 562.
29 Id.
89 Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 562.
31 Id.
392	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 34:309
The South Carolina trial court dismissed the action, claiming
that Parden had effectively been overturned by Welch and Will, so
that FELA does not authorize actions against state-owned rail-
roads. 32 Hilton then appealed this reading of FELA and the appli-
cable case law to the South Carolina Supreme Court." While his
appeal was pending, that court announced its decision of another
case that held in favor of the state on the precise issue on appeal
in Hilton's suit." Accordingly, Hilton's subsequent appeal was dis-
missed in a one-sentence opinion by the South Carolina Supreme
Court."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Hilton's
appeal in order to clarify whether Will had overturned the Parden
holding that FELA authorizes a state court action against a state-
owned railroad." Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated
that under stare decisis, the Parden Court's interpretation of FELA
was reviewable only with some "compelling justification."37 The
Court, therefore, refused to reevaluate its interpretation because
there were "strong considerations" favoring adherence to stare de-
cisis, and because there were no "sufficient, countervailing justifi-
cations" for departing from precedent."
The Court based its decision on two primary policy consider-
ations." First, the Court's jurisprudence has traditionally been very
strong in adhering to stare decisis in matters of statutory, as opposed
to constitutional, interpretation." The Court concluded that it
should give great weight to its earlier interpretation because Con-
"See id. at 562-63.
]3 Id.
54 Id. In Freeman v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, the South Carolina Supreme Court
read the United States Supreme Court's Will decision as holding that a federal statute will
not be read to authorize money damages against a state absent unmistakably clear language
showing congressional intent to impose such liability. 393 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1990). The South
Carolina Supreme Court decided on the basis of Welch that there was a lack of unmistakably
clear language in FELA abrogating the states' sovereign immunity, and thus held that FELA
does not impose liability on an agency of the state. Freeman, 393 S.E.2d at 384.
35 Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 563. See also Hilton v. South Carolina Pub, Rys. Comm'n, 411 S.E.2d
424, 424 (1990) (South Carolina Supreme Court dismissal of Hilton's suit).
38 See Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 563.
17 Id. at 563-64.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 564. The Court stated general approval of stare decisis because lalldherence
to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority." Id.
40 See id. "Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory inter-
pretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power
is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Id. (quoting Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)).
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gress had not amended FELA's language during the thirty years
since the Parden interpretation of that language.'" The Court rea-
soned that this congressional silence indicated implicit acceptance
of the interpretation. 42
Second, the Court noted that applying the doctrine of stare
decisis has added force when the public and private sectors have
relied on an earlier interpretation of a federal statute." In the case
of FELA, the Court noted, many states, including South Carolina,
had explicitly excluded railroad workers from their workers' com-
pensation laws on the assumption that those workers would be
protected by FELA. 44
 The Court stated that it was unwilling to risk
the protection that the Parden interpretation afforded state-owned
railroad employers and employees who had been acting on the
assumption that their activities were covered by FELA. 45
 The Court
further reasoned that overruling Parden would cast doubt on the
prior holdings that the entire federal system of railroad regulation
applied to state-owned railroads.46 Relying on these policies, the
Court held that the factors weighing in favor of stare decisis con-
trolled because there were no sufficient, countervailing justifications
for a reevaluation of FELA's scope.47
The Court directly rejected the argument that the Welch Court
had considered and decided against the policies for applying stare
decisis to FELA.48
 The Court stated that an overruling of Parden
would leave injured state employees without a remedy. 49
 The Court
reasoned that because this consideration was not discussed in Welch,
Welch only overruled that portion of Parden that held that FELA
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in
federal court. 50 Because the Eleventh Amendment only applies to
suits in federal court, the Court dismissed the argument that Welch
was relevant to the analysis, and narrowed the issues to statutory
interpretation and whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis. 51









" Id. at 564-65.
51 Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 565.
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The Court then addressed the contention that Will mandated
a per se rule that courts examine all federal statutes, including
FELA, that possibly impose liability on the states under the "clear
statement" standard. 52 The Court rejected this analysis of Will, stat-
ing that such a per se rule would make federal statutory interpre-
tation standards coequal with the Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence.53 The Court noted that the primary focus of the
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 conducted in Will was on the
language and history of the statute. 54 The Court reasoned that this
specific discussion would have been unnecessary if the decision had
adopted a per se rule governing federal statutory interpretation. 55
The Court instead described the clear statement rule as one that is
applied during statutory interpretation only where the statute's in-
tent is vague. 56
The Court noted that although the use of a clear statement
standard would be useful to both Congress and the courts in inter-
preting whether federal statutes impose liability on the states, the
standard is not a rule of constitutional law. 57 The Court stated that
the clear statement rule was not applied to FELA because a standard
of statutory construction of less than constitutional import did not
prevail over the doctrine of stare decisis where the prior interpre-
tation implicated important reliance interests.58 Accordingly, the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Parden that FELA imposes liability
on a state-owned railroad, enforceable in state court."
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting
opinion.60 She read Will as establishing a per se rule that if a federal
statute required a state to entertain a suit against itself, it must do
so in a clear statement because of the principle that a state cannot
normally be sued without its consent. 6 ' Justice O'Connor argued
that the result of Hilton should have been automatically resolved by
"Id.
"Id. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence requires a clear statement from Congress in
the language of the statute when Congress abrogates the states' sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court. See id.
5* Id.
" Id.
" Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 566.
57 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 562.
6° Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 566 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
61 1d. at 567.
March 1993]
	
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 395
an honest reading of both Will and Welch. 62 She stated that Welch
held that FELA does not contain the requisite clear statement to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and Will re-
quired a similar clear statement for states to be liable in state court
under a federal statute." She argued, therefore, that the Court was
claiming to follow the policies of stare decisis while ignoring very
recent precedent."
Justice O'Connor criticized the Court for ignoring the consti-
tutional basis for the clear statement rule, stating that the rule is
derived from the concepts of federalism inherent in the entire
constitutional scheme. 65 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court
has a constitutional mandate to be wary of "extending the effects
of congressional enactments into areas traditionally governed by the
states, unless Congress has directed [the Court] to do so by an
unmistakably clear statement." 66 Justice O'Connor concluded by
stating that a state is a proper defendant under FELA only if it
consented to be sued by allowing itself to be treated as a railroad
owner rather than as a sovereign for the purpose of the action."
The Hilton decision firmly establishes that employees of state-
owned railroads that are engaged in interstate commerce may sue
their employers for negligence under FELA in state court if they
are injured on the job. 68 The current interpretation of FELA pres-
ents the anomalous situation where the state court is the only avenue
of relief under a federal statute for certain classes of plaintiffs,
namely, employees of state-owned railroads." This lack of symmetry
does not, however, disturb a majority of the Court so as to override
the merits of stare decisis. 7°
Apart from the direct impact the Hilton decision has on FELA
lawsuits, the most important aspect of the decision appears to be
that it carves out an exception to the use of the clear statement
rule. 7 ' In some very recent Supreme Court cases, the clear statement
rule has been posited as the ordinary rule of statutory interpretation
02 Id.
65 Id.
04 Id. at 566.
66 Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 568.
66 Id,
65 Id. at 570.
"Id. at 562.
" See id. at 566.
70 See Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 566.
" See id. at 567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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when "Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government.'" 72 Hilton excepts
from this interpretational mandate certain statutes that have pre-
viously been interpreted by the Court." The decision creates a
balancing test by which the clear statement standard will be applied
only if there are sufficient justifications outweighing any factors
favoring adherence to precedent. 74 The Hilton test apparently
means that the Court will favor adhering to a precedential inter-
pretation if it is long-standing and if states have relied on that
interpretation in structuring their own remedial laws such that an
injured party would have no avenue of relief if the federal law was
found inapposite. 75
In sum, Hilton leaves injured state-owned railroad employees a
state court, but not a federal court, remedy under FELA if they
were injured due to their employer's negligence during the course
of operations in interstate commerce. 76 Because the state will not
be able to argue sovereign immunity in FELA suits, the state courts
will not be able to dismiss such suits on the grounds that the statute
does not authorize money damages against an agency of the state."
As a result of Hilton, state legislatures can continue to rely on the
fact that injured employees of state-owned railroads have a possible
avenue of relief under FELA." The legislatures will therefore not
need to reevaluate their workers' compensation laws if they are
concerned about giving such employees a legal remedy."
B. *Land-Based Maritime Workers as "Seamen". Under the Jones Act:
Southwest Marine v. Gizoni'
The Jones Act2 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act ("LHWCA")3 provide federal remedies for injured
72 Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242). See also Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
73 See Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 564.
74 See id.
73 See id. The reliance consideration seemed to be the Court's overriding concern, as
Justice Kennedy described it as "the most vital consideration of our decision." Id.
7 ' Id. at 562.
77 See id.
73 See Hilton, 112 S. Ct. at 564.
73 See id.
* By Mark C. Solakian, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 112 S. Ct. 486 (1991).
2 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
3
 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1988).
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maritime workers whose occupations come within each Act. 4
 The
Acts differ, however, with regard to the types of maritime workers
that they cover. 5
 The Jones Act, for example, covers "seamen," or
those maritime workers who assist in the function of a "vessel in
navigation." The Jones Act allows a seaman to initiate a suit for
damages for personal injuries suffered during the course of his or
her employment.' In contrast, the LHWCA provides an adminis-
trative compensatory scheme for injured land-based maritime work-
ers such as longshoremen, ship repairmen and shipbuilders.8 The
LHWCA's definition of "employee," however, explicitly excludes "a
master or member of a crew of any vessel"—someone who is the
quintessential Jones Act seaman plaintiff.°
In 1991 the United States Supreme Court in McDermott Inter-
national, Inc. v. Wilander held that the Jones Act and the LHWCA
were mutually exclusive because the LHWCA excluded any em-
ployee who was a master or member of a crew of any vessel.'° Thus,
Wilander clarified that a master or member of a crew could only
4 See id.; 46 U.S.C. app. 688.
Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 491. Compare 46 U.S.C. app. 688 with 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq.
6
 McDermott Intl, Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807,817 (1991). In determining whether
or not the vessel is in fact a vessel in navigation, the courts consider factors such as whether
the vessel has its own source of power, a navigation system or living facilities. See Southwest
Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 489-90; Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir.
1990).
7 The Jones Act provides in relevant part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply. . . .
46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
Although the term "seaman" is not defined in the Jones Act, the Supreme Court in
Wilander defined seaman in terms of the employee's relation to the vessel in navigation. I I I
S. Ct. at 817-18. The Court held that the determination of seaman status depends on the
nature of the vessel and the employee's precise relation to it. Id. The Supreme Court rejected
the idea that an employee must assist in navigation in order to qualify as a seaman under
the Jones Act. Id.
8
 33 U.S.C. 902(3). Under the LHWCA, the liability of an employer "shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. , . ." Id. § 905(a).
9
 The LHWCA defines "employee" as: "any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker. . . ." Id. § 902(3).
The LHWCA then excludes a list of individuals from its scope, including masters or members
of a crew of any vessel. Id. § 902(3)(g).
'° I I 1 S. Ct. at 813 (citing Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946)).
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seek relief under the Jones Act." Left unresolved by the language
of the statutes as well as the case law was the issue of whether a
land-based maritime employee covered under the LHWCA might
also be able to recover as a seaman pursuant to the Jones Act.' 2
A conflict arose between two federal appellate courts concern-
ing the question of whether a maritime worker whose occupation
is one of those enumerated in the LHWCA may be a seaman entitled
to sue for damages under the Jones Act." In 1986, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Petersen v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railroad Co., held that a plaintiff is limited to LHWCA
remedies unless a genuine issue of fact exists regarding the plain-
tiff's seaman status at the time of the injury.' 4 Petersen involved a
machinist whose estate brought a Jones Act claim against a railway
company for fatal injuries sustained due to prolonged asbestos ex-
posure." Petersen's duties involved repairing equipment and ma-
chinery on railway car ferries as they sailed across the Great Lakes."
Because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Petersen
was a Jones Act seaman, the decedent's estate was not limited to
LHWCA remedies.°
In contrast, in 1987 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held in Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. that mar-
itime workers whose occupations are enumerated in the LHWCA
are prohibited from claiming the benefits under the Jones Act as
seamen or members of a crew of a vessel." Pizzitolo involved an
electrician who was employed by a company that owned and oper-
ated a coal terminal and dock on the Mississippi River.' 9 Pizzitolo
" See 111 S. Ct. at 813.
12 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688; 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). Compare Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer
Corp., 812 F.2d 977, 985 (5th Cir. 1987) with Petersen v. Chesapeake Sc Ohio R.R. Co., 784
F.2d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 1986).
Compare Petersen, 784 F.2d at 739 (holding that a plaintiff is not limited to LHWCA
remedies if able to show that a genuine factual issue exists as to whether he or she was a
seaman at the time of injury) with Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 983 (holding that a worker who
engages in an occupation enumerated in the LHWCA is ineligible to claim benefits under
the Jones Act).
14 Petersen, 784 F.2d at 739.
15 Id. at 734-35.
16 Id. at 734.
17 Id. at 739. The Petersen court affirmed the judgment of the district court where the
jury decided that the amount of time spent on the vessel during the course of his duties
qualified Petersen for seaman status. See id. at 735, 738.
Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 983. Also, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) provides that "compensation shall
be payable ... only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States. .. ." Id.
19 Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 979.
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spent twenty-five percent of his time repairing equipment on vessels
tied to docks. 2° While repairing a conveyor used to load a vessel, he
was injured when the scaffold board he was standing on broke,
causing him to fall into the river. 21 Pizzitolo subsequently filed a
Jones Act suit against his employer. 22 The Pizzitolo court concluded
that the implementation of the LHWCA essentially amended the
Jones Act to exclude maritime workers from Jones Act remedies."
During the Survey year, in Southwest Marine v. Gizoni, the United
States Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits by unanimously holding that a maritime worker who
qualifies for receipt of benefits under the LHWCA may nonetheless
be a seaman under the Jones Act. 24 Gizoni was a ship repairman
who was injured on a floating platform as it was being towed into
position alongside a vessel in need of repairs. 25 In its statutory
interpretation of the LHWCA and the Jones Act, the Court rea-
soned that there is a possibility that Jones Act seamen may perform
jobs enumerated under the LHWCA. 26 In addition, the Court de-
termined that there is no evidence of congressional intent to limit
Jones Act remedies to seamen who assist in navigation. 27 Therefore,
the Court concluded, a maritime worker is entitled to pursue Jones
Act remedies if there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the work-
er's seaman status. 28
The plaintiff in Southwest Marine, Gizoni, was employed as a




2° 812 F.2d at 983. The Pizzitolo court relied on the reasoning of the prior Fifth Circuit
decision of Bouvier v. Krenz in which the court in its statutory interpretation of the LHWCA
and the Jones Act stated that the LHWCA specifically covers harborworkers, ship repairmen
or shipbuilders, but does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel. Id. at 982-
83; Bouvier, 702 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1983). The Pizzitolo court concluded that the statutory
language of the LHWCA "arguably demands" the conclusion that land-based harbor workers
are not, as a matter of law, members of a crew or Jones Act seamen. Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at
983.
A subsequent decision by the Fifth Circuit limited the scope of the Pizzitolo decision to
cases where "the evidence is insufficient to warrant a Finding of seaman's status." Legros v.
Panther Servs. Group, 863 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1988). Prior to a rehearing en banc,
however, the Legros parties settled and the appeal was dismissed, thereby negating the
precedential effect of the decision. See Legros v. Panther Servs. Group, Inc., 874 F.2d 953,
954 (5th Cir. 1989).
2a
	 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 492.
22 Id. at 489-90.
26 Id. at 492.
22 Id.
SP a
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California. 29 Southwest Marine owned floating platforms that did
not have engines, navigation equipment or living facilities." Tug-
boats moved these platforms into position alongside vessels to aid
ship repairmen engaged in their work. 3 Gizoni rode the floating
platforms in the normal course of his duties and occasionally served
as a lookout and provided maneuvering signals to the tugboat op-
erator as the platform was being towed into position." While in the
course of his duties, Gizoni was injured when his foot broke through
a thin wooden sheet covering a hole in the deck of the platform."
After receiving medical and compensation benefits from South-
west Marine in accordance with the provisions in the LHWCA,
Gizoni filed a negligence suit under the Jones Act against Southwest
Marine in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California." In his suit, Gizoni alleged that he was a seaman
injured as a result of Southwest Marine's negligence." The district
court granted the employer's summary judgment motion, finding
that the LHWCA's exclusive remedy provision prohibited Gizoni
from bringing his Jones Act suit. 36 In addition, the district court
ruled that Gizoni did not satisfy the criteria for Jones Act seaman
status because the platforms were not "vessels in navigation." 37 Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned that Gizoni's presence on board the
platforms derived from his duty as a ship repairman, and did not
include any responsibility to assist in the navigation of the plat-
forms." In granting Southwest Marine's motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court therefore ruled that, as a matter of law,
Gizoni was not a Jones Act seaman."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's determination that the exclusive remedy
provisions of the LHWCA barred Gizoni from pursuing his Jones





34 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 490; Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1990); Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, No. 87-1424, (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1988).
" Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 490.
"Id. For the relevant portion of the text of the LHWCA's exclusive remedy provision,
see supra note 7.
" Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 490. For a definition of "vessel in navigation," see supra
note 5.
" 112 S. Ct. at 490.
" Id.
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Act claim.° The Ninth Circuit also reversed the trial court's deter-
mination that Gizoni was not a seaman as a matter of law, holding
that questions of fact existed as to Gizoni's status as a seaman.' In
its decision, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the key factor in de-
termining whether or not the maritime employee is covered by the
LHWCA or the Jones Act depends on the nature of the worker's
employment and the congressional intent embodied in these Acts,
rather than the worker's job title. 42 The question of Gizoni's em-
ployment status under the LHWCA and Jones Act is therefore a
question of fact that should be submitted to a jury.43
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling unan-
imously.'" The Court held that an employee whose work involved
ship repair is not restricted to LHWCA remedies. 45 The Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that the nature of the work-
er's employment and the congressional intent in enacting the
LHWCA and the Jones Act, as opposed to the employee's job title,
should be the prevailing factors to consider in determining coverage
under these statutes. 46
Writing for the Court, Justice White stated that the district
court was incorrect in holding that, as a matter of law, the LHWCA
provided the exclusive remedy for all harbor workers.'? The Court
reasoned that the LHWCA cannot provide the exclusive remedy
for all harbor workers because the LHWCA could apply to a harbor
worker who was also a member of a crew of any vessel, as specified
under the Jones Act." The phrase "member of a crew of any vessel"
was a "refinement" of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act, according
to the Court.° Consequently, the question of whether a longshore-
man could be a seaman could not be resolved as a matter of law. 5°
The Court rejected Southwest Marine's argument that the fact-
specific inquiry into seaman status must always be decided as a
40 Id.; Gizoni, 909 F.2d at 389.
41 Gizoni, 909 F.2d at 387-88. The questions of fact included: "whether the floating
platforms were vessels in navigation, whether Gizoni's relationship to those platforms was
permanent, and whether he aided in their navigation." Id.
42 Id. at 389.
45 Id.
44 See Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 490.
45 See id. at 492.
40
	 id. at 490, 492; Gizoni, 909 F.2d at 389.
47 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 491.
45 Id.
45 Id. at 491.
50 See id.
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matter of law if the employee's job fits within one of the occupations
enumerated in the LHWCA." The Court stated that Southwest
Marine's argument failed to consider the possibility that some mar-
itime workers may be Jones Act seamen performing a job specifically
enumerated in the LHWCA.52 The Court then reiterated its holding
in Wilander that an examination of the Jones Act, the LHWCA and
other sources did not reveal a congressional intent to exclude from
Jones Act remedies those "traditional seamen" who are affiliated
with a vessel at sea, but who do not aid in navigation. 53 The Court
noted that in some cases a ship repairman may not qualify for
seaman status because he or she may lack the requisite connection
to the vessel in navigation." Not all ship repairmen, however, lack
the requisite connection as a matter of law because the determina-
tive factor is not the employee's particular job, but the employee's
connection to a vessel. 55 The Court concluded that a maritime
worker is limited to remedies under the LHWCA only if no genuine
issue of fact exists as to whether the worker was a seaman under
the Jones Act. 56 Thus, the LHWCA preserves a Jones Act remedy
for a vessel's crew even if they are shipyard employees."
The Court also rejected several other arguments by Southwest
Marine in its attempt to prevent Gizoni's Jones Act suit. 58 First, the
Court determined that the decisions holding that the LHWCA pro-
vided an exclusive remedy for specified injured railroad workers
otherwise permitted by the Federal Employers' Liability Act" were
not determinative in this case." The Court based its decision on the
51 /d. at 492. Southwest Marine's argument followed the Fifth Circuit precedent of
Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 983. See Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 490 n.1, 492.
32 Id. at 492.
" Id.; Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807, 817-18, discussed supra notes 6-11 and accompanying
text.
" Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 492.
"Id. Justice White wrote, "Because a ship repairman may spend all of his working hours
aboard a vessel in furtherance of its mission—even one used exclusively in ship repair work—
that worker may qualify as a Jones Act seaman," Id. at 494. See also McDermott lnt'l v.
Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991) (holding that seaman status depends on the maritime
worker's connection-to the vessel in navigation).
56 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 492.
57 Id.
Se Id. at 492-94,
39 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1988).
60 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 492-93. See also Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Schwalb,
493 U.S. 40, 42, 48 (1989) (holding that injured railroad employees who were repairing coal
loading equipment for maritime vessels were covered by the LHWCA); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 338-40 (1953) (holding that the LHWCA was the exclusive remedy
for a railroad brakeman injured while working on a railroad car float in navigable waters).
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fact that the LHWCA does not contain an exclusion for railroad
workers comparable to the Jones Act exclusion for seamen. 6 '
The Court also rejected Southwest Marine's argument that,
where a maritime worker is "arguably covered" by the LHWCA,
the district court should stay or preclude a traditional Jones Act
suit pending an LHWCA administrative decision that the worker is
a master or member of a crew. 62 The Court reasoned that Congress
did not intend the LHWCA to preclude or stay traditional Jones
Act suits brought in the district courts.63 In fact, the LHWCA ac-
tually anticipates that such suits could be brought without admin-
istrative action, according to the Court." The Court thus concluded
that Gizoni was not required to await an administrative determi-
nation of his status prior to a judicial determination. 65
In addition, the Court rejected Southwest Marine's argument
that a judicial proceeding under the LHWCA was subject to the
same jurisdictional restrictions required under the National Labor
Relations Act. 66 Cases involving the NLRA's complicated adminis-
trative proceedings required that state and federal courts yield to
the authority of the National Labor Relations Board. 67 The level of
complexity at the administrative level in the NLRA was not present
in the LHWCA, according to the Court. 68 The Court therefore
rejected Southwest Marine's argument that the LHWCA proceed-
ings should preempt any action taken by the plaintiff in federal
court."
Finally, the Court rejected Southwest Marine's argument that
an employee who receives benefits under the LHWCA is barred
from seeking relief under the Jones Act. 7° The Court stated that it





66 Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 493. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988); see also Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 388-91, 122 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2372-74
(1986); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
67 See Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 493 (citing Davis, 476 U.S. at 391, 122 L.R.R.M. at
1272). The Davis Court stated that it has repeatedly reiterated in its decisions that Congress,
in enacting the NLRA, intended the Board to have exclusive jurisdiction in these matters.
Davis, 476 U.S. at 391, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2393. Congress intended that the NLRA's scheme
of law, remedy and administration be applied consistently by a centralized administrative
board in order to avoid conflicts that would arise from the application of the NLRA's rules
by a wide number of tribunals. fd. at 389, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2372-73.
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is universally accepted that an employee who receives voluntary
payments under the LHWCA, without a formal determination of
his or her seaman status, is not prevented from seeking relief under
the Jones Act." In addition, the Court emphasized that statutory
interpretation of the LHWCA did not reveal an intent to preclude
a maritime worker from pursuing a Jones Act remedy." Further-
more, the Court rejected the contention that a maritime worker
who pursued a Jones Act remedy would benefit from double re-
covery by pointing out that under the LHWCA, any Jones Act
recovery for an injury is credited against liability imposed by the
LHWCA." Thus, by dispensing with the possibility of double re-
covery, the Court maintained either LHWCA or Jones Act remedies
for injured maritime workers. 74
The Court's decision in Southwest Marine effectively resolves a
split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and firmly signals the
Court's desire to clarify the interaction between claims made under
the LHWCA and suits brought under the Jones Act. 75 As such, the
Court establishes clear avenues for an injured maritime worker to
follow in seeking compensation for injuries suffered on the job. An
injured maritime worker should not be denied an opportunity to
recover compensatory damages (by a jury trial) merely based on the
title of his or her job. This decision, although based upon reasoning
that arguably contradicts prior judicial interpretation of the Jones
Act and the LHWCA and the legislative intent behind these Acts,
greatly benefits a class of workers who should not have . been fore-
closed from recovery on the basis of job title.
This decision greatly benefits injured land-based maritime
workers by making remedies available for those such as Gizoni who,
although they are longshoremen under the LHWCA, spend nearly
all of their time working aboard a vessel in furtherance of the
71
 Id. See also GRANT GI MORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., LAW OF ADMIRALTY 435 (2d ed.
1975); 4 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 90.51(a), at 16-507 (1989).
72 See Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 494.
" See id. at 494 & n.5. The Court also noted that the LHWCA specifically provided for
full compensation credit for claims made under the Jones Act. Id. In addition, 33 U.S.C.
§ 903(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any amounts paid to an employee
for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under
this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law or section 688 of
Title 46 Appendix (relating to recovery for injury to or death of seamen) shall
be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter.
74 See Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 494 & n.5.
" See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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vessel's objectives. By allowing injured maritime workers to pursue
Jones Act remedies in addition to LHWCA remedies, it can be
expected that the total amount of compensatory damages awarded
to injured maritime workers will vary considerably from case to case
due to the unpredictable nature of juries in granting damage
awards.76 A maritime worker who is successful in a Jones Act suit
will most likely be awarded a higher amount of compensatory dam-
ages from a jury than he or she would have received from an
administrative body. This result is appropriate, especially in in-
stances where the severity of the worker's disabling injury would
essentially prohibit the employee from ever returning to his or her
desired profession.
Nevertheless, commentators have argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the principal
case, is flawed because the Court's reasoning contradicts the intent
of the LHWCA by upsetting the uniform compensatory scheme for
all workers whose occupations are enumerated within the Act. 77 In
addition, it has been argued that the Ninth Circuit's ruling contra-
dicted the Supreme Court's decision in Wilander, 78 where the Court
determined that the LHWCA and the Jones Act were mutually
exclusive, thereby clarifying the distinction between land-based
maritime workers covered by the LHWCA and workers who qualify
for seaman status under the Jones Act. 79 These commentators pre-
fer a clear-cut distinction be made between land-based maritime
workers covered under the LHWCA and traditional seamen cov-
ered under the Jones Act."
This decision does not violate the intended purpose and judicial
interpretation of these Acts, however, as the majority of workers
whose occupations are enumerated within the LHWCA will only be
able to recover under that Act. Arguably, this decision creates an
opportunity to pursue both LHWCA and Jones Act statutory rem-
76 See Edith Green, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Dethionmaking, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 225-27 (Fall 1989) (addressing generally the competence and decision-
making process of juries in determining damage awards).
" See Kenneth G. Engerrand, Seaman Status Reconstructed, 32 S. TEx. L. REV. 169, 182
n.91 (1991); Eileen R. Madrid, Seaman Status: The Supreme Court Recharts Its Course: Wilander
and Gizoni, 51 Lt. L. REV, 1149, 1179-81 (1991).
76 Wilander, 111  S. Ct. at 817,
79 See Engerrand, supra note 77, at 182 n.91; Madrid, supra note 77, at 1179-81.
In Wilander, the Court determined that the LHWCA and the Jones Act were mutually
exclusive because the LHWCA excluded any employee who was a master or member of a
crew of any vessel. 1 11 S. Ct. at 813. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
8° See Engerrand, supra note 77, at 182 n.91; Madrid, supra note 77, at 1179-81.
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edies for a discrete number of individuals, namely, those maritime
workers whose occupations are enumerated under the LHWCA and
who also qualify as Jones Act seamen. Although there are a limited
number of maritime workers who will be allowed to pursue both
remedies, the Court clarified that they will not benefit from double
recovery, because the LHWCA specifically provides for full com-
pensation credit for claims made under the Jones Act.'" This factor
will most likely discourage land-based plaintiffs from stretching an
argument that they should qualify as Jones Act seamen.
In sum, Southwest Marine resolved the split between the circuits
by unanimously holding that injured maritime workers whose oc-
cupations are enumerated within the LHWCA may pursue damages
under the Jones Act, provided that there is a genuine issue of fact
as to the worker's seaman status. 82
 Because the number of injured
maritime workers in this employment category is extremely limited,
this decision arguably affects very few people. Thus, after Southwest
Marine, injured maritime workers who satisfy the criteria for both
the LHWCA and the Jones Act will have a choice of remedies to
pursue and will be assured of attaining the maximum amount of
allowable compensatory damages for their injuries.
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. *The Use of After-Acquired Resume Fraud as a Defense to
Discrimination Claims: Washington v. Lake County, Illinois'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion and
national origin. 2
 Employers, however, can sometimes escape liability
even if an employment decision was motivated by discrimination.'
" Southwest Marine, 112 S. Ct. at 494 & n.5. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text.
8' 112 S. Ct. at 492.
* By Brian J. King, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I
 969 F.2d 250, 59 FEP Cases 989 (7th Cir. 1992).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The applicable section of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
' See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242, 49 FEP Cases 954, 959 (1989).
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If an employer can prove that it would have taken the same action
absent discrimination, the employer will not be liable. 4
In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the United States
Supreme Court decided that an employer may not be liable even if
an impermissible factor under Title VII substantially influenced an
employment decision. 5
 The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse alleged she
was denied promotion because of her sex. 6
 The Court held that if
an impermissible factor played a part in an employment decision
the employer can avoid liability if the same decision would have
been made without consideration of the impermissible factor.?
Thus, an employer who based an employment decision on a mixture
of permissible and impermissible motives may escape Title VII
liability. 9
Analogizing to this so-called "mixed motive" doctrine, federal
appellate courts have allowed the use of evidence acquired after the
employee's termination as a defense to employment discrimination
claims. 9 In 1988, in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that evidence of employee misconduct discovered after the employ-
ee's termination was relevant to a "mixed motive" analysis."' The
court found that the employee would have been discharged had
the employer known about the misconduct, regardless of any other
motivation." While the after-acquired evidence could not have been
a cause of the employee's discharge, the court did find it relevant
to the employee's claim of injury and precluded any recovery. 12
The federal courts have developed two standards in cases in-
volving after-acquired evidence of dishonesty in the employment
application process." Some courts have allowed employers to escape
4 See id. at 244-45, 49 FEP Cases at 960-61.
Id. at 250, 49 FEP Cases at 962.
Id. at 232, 49 FEP Cases at 955.
Id. at 242, 49 FEP Cases at 959 (plurality). See also id. at 259-60, 49 FE? cases at 966
(White, J., concurring); id. at 261, 99 FE? Cases at 967 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8
 See Price Waterhouse, 990 U.S. at 247, 49 FEP Cases at 961.
See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., No. 91-1894, 1992 WL 224610, at
*3, 59 FEP Cases 1249, 1250-51 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 704-08, 48 FEP Cases 1107, 1110-13 (10th Cir. 1988);
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 623, 34 FEP Cases 217, 225 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).
" See 864 F.2d at 708, 98 FEP Cases at 1113.
11 /d,
18 Id.
" See Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102, 1106, 58 FEP Cases 1430,
1433-34 (D. Colo. 1992).
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liability if they can prove that they would not have hired the em-
ployee had they known of the resume fraud. 14 In place of this
"would not have hired" standard, other courts have applied the
"would have fired" standard that requires employers to show that
they would have fired the employee had they known about the
misrepresentations during the employee's employment. 15 In some
cases, courts have applied both of these standards. 16 No circuit
court, however, has clarified the relationship between these stan-
dards."
During the Survey year, in Washington v. Lake County, Ill., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
the "would have fired" standard applies when an employee lies on
the employment application and is later fired for an unrelated
reason."' The Washington court determined that the facts of each
case dictate which standard should apply. 19 Accordingly, the Wash-
ington court is the first federal appellate court to examine closely
the relationship between the "would not have hired" and "would
have fired" standards in a case involving after-acquired evidence of
resume fraud."
In Washington, plaintiff Eddie Washington began work as a
jailor at the Lake County Sheriff's Department ("the Department")
in September 1986. 21 Before being hired, Washington completed
and signed an application that stated that any misrepresentation
would result in discharge. 22 On the application, Washington rep-
14 See Punahele v. United Air Lines, 756 F. Supp. 487, 490-91, 55 FE? Cases 44, 47 (D.
Colo. 1991); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 999-95, 50 FEP Cases
688, 691 (D. Kan. 1989).
See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1968-69, 58 FEP
Cases 535, 537 (D. Ariz. 1992); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659-61, 53
FEP Cases 951, 953-55 (D. Utah 1990).
16 See, e.g., Milligan Jensen, 1992 WL 224610, at *3, 59 FE? Cases 1249, 1250-51; Johnson
v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415, 57 FE? Cases 1362, 1367 (6th Cir. 1992);
Churchman v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 521, 55 FEP Cases 81, 86 (D. Kan. 1991).
See Washington v. Lake County, III., 969 F.2d 250, 259 n.3, 59 FE? Cases 989, 992
n.3 (7th Cir. 1992).
18 Id. at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 993.
19 See id. at 254-56, 59 FEP Cases at 992-93.
" See id. at 254-57, 59 FEP Cases at 991-94.
21 1d. at 251, 59 FEP Cases at 989-90.
" Washington, 969 F.2d at 252, 59 FEP Cases at 990. This provision stated:
I agree that if any misrepresentation has been made by me ... any offer
of employment may be withdrawn or my employment terminated immediately
without any obligation to me other than for payment, at the rate agreed upon,
for services actually rendered. .. .
Id., 59 FEP Cases at 990.
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resented that he had never been convicted of a criminal offense. 23
In fact, Washington had been convicted of criminal trespass in 1974
and third-degree assault in 198L 24
On July 13, 1989, the Department fired Washington. 25 At this
time, the Department did not know that Washington had lied on
his application. 2" The letter of termination stated that Washington
was fired because his recent arrest for criminal sexual assault had
discredited the Department. 27 The complainant later dropped this
sexual assault charge. 28 The letter further explained that Washing-
ton's file contained evidence of twelve transgressions of Department
policy, including insubordination and violation of jail security. 29
Washington filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois." In his complaint, Washington,
who is African-American, alleged that the defendants had unfairly
singled him out because of his race and had falsely characterized
the incidents reported in his file. 3 ' The district court dismissed
several of Washington's claims, leaving a Title VII claim of racial
discrimination against Lake County." Washington presented evi-
dence of an appraisal conducted less than two months before his
firing in which he received all "excellent" and "proficient" ratings
with no "adequate" or "marginal" scores." He also compared his
situation with that of Officer Linda Blau, a white member of the
Department. 34 Blau was involved in a hit-and-run accident while in
uniform." The police arrested her for driving while under the
influence of alcohol and for leaving the scene of an accident, but
the Department only suspended her for three days. 3° Despite the
" Id. at 251-52, 59 FEP Cases at 990.
23 Id, at 252, 59 FEP Cases at 990.
23 Id,
26 Id.




3 ' Id. Washington's amended complaint charged Lake County, Illinois, the Department,
and Lieutenant Harry Frossard, individually and in his official capacity, with violating Title
VII, 42 U.S.C.
	
1983 and with violating his procedural due process rights under the
Constitution. Id.
32 Washington, 969 F.2d at 252, 59 FEP Cases at 990. The district court also did not
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presentation of this evidence, in March 1991, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Wash-
ington's remaining claims." The district court based its decision on
the after-acquired evidence of Washington's resume fraud. 38 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed."
The Washington court observed that the "would not have fired"
and "would have fired" standards were confusingly intermingled."
Because the Tenth Circuit's decision in Summers involved after-
acquired evidence of on-the-job misconduct and not a falsified ap-
plication, the Washington court found Summers inapplicable to re-
sume fraud cases.'" According to the Washington court, which stan-
dard is applied can alter the outcome of a case involving after-
acquired evidence of resume fraud. 42 The court reasoned that an
employer will most likely not hire someone who lies on an appli-
cation, especially if the misrepresentation concerns a material re-
quirement for the position sought." On the other hand, an em-
ployer might be loath to fire an employee if the falsification were
discovered after the employee had proven capable in the position."
The Washington court found guidance in Price Waterhouse for
deciding when each of the two standards should apply." The court
noted that Price Waterhouse focused on the time of the adverse
employment decision and inquired whether the same decision
would have been made without the discriminatory motive.'" The
Washington court concluded that this temporal focus should be used
in cases involving after-acquired evidence.47 Thus, the court stated
that in after-acquired evidence cases an employer must prove that
if acting in a race-neutral manner, it would have made the same
decision had it known of the after-acquired evidence at the time of
decision." Because Washington claimed that he was unjustly fired,
the court concluded that the "would have fired" standard was op-
57 Washington, 969 F.2d at 252, 59 FEP Cases at 990.
" See id.
" Id. at 257, 59 . FEP Cases at 994.
" Id. at 254, 59 FEP Cases at 991.
41 See id., 59 FEP Cases at 992.
42 See Washington, 969 F.2d at 254, 59 FEP Cases at 992.
45 Id.
14 Id.
45 Id. at 255, FEP Cases at 992-93.
45 Id. at 255-56, 59 FEP Cases at 992-93.
42 Washington, 969 F.2d at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 993.
45 Id. at 255, 59 FEP Cases at 993.
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propriate.49
 The court found equitable appeal in the idea that a
person who would not have been hired but for his misrepresenta-
tions should not receive legal relief for a later employment deci-
sion. 5° Nevertheless, the court found that its temporal focus made
the "would not have hired" standard irrelevant in this case. 51 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the "would not have hired" standard
would unjustifiably incorporate property right concepts into em-
ployment discrimination law. 52 According to the court, a "property
right" in one's job is not required and could not be required to
show injury under Title VII because much employment is "at-will,"
where an employee can be fired for any reason or no reason."
Applying the "would have fired" standard to the facts of the
case, the Washington court determined that the Department, acting
in a race-neutral manner, would have fired Washington if it had
discovered the resume fraud during his employment." Washington
failed to produce affirmative evidence to counter affidavits from
the Superintendent of the Lake County Jail and the Sheriff of Lake
County, which both stated that Washington would have been dis-
charged if the facts of his criminal convictions were known at the
time of his employment. 55
 Also, the court found the facts of Wash-
ington's and Officer Blau's situations too dissimilar to justify a con-
clusion that the Department treated white and black officers differ-
ently. 56
 Finally, even though the Department had no formal policy
to fire employees whom it later discovered had lied on their appli-
cations, the court stated that Washington did not affirmatively prove
that an employee would not have been fired for resume fraud. 57
Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 58
The Washington court logically determined that the timing of
the adverse employment decision should dictate which of the two
standards apply." The court correctly reasoned that situations could
49
 Id. at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 993,
"9 Id.
'' See id.
52 Washington, 969 F.2d at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 993.
55 Id.
54 Id., 59 FEP Cases at 994.
35 Id. at 256-57, 59 FEP Cases at 994.
5" Id. at 257, 59 FEP Cases at 994. The court noted that, unlike Washington, Blau did
not lie on her application and her criminal act did not involve personal violence, which the
court found relevant to Washington's position as a jailor. Id.
57 Washington, 969 F.2d at 257, 59 FEP Cases at 994.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 994.
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arise in which an employer would not fire an employee if the
employer subsequently discovered resume fraud, even though the
employee would not have been hired if the resume fraud had been
discovered during the hiring process.° An employee, trained with
the employer's resources, who had proven to be a proficient worker,
might not be fired for subsequently discovered resume fraud. 61
Thus, this standard correctly burdens an employer with the more
difficult task of proving that it would have fired a capable employee
in spite of the employee's good work. 62
The Washington court's distinction between the two standards
is rational.63 Nevertheless, permitting the use of after-acquired ev-
idence in employment discrimination cases is unwise." The after-
acquired evidence defense is antithetical to Title VII's goal of en-
couraging employers to eliminate discrimination. 65 Through the use
of after-acquired evidence, employers can terminate an employee
unlawfully and then escape liability by searching the employee's
background for flaws in order to create a "legitimate" reason for
the termination. 66 Courts undermine the strength of Title VII when
they allow the use of after-acquired evidence to prevent a victim of
employment discrimination from gaining a remedy. 67
In sum, in Washington v. Lake County, Ill., the Seventh Circuit
addressed and clarified the interaction between the "would not have
hired" and "would have fired" standards in the context of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 68 The Washington court determined
that if a case involves after-acquired evidence of resume fraud in
which an employee claims to be the victim of an unlawful firing,
the "would have fired" standard applies.69 On the other hand, if
the employee's claim involves discriminatory hiring, the "would not
6° See Id. at 254, 59 FEP Cases at 991-92.
" See id., 59 FEP Cases at 992; see also Banger, 789 F. Supp. at 1106 & n.4, 58 FEP Cases
at 1434 & n.4.
62 See Banger, 789 F. Supp. at 1106, 58 FEP Cases at 1434. .
63 See id.
"See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179-81, 59 FEP Cases 997,
1001-02 (11th Cir. 1992) (after-acquired evidence defense does not encourage employers to
eliminate discrimination).
" See id. at 1180, 59 FEP Cases at 1102 (goal of Title VII is to achieve equality of
employment opportunity) (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18
(1975)).
66 Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180, 59 FEP Cases at 1102.
67 See id.
Washington, 969 F.2d at 254-57, 59 FEP Cases at 991-94.
69 Id. at 256, 59 FEP Cases at 993.
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have hired" standard applies." Whether other circuit courts will
follow the Washington court's reasoning remains to be seen.
IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. *Retaliation Claims Under § 4(d) of the ADEA: EEOC v. Board of
Governors of State Colleges and Universities.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")
prohibits discrimination by an employer on the basis of age. 2 Section
4(d) of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any employee who has "made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or
litigation under this [Act]." 3 This prohibition against retaliatory
action on the part of an employer derives its spirit and wording
from a similar provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII").4 The purpose of such provisions is to protect persons
who seek to redress congressionally recognized forms of discrimi-
nation by initiating legal action'
Courts have generally raised three main questions when con-
sidering an individual employee's right to protection from retalia-
tory action under the ADEA or Title V11. 6 First, must a plaintiff
demonstrate a particular retaliatory intent or state of mind in the
employer? 7 Second, what affirmative defenses might an employer
legitimately advance to defeat such claims? 8 Finally, can an employee
waive the right to protection from retaliatory action, either individ-
ually or through a collective bargaining agreementP
79 See id. at 255 n.5, 59 FEP Cases at 993 n.5.
* By Lorne Fienberg, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 58 FEP Cases
292 (7th Cir. 1992).
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
5 Id. 623(d).
See EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088, 44 FEP Cases 569, 571 (5th Cir. 1987);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
5 Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1088, 44 FEP Cases at 571.
6 See Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 427-31, 58 FEP Cases at 294-97.
7 See TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128-29, 36 FEP Cases 977, 985 (1985); Rose v.
Hearst Magazines Div., The Hearst Corp., 814 F.2d 491, 492-93, 43 FEP Cases 641, 642
(7th Cir. 1987).
8 See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 129, 36 FEP Cases at 986; Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 429,
58 FEP Cases at 296; Rose, 814 F.2d at 493, 36 FEP Cases at 985.
9 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52, 7 FEP Cases 81, 87 (1974);
Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1089-90, 44 FEP Cases at 572-73.
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In TWA v. Thurston, the United States Supreme Court held in
1985 that the defendant airline's transfer policy for pilots over the
age of sixty violated the ADEA even though the discrimination was
not willful.i° TWA's policy subjected captains over the age of sixty
to a complex bidding procedure for available engineer positions,
while captains who became disqualified from serving for reasons
other than age could automatically displace less senior engineers."
The Court held that the ADEA required the airline to afford sixty-
year-old captains the same transfer privileges that it gave to captains
disqualified for reasons other than age. 12 TWA's affirmative defense
that it was acting reasonably and in good faith by attempting to
bring its policy into compliance with the ADEA was only sufficient
to shield it from liability for the payment of liquidated damages.' 3
In Rose v. Hearst Magazines Division, The Hearst Corp., however,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled
in 1987 that a federal district court's verdict of retaliatory discharge
against an employee who had filed an ADEA complaint could not
stand because the jury had found no willful intent on the part of
the employer.' 4 Rose, an advertising sales manager, claimed that he
had been discharged in retaliation for filing ADEA discrimination
charges.' 5 The jury found that the filing of the age discrimination
charges had been a determining cause for Rose's discharge, but that
Hearst's violation of the ADEA had not been willful, because it had
discharged Rose only after his work performance deteriorated fol-
lowing an automobile accident. 16 The Rose court held that these two
conclusions were irreconcilable and reasoned that as long as Hearst
was acting in good faith, it could not be found to have retaliated
against Rose."
In 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held in EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., that an employee's right to
file a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") cannot be waived, either by the individual
10 See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 130, 36 FEP Cases at 986. Intent remained an issue in the
Thurston Court's determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to liquidated damages
because the violation was not "willful." Id.
Id. at 116-17, 36 FEP Cases at 980.
12 1d. at 130, 36 FEP Cases at 986.
ES Id.
14 Rose, 814 F.2d at 493, 43 FEP Cases at 643.
1a Id. at 493, 43 FEP Cases at 642.
1a Id. at 492-93, 43 FEP Cases at 642.
17 Id. at 493, 43 FEP Cases at 642.
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or by a union in a collective bargaining agreement." In Cosmair, the
employer terminated the benefits of an employee who filed an age
discrimination complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the em-
ployee had signed an agreement waiving his right to file such
claims.° The court reasoned that any waiver by an employee of the
right to file an ADEA charge would be against public policy and
thus void." Accordingly, the court held that the employer could
not rely upon an employee's signed statement as a justification for
a retaliatory employment policy. 2 '
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., a discrimination suit brought
under Title VII, the United States Supreme Court held in 1974
that an employee who had filed a grievance under the non-discrim-
ination clause of a collective bargaining agreement was not fore-
closed from filing a similar complaint with the EEOC. 22 Writing for
the Court, Justice Powell reasoned that Congress intended to pro-
vide employees with parallel and overlapping remedies as a means
of furthering both the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment
practices. 25 Thus, the Court held that the waiver of an individual's
right to be free from discriminatory employment practices "can
form no part of the collective-bargaining process. . . . "24
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges
and Universities, held that the provision in a collective bargaining
agreement requiring employees to choose between an in-house
grievance proceeding and the filing of a complaint with the EEOC
was retaliatory on its face, and thus violated § 4(d) of the ADEA. 25
Neither the employer's good faith nor its lack of willful intent was
a valid affirmative defense." After Board of Governors, a court hear-
ing a complaint under § 4(d) of the ADEA need only consider the
effects of the retaliatory action on the employee, without reference
to the employer's intent or motivation." In addition, unions may
" See Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1089-90, 44 FEY Cases at 573.
19 Id. at 1087, 44 FEY Cases at 570-71.
40 1d. at 1090, 44 FEP Cases at 573.
21 Id.
22 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 FEY Cases at 90.
"Id. at 47, 7 FEP Cases at 85.
24 Id. at 51, 7 FEP Cases at 87.
"Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 431, 58 FEP Cases at 298.
"Id. at 428, 58 FEP Cases at 294-95.
" See id. at 427, 58 FEP Cases at 294.
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expect that courts will invalidate any collective bargaining agree-
ment that waives their members' ADEA rights. 28
In April 1984, Raymond Lewis, a professor at Northeastern
Illinois University ("University"), filed a grievance with the Univer-
sity Professionals of Illinois ("Union") when the President of the
University decided not to recommend Lewis for tenure, allegedly
in violation of University procedures. 29 Six days before his arbitra-
tion hearing was set to convene, Lewis filed an age discrimination
claim under the ADEA at the urging of the EEOC. 3° Article 17.2
of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the
Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities ("Board")
stipulates: "If . . . while a grievance proceeding is in progress, an
employee seeks resolution of the matter in any other forum,
whether administrative or judicial, the Board or any University shall
have no obligation to . . . proceed further with the matter pursuant
to this grievance procedure." 3 ' Even though the Board learned of
Lewis's EEOC claim after the arbitration hearing had concluded, it
invoked article 17.2 to prevent the arbitrator from rendering a
decision. 32 The Board's termination of the grievance proceeding
prompted the EEOC to file a federal action."
The case generated three federal district court opinions, des-
ignated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit as BOG I, BOG II and BOG III. 34 In BOG I, the Board moved
to dismiss the complaint, asserting that it had a fundamental con-
tractual right under article 17.2 of the collective bargaining agree-
ment not to submit the dispute to arbitration." The Board also
argued that the termination agreement served the purpose of avoid-
ing the waste of duplicate proceedings on the same complaint."
xe See id. at 431, 58 FEP Cases at 297.
'9 Id. at 426, 58 FEP Cases at 293.
' Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 426, 58 FEP Cases at 293.
3' Id.
"Id.
"Id., 58 FEP Cases at 293-94. Subsequently, the Board reinstated Lewis's grievance
proceeding, but the EEOC decided to proceed to trial to challenge article 17.2, which the
Board had used against three other employees who had filed charges of discrimination, and
which the Board had not modified. Id. at 426-27 & n.2, 58 FEP Cases at 293-94.
Id. at 426, FEP Cases at 293. The cases are reported as: EEOC v. Board of Governors
of State Colleges and Univs., 735 F. Supp. 888, 52 FEP Cases 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1990); EEOC
v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 706 F. Supp. 1377, 50 FEP Cases 126
(N.D, Ill. 1989); EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 655 F. Supp.
630, 44 FEP Cases 724 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
'5
 Board of Governors I, 665 F. Supp. at 633, 44 FEP Cases at 726.
36 Id.
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Judge Getzendanner of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois rejected the Board's motion, holding that
article 17.2 of the collective bargaining agreement constituted a
prima facie case of forbidden retaliation under § 4(d) of the
ADEA. 57
In BOG II, Judge Aspen of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Illinois denied an EEOC motion for partial
summary judgment on the ground that the Board's desire to avoid
duplicative litigation was a non-malicious justification for article
1 7.2. 38 Thus, there was a genuine issue as to the Board's good faith
in adopting the measure." Judge Aspen relied upon dicta in Rose
v. The Hearst Corp. which stipulated that retaliatory action must be
willful to be actionable."
In BOG III, Judge Aspen granted summary judgment for the
Board, concluding that article 17.2 was not invalid, absent evidence
that the provision was adopted with intent to retaliate. 4 ' In Board of
Governors, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the
district court in BOG III had misapplied the Rose case. 42 Its ruling
effectively restored Judge Getzendanner's initial opinion that article
17.2 of the collective bargaining agreement was invalid per se as a
form of retaliation forbidden by § 4(d) of the ADEA. 43
The court's reasoning in Board of Governors comprised a two-
step process. 44 First, it demonstrated that any retaliatory employ-
ment policy constitutes a per se violation of § 4(d), and is thus
invalid regardless of the employer's intent or its proffer of a good
faith justification.45 Second, it determined that article 17.2 of the
collective bargaining agreement was such a retaliatory policy with
respect to ADEA claimants."
The court insisted that § 4(d) explicitly prohibits discrimination
against employees who engage in protected activity, and that no
"Id. at 635, 44 FEP Cases at 727-28.
38 Board of Governors II, 706 F. Supp. at 1386-87, 50 FEP Cases at 133. After Judge
Getzendanner resigned from the judiciary, the case was assigned to Judge Aspen. See EEOC
v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 427, 58 FEP Cases 292,
294 (7th Cir. 1992).
39 Board of Governors II, 706 F. Supp. at 1386, 50 FEP Cases at 133.
40 Id. (citing Rose, 814 F.2d at 493, 43 FE? Cases at 642).
41 Board of Governors III, 735 F. Supp. at 891, 52 FEP Cases at 1267.
49 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 427, 58 FE? Cases at 294.
45 Id.
" See id. at 429, 58 FEP Cases at 296.
43 Id.
40 Id.
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showing of willful intent is necessary in cases involving retaliatory
employment policies. 47 The court rejected the Board's good faith
motive for adopting the retaliatory policy and its contention that
discrimination ought to be illegal only if it is malicious." Rather,
the court observed that Congress had relieved the judiciary of the
responsibility of distinguishing between legal and illegal discrimi-
nation by choosing not to provide any affirmative defenses to a
charge of retaliation and by providing no exceptions for discrimi-
nation that an employer might find "rational or financially pru-
dent."49
 The court acknowledged that the invalidation of article
17.2 would allow an employee of the University overlapping legal
and contractual remedies. 5° Moreover, this choice of remedies was
consonant with the strong federal policy against discriminatory em-
ployment practices.m
In holding that the Board's asserted good faith defense was
irrelevant, the court distinguished the treatment of intent in Rose. 52
In Rose, the court required a finding of,both retaliation and willful
intent because of the particular facts in that individual-disparate-
treatment case." In Board of Governors, the court did not extend the
rationale of Rose to a case that involved a discriminatory policy."
47 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 427, 58 FEY Cases at 294.
49 Id. at 428, 58 FEP Cases at 294.
49 Id., 58 FEP Cases at 295.
50 Id. (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47, 7 FEP Cases at 85).
51 See id. at 428, 58 FEP Cases at 295.
" Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 428, 58 FE? Cases at 295 (citing Rose, 814 F.2d at 493,
43 FEP Cases at 642).
" Rose, 814 F.2cf at 493, 43 FEP Cases at 642. The determination of "willfulness" or
"discriminatory intent" is central to the two-tier liability scheme set up by the ADEA. Board
of Governors, 957 F.2d at 428-29, 58 FEP Cases at 295. Section 623 constitutes the first tier
and subjects the employer to the payment of damages for non-willful age discrimination. Id.
See also Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1064, 99 FEP Cases 395, 396 (7th Cir. 1989).
Section 626(b) provides for the second tier of liability and subjects an employer to double
damages for willful violations. See Burlew, 896 F.2d at 1064, 49 FEP Cases at 396. The
Supreme Court's standard for determining if a violation is willful is whether "the employer
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the ADEA." TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128, 36 FEP Cases 977, 985 (1985). In Rose,
the employer confronted the plaintiff with a series of criticisms of his work and "angrily
chastised him for filing the age discrimination charges." 814 F.2d at 492, 43 FEP Cases at
642. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that under those
circumstances, the jury could not return a finding of non-willful retaliation, because the
employer's flagrant conduct must have been evidence of a willful intent to commit an action
prohibited by the ADEA. Id.
9" Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 429, 58 FEP Cases at 295. At least two other federal
circuit courts have rejected the holding in Rose, even in cases of individual disparate treat-
ment. See Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1571, 50 FEP Cases 622, 628
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Such cases, it asserted, require no inquiry into the defendant's state
of mind in order to determine whether the policy has a discrimi-
natory effect. 55
Having concluded that any retaliatory policy is a per se violation
of § 4(d), the Board of Governors court proceeded to explain why
article 17.2 of the collective bargaining agreement constituted such
a retaliatory policy with respect to ADEA claimants. 56 Article 17.2
authorized the Board to terminate an in-house grievance proceed-
ing for the sole reason that the employee had filed an ADEA com-
plaint." Although the Board acknowledged that article 17.2 com-
pelled an employee to choose between two forms of relief, it claimed
that the loss of the contractual right to a grievance procedure did
not create a legal issue, because the University was under no obli-
gation to provide employees with the right to a grievance procedure
in the first place." The court rejected this argument on the grounds
that an employer is not free to dole out benefits in a discriminatory
fashion, even if the employer would have been free not to provide
the benefit at al1, 59
Similarly, the court rejected the Board's contention that article
17.2 was not discriminatory because it did not apply solely to em-
ployees who brought ADEA or Title VII discrimination claims, but
to any employee who brought an employment-related action in any
judicial or administrative forum. 6° The court reasoned that a policy
is no less discriminatory toward a protected group simply because
it adversely affects non-protected persons as wel1. 61 Adoption of the
Board's position would enable employers to apply all kinds of dis-
criminatory criteria against a protected group as long as they were
careful to include some members of a non-protected class. 62
(2d Cir. 1989) (asserting that a finding of retaliation may result in a finding of willfulness,
but need not do so in every case); Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 636,
48 FEP Cases 516, 519 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the view that a finding against willfulness
must be inconsistent with a jury finding of intentional discrimination).
55 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 429, 58 FEP Cases at 296 (citing BurIew, 869 F.2d at
1065, 49 FEP Cases at 397).
56 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 429, 58 FEP Cases at 296.
57 Id. at 430, 58 FEP Cases at 296.
m, Id.
59 Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, 34 FEP Cases 1406, 1410
(1984)).
130 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 430, 58 FEP Cases at 296. For example, under article
17.2, an employee's decision to file a contract claim in a judicial forum would similarly result
in the termination of his or her grievance proceeding. Id.
6 ' Id. at 430, 58 FEP Cases at 297.
62 Id. at 431, 58 FEP Cases at 297.
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Manion expressed concern that
the court's hard line against retaliatory employment policies such
as article 17.2 might inadvertently have effects that were not in-
tended by the federal laws against discrimination.° Judge Manion
acknowledged that the choice which article 17.2 imposed, between
an in-house grievance procedure and the filing of an age discrimi-
nation charge, did technically violate § 4(d) of the ADEA. 64 Never-
theless, he warned that the rigid result reached by the majority
might cause employers to eliminate the contractual grievance pro-
cedure as a viable option to litigation as a means of resolving em-
ployment disputes.°
In sum, EEOC v. Board of Governors strongly reinforced § 4(d)'s
prohibition against policies that penalize employees who exercise
their statutory rights under the ADEA. 66
 The court recognized that
the effectiveness of the EEOC depends upon the willingness of
employees to come forward with their claims. 67 It should reassure
employees that their rights to bring such claims will be forcefully
protected by statutory provisions against retaliation such as those
in the ADEA or Title VII.
The Board of Governors decision should deter employers from
adopting policies that inhibit their employees from exercising their
ADEA rights by imposing adverse employment consequences. 68 It
seems that courts will invalidate provisions in any collective bar-
gaining agreement which stipulate that grievances will proceed to
arbitration only if an employee is willing to forego his or her right
to bring a complaint under the ADEA.69 The Board of Governors
decision also warns union leaders that even though they may be
free to bargain away certain rights, such as the right to strike, in
exchange for other benefits or concessions, any attempt to waive
employees' rights under the ADEA or Title VII will be void as
against federal employment policy.
Judge Manion's concurring opinion in Board of Governors, how-
ever, speculates that without provisions such as article 1 7.2, em-
ployers may have little incentive to provide in-house procedures for
65 Id. at 432, 58 FEP Cases at 298 (Manion, J., concurring).
64 Id.
65 Id.







ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 421
hearing and resolving employment grievances. 70 As the "baby
boom" generation ages and the number of workers covered by the
ADEA grows, age discrimination complaints can be expected to
increase. The advantage of a grievance procedure that includes
binding arbitration is that a just result can often be achieved without
sending every employment dispute into the federal courts for res-
olution." In-house grievance procedures provide both employers
and employees with a mechanism for resolving disputes without the
financial expense and negative publicity that accompany drawn-out
litigation. Moreover, in those instances where the employee seeks
to preserve an ongoing employment relationship, the in-house
grievance procedure is far more likely to result in an amicable
compromise than is a combative lawsuit.
Judge Manion pessimistically foresees that the strong ruling in
Board of Governors may inadvertently result in a dramatic increase
in the number of age discrimination claims brought before federal
courts." Such cases instead might well have been aired in a timely
fashion and justly settled through in-house grievance procedures. 73
Faced with the prospect that employees will simultaneously bring
their complaints in two fora and take the most advantageous result,
employers may determine that it will be more efficient and econom-
ical if legal action is the only available alternative. 74
There will always be employers who are skeptical of in-house
grievance hearings, particularly where the complainant's peers par-
ticipate in the adjudication, because such hearings tend to result in
findings that are sympathetic to employees. Those employers may
indeed bear out Judge Manion's pessimism by using the decision in
Board of Governors to rationalize the abandonment of in-house griev-
ance proceedings in cases involving ADEA claims. For the majority
of employers who recognize that the in-house resolution of such
employment disputes is preferable to the publicity and expense of
time-consuming litigation, Board of Governors should have a salutary,
clarifying effect. Because employers can expect courts to adopt a
hard line against retaliatory employment practices, they are far
more likely to avoid such practices altogether. They are also likely
to devise grievance procedures that produce just results instead of
seeking ways to subvert the process of in-house dispute resolution.
7° Id. at 432, 58 FEP Cases at 298,
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In sum, the ruling in EEOC v. Board of Governors ensures that
the Seventh Circuit will apply § 4(d) of the ADEA to strike down
any retaliatory employment policy regardless of the employer's
good faith or lack of willful intent. 75 Courts may also invalidate any
collective bargaining agreement in which a union waives its mem-
bers' ADEA rights.Th The Board of Governors court has thus strength-
ened the rights given to ADEA claimants under § 4(d) and increased
the likelihood that employers will seek to resolve age discrimination
disputes through in-house grievance procedures instead of defend-
ing their retaliatory employment practices in inhospitable courts.
V. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
A. *American Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations Immune from Title
VII: Fortino v. Quasar Co.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination by employers on the basis of an individual's national
origin.2 Discrimination on the basis of national origin is not, how-
ever, the same as discrimination on the basis of citizenship. 3
 Thus
an employer's refusal to hire alien employees does not constitute
discrimination on the basis of national origin and is not unlawful
under Title VII.4
In 1973, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that the term "national origin" refers
not to one's country of citizenship, but instead to the country of
one's ancestors. 5 In Espinoza, the petitioner, a Mexican citizen law-
fully residing in the United States with her American husband, was
denied employment with Farah Manufacturing because Farah had
a policy against hiring aliens. 6 Espinoza sued Farah alleging that it
73 Id. at 428, 58 FEP Cases at 295.
76 Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 431, 58 FEP Cases at 297.
* By Andrea L. Crowley, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
950 F.2d 389, 57 FEP Cases 712 (7th Cir. 1991).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1989). Title VII states in
part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. . ."
Id.
3 See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87-88, 6 FEP Cases 933, 933-34 (1973).
4 See id. at 88, 6 FEP Cases at 934.
Id.
6 Id. at 87, 6 FEP Cases at 933. The Court pointed out that the original draft of Title
VII included a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin and ancestry,
but the word "ancestry" was eventually dropped because it was considered synonymous with
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had discriminated against her on the basis of national origin.' The
Farah Court reasoned that the terms "national origin" and "citizen-
ship" were distinct. 8 Thus, the Court held that Farah had not vio-
lated Title VII.°
Then, in 1976, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,
the United States Supreme Court held that Title VII protects the
interests of whites in being free from discrimination the same way
it protects the interests of nonwhites.'° In McDonald, two white
employees and one black employee of the Santa Fe Trail Trans-
portation Company ("Santa Fe") were caught stealing sixty gallons
of anti-freeze being transported for a Santa Fe customer." Shortly
thereafter, the two white employees, the petitioners, were fired, but
the black employee was not. 12 The petitioners sued Santa Fe under
Title VII alleging racial discrimination." The Court based its ruling
on prior Equal Employment Opportunity Commission decisions
that prohibited racial discrimination against whites in the same
manner as racial discrimination against nonwhites." The Court also
examined the legislative history of Title VII and concluded that
Title VII was intended to protect whites from discrimination in the
same way it protects nonwhites."
Pursuant to certain treaty rights, however, employers who are
not American corporations may be immune from Title VII.' 6 Be-
tween 1946 and 1956, the United States entered into sixteen treaties
national origin. Id. at 89, 6 FEP Cases at 934. The Court also relied on the common federal
practice since 1914 of denying aliens entrance to competitive examination for federal em-
ployment as indicative of the distinction between national origin and citizenship for the
purposes of discrimination. Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the federal government
had excluded aliens from federal employment, while at the same time issuing executive
orders that prohibit discrimination in federal employment on the basis of national origin,
thus indicating the distinction between the two terms. See id.
7 Id. at 87, 6 FEP Cases at 933,
8 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 87, 6 FEP Cases at 933-34.
9 See id. at 95-96, 6 FEP Cases at 937.
10 See 427 U.S. 273, 280, 12 FEP Cases 1577, 1580 (1976).
" hi. at 276, 12 FEP Cases at 1578.
12 id
" Id.
14 Id. at 279, 12 FEP Cases at 1579-80.
18 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280, 12 FEP Cases at 1580.
16 See, e.g., MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141, 48 FEP Cases 980, 983
(3d Cir. 1988) (where Title VII protections conflict with rights granted through FCN treaty,
conflict must be resolved in favor of treaty). See also Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d
363, 367, 35 FEP Cases 1766, 1769 (6th Cir. 1984) (companies of parties to FCN treaty can
discriminate in favor of their own citizens); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 362, 25
FEP Cases 849, 855 (5th Cir. 1981) (treaty permits Japanese companies to discriminate in
favor of their own citizens).
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with foreign nations.'' Although the terms of the treaties varied
slightly depending on the particular parties, the treaties basically
served to establish guidelines for the treatment each country was
expected to give the other and the rights of each country to conduct
business in the territory of the other. 18 In 1953, the United States
entered into a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN")
treaty with Japan that governed the countries' commercial relation-
ship.'°
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether Title VII immunity under an FCN treaty extended to
an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation." The Supreme
Court held, in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, that certain
FCN treaty rights that permit the parties to the treaty to hire ex-
ecutives of their choice do not apply to the American subsidiary of
a Japanese corporation engaged in business pursuant to the treaty. 2 '
An American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation doing business
in the United States pursuant to the FCN treaty between the United
States and Japan was sued by a group of employees who alleged
that Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens for
its high-level positions violated Title VII. 22 The Court reasoned that
the American subsidiary did not acquire the same rights under the
FCN treaty as the Japanese corporation." Thus the Sumitomo Court
held that the American subsidiary could not invoke the rights
granted through article VIII(1) of the treaty."
The treaty in Sumitomo provided that Japanese companies doing
business in the United States could employ "accountants and other
technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other
specialists of their choice." 25 The treaty also provided that compa-
17 Herman Walker, jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 805, 806 (1958).
'8
' 9 Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185-86, 28 FEP Cases 1753, 1757
(1982). See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.—Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063.
20 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 179-80, 28 FEP Cases at 1754-55.
21 See id. at 179, 181-82, 28 FEP Cases at 1754, 1755.
22 Id. at 177-78, 28 FEP Cases at 1754-55. Sumitomo was incorporated in New York
and was doing business as a United States company. Id. at 182, 28 FEP Cases at 1756.
" Id. at 182-83, 28 FEP Cases at 1756.
24 Id. Article V111(1) of the treaty provides "[C]ompanies of either Party shall be permitted
to engage, within the territories o the other Party, accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." Id. at 181, 28
FEP Cases at 1755 (emphasis added).
25 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181, 28 FEP Cases at 1755.
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vies incorporated within the territory of one of the parties would
be considered a company of that party. 26 The Sumitomo Court relied
on the plain language of the treaty to decide that Sumitomo was
not entitled to the same rights as a Japanese company operating in
the United States because Sumitomo was incorporated under New
York law. 27
 The Court also reasoned that it was unnecessary to give
an American subsidiary corporation, incorporated in the United
States, the same right as its parent company because the American
subsidiary was already on equal ground with other American com-
panies.28
 The Court concluded that the purpose of the treaty, to
equate the rights of Japanese companies doing business in the
United States with the rights of American companies, was fully met
even when an American subsidiary was not considered a Japanese
company. 29
 Thus, Court held that article VIII(1) of the FCN treaty,
which allows parties to the treaty to hire executives of their choice,
did not apply to the American subsidiary."
After Sumitomo, courts have consistently held that discrimina-
tion on the basis of citizenship by a foreign corporation operating
in the United States pursuant to a FCN treaty does not fall within
the realm of Title VIP' For example, in 1988, in MacNamara v.
Korean Airlines, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the FCN treaty between the United States and
Korea provided protection for Korean corporations engaged in
business in the United States from local laws that prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of citizenship. 32 MacNamara involved an Amer-
26 Id. at 182, 28 FEP Cases 1756.
" Id. at 181-82; 28 FEP Cases at 1756. The treaty provided in pertinent part that "the
term 'companies' means corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations,
whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies
constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party
shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their judicial status recognized within the
territories of the other Party." Id, at 182, 28 FEP Cases at 1756. The Court also examined
testimony of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated that an American subsidiary, wholly
owned by a Japanese company, is not a Japanese company under the treaty. Id. at 183, 28
FEP Cases at 1756.
28 Id. at 187-88, 28 FEP Cases at 1758.
29 Id.
30 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189, 28 FEP Cases at 1759.
31 See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1141, 48 FE? Cases at 983. See also Wickes, 745 F.2d at
367, 35 FEP Cases at 1769 (companies of parties to FCN treaty can discriminate in favor of
their own citizens); Spiess, 643 F.2d at 362, 25 FEP Cases at 855 (treaty permits Japanese
companies to discriminate in favor of their own citizens).
32 See McNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147, 48 FEP Cases at 989. The treaty provided in pertinent
part: "Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the
territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel,
attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." Id, at 1138, 48 FEP Cases at 981.
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ican executive who was terminated from Korean Airlines after eight
years of employment and replaced by a Korean citizen." The em-
ployee sued Korean Airlines alleging that Korean Airlines had dis-
criminated against him on the basis of race, national origin and
age. 34 The MacNamara court explained that the legislative history
of FCN treaties suggested that American negotiators intended to
secure American companies the right to employ their own citizens
when doing business in Korea, similar to the rights they would have
if they were operating in the United States. 35 The court subse-
quently held that the Korean company had not violated Title VII
by showing preference toward its own citizens in hiring Korean
manage rs. 36
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, in Fortino v. Quasar Co., that discrimination by an
American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation in favor of Japanese
citizens, based on express treaty authorization, is not actionable
under Title VII as discrimination based on national origin." In
Fortino, three American executives charged their former employer
with discriminating against them on the basis of national origin by
choosing Japanese employees to replace them." The Fortino court
distinguished between discrimination by a foreign company, doing
business in the United States pursuant to a treaty that favors citizens
of its own country, from discrimination on the basis of national
origin." The Fortino court extended immunity from Title VII, based
on a FCN treaty, to an American subsidiary of a Japanese corpo-
ration doing business in the United States. 4 °
In Fortino, three American executives charged their former
employer, Quasar Co., an American subsidiary of the Japanese
corporation Matsushita Electric Industrial Company ("Matsushita"),
with discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of
Title VII." Quasar was an unincorporated division of an American
" Id. at 1137, 48 FEP Cases at 981.
34 Id. at 1138, 48 FEP Cases at 981.
" Id. at 1144-45, 48 FEP Cases at 986.
36 Id. at 1147, 48 FEP Cases at 989.
37 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393, 57 FEP Cases 712, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1991).
33 Id. at 391, 57 FEP Cases at 714.
"Id. at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 715.
See id. at 393, 57 FEP Cases at 715-16.
Id. at 391, 57 FEP Cases at 714. The petitioners in Fortino also alleged discrimination
on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Ad of 1967
("ADEA"), 29 U,S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Id, The Fortino court dismissed one petitioner's ADEA
claim based on his execution of a valid waiver of any claims against Quasar. Id. at 394-95,
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company owned by Matsushita that marketed Matsushita products
in the United States:42 Matsushita periodically sent Japanese exec-
utives to America to work temporarily for Quasar.'" Although these
Japanese executives were under the control of Quasar while they
were in the United States, they continued to be official Matsushita
employees:" In fact, the visiting Japanese executives, called "expa-
triates," were referred to as "MEI (Matsushita Electrical Industrial)
Personnel" on the Quasar payroll records." While the expatriates
were in the United States, Matusushita retained control over their
performance evaluations, personnel files and salary information.'"
In 1985, Quasar suffered a substantial financial setback:" In
order to recoup its losses and reorganize Quasar, Matsushita sent a
Japanese executive to the United States to work at Quasar." This
executive reorganized Quasar and reduced its workforce by fifty
percent." During the reorganization the three plaintiffs were ter-
tninated. 5° Other American executives were also terminated as a
result of the overhaul of Quasar, including two American executives
of Japanese descent, but none of the Japanese citizens were dis-
charged."
57 FEP Cases at 716-17. The court reversed and remanded for new trial the lower court's
verdict in favor of the remaining two petitioners on the basis of two evidentiary errors by
the district court. Id. at 395-97, 399, 57 FEP Cases at 717-19, 720. In order to help the
court and the parties on remand, the Fortino court explained its opinion on the issues of
prejudgment interest and front pay in ADEA cases. Id. at 397-98, 57 FE]) Cases at 719-20.
The Fortino court explained that prejudgment interest should not be awarded in cases where
double damages are also awarded because the prejudgment interest becomes an "unauthor-
ized form of punitive damages." Id. at 397-98, 57 FEP Cases at 719. The Fortino court also
stated that there is no right to a jury trial on the issue of front pay as front pay serves as a
damage award in lieu of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. Id. at 398-99, 57 FEP Cases
at 720.
42 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391-92, 57 FEP Cases at 714.
45 Id. at 392, 57 FEY Cases at 714. Under the FCN treaty, Japanese citizens working for
Quasar were allowed to enter the United States to do executive or supervisory work for any
company that was at least half-owned by Japanese citizens provided the work was authorized
by the treaty. Id. at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 714-15. This treaty authorized corporations from
the United States to employ executives of their choice in business in Japan, and companies
from Japan to employ executives of their choice in business in the United States. Id.








51 Id. Not only were none of the Japanese executives discharged, but most received raises
while none of the American executives who retained their jobs were given raises. Id.
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Three former employees filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 52 The district court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that Quasar had discriminated
against its American executives on the basis of their national ori-
gin." The district court found that Quasar had violated Title VII
based on the fact that Quasar terminated only American executives
during its reorganization while at the same time employing more
executives from Japan and giving raises to the Japanese executives
who remained at Quasar.54
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the lower court's ruling and held that discrimination against
American citizens in favor of Japanese citizens working in the
United States pursuant to a FCN treaty did not constitute discrim-
ination on the basis of national origin. 55 The Fortino court, relying
on McDonald, which held that Title VII prohibits discrimination
against whites in favor of nonwhites, concluded that Title VII pro-
hibited discrimination against people of non-Japanese descent in
favor of people of Japanese descent. 56 The Fortino court also noted
that in Espinoza, the United States Supreme Court had distinguished
between discrimination on the basis of national origin, which was
expressly prohibited by Title VII, and discrimination on the basis
of citizenship, which was not prohibited. 57 Following Espinoza, the
court stated that although citizenship and national origin were
closely related, discrimination on the basis of citizenship, especially
when authorized by a treaty, was not prohibited by Title VII. 58 The
court concluded that although Quasar's behavior was clearly dis-
criminatory against its American executives, such discrimination was
based on citizenship rather than national origin and was authorized
by the FCN treaty and thus did not violate Title VII. 59
The court also analyzed the language and intent of the FCN
treaty between the United States and Japan.° The court reasoned
" Fortino, 950 F,2d at 391, 57 FEP Cases at 714.
" See id.
" See id. at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 714.
65 1d.
66 Id.
57 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 715.
56 1d. at 392-93, 57 FEE' Cases at 715.
56 Id. The appellate court admitted the evidence regarding the treaty between the United
States and Japan even though the issue had not been raised in the district court. Id. at 391,
57 FEP Cases at 714. The court based its decision to admit the treaty on comity between the
United States and Japan. id.
60
 Id. at 392-94, 57 FEP Cases at 715-16. Like the FCN treaties in MacNamara, Wickes,
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that if Quasar's preference for Japanese citizens were considered
discrimination on the basis of national origin, the treaty would be
unable to serve its purpose.6 ' Based on MacNamara, where the court
looked to the rights of the parties under the FCN treaty to hold
that a Korean company had not violated local discrimination laws,
the Fortino court reasoned that a treaty expressly granting Japanese
businesses the right to hire executives of their own choice could not
be nullified by Title VI . 62
 Because the power to hire executives of
their own choice was granted through the treaty, the court would
be removing a term of the treaty by upholding a judgment against
Quasar for choosing Japanese executives over American execu-
tives. 63
Although the court stated that Matsushita was clearly granted
express rights through the treaty, the court questioned whether
these rights extended to Quasar as an American subsidiary. 64
 The
court decided that the treaty rights did extend to Quasar by distin-
guishing Sumitomo, which held that an American subsidiary of a
Japanese company did not fall under the terms of a FCN treaty. 65
According to the Fortino court, there was no evidence in Sumitomo
that the Japanese parent company was influential in the subsidiary's
decision to discriminate. 66 The Fortino court concluded that a judg-
ment precluding Quasar from treating Japanese executives sent by
Matsushita more favorably than American executives would affect
Matsushita in the same way as a judgment entered directly against
it; Matsushita would be prevented from choosing its own executives
to run Quasar in place of choosing American executives. 67
 The court
held that the American division of the Japanese corporation had
the same rights under the FCN treaty as its Japanese parent cor-
poration and was not liable under Title VII."
Under the reasoning of the Fortino court, any unincorporated
subsidiary of a Japanese-owned American corporation who takes its
and Spiess, the treaty in Fortino authorized in pertinent part that ". . . companies of either
Party [i.e., the U.S. and Japan] to engage, within the territories of the other Party
executive personnel , .. of their choice." Id. at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 715,
" Id.
62
 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392, 57 FEP Cases at 715.
Id.
51 Id.
55 Id. at 393, 57 FEP Cases at 715-16.
55
 Id. at 393, 57 FEP Cases at 715.
Id. The court determined that there was no evidence of wrongful discrimination, but
the court left open the question whether the treaty provided total immunity to the parties
from Title VII claims. Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393, 57 FEP Cases at 716.
" See id. at 393-94, 57 FEP Cases at 715-16.
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direction from its Japanese parent may be entitled to immunity
from Title VII for discrimination in favor of Japanese citizens. 69
The Fortino decision gives real latitude to foreign-owned American
corporations doing business in the United States. In cases where
FCN treaties exist between the foreign parent's company and the
United States, an unincorporated subsidiary must only show that
its foreign parent directed the alleged discrimination in favor of its
own citizens to avoid Title VII liability. This means, however, that
where an American subsidiary has a substantial influence over dis-
criminatory behavior, it may not be considered a party to the treaty
and may be subject to liability.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Fortino that Quasar, as an
American subsidiary of a Japanese company, is not subject to Title
VII considerations seems inconsistent with the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Sumitomo. The Court in Sumitomo held
that companies incorporated in the United States do not fall under
the protection of the treaty. 7° In Sumitomo, although the subsidiary
was a division of a Japanese company, it was incorporated in the
United States. 7 ' In Fortino, the subsidiary was an unincorporated
division of an American company that was Japanese-owned. 72 Al-
though the Fortino court did not consider whether it was relevant
that Quasar was unincorporated, the United States Supreme Court
may find no distinction between the entity in Sumitomo and the entity
in Fortino. Thus the question remains open whether protection
under a FCN treaty that is denied to an incorporated United States
subsidiary will be given to a United States subsidiary that is unin-
corporated. In Sumitomo, the Supreme Court based its decision not
to consider Sumitomo a "party" for purposes of the FCN treaty on
the fact that Sumitomo was not a company of Japan because it was
incorporated in New York." If the Supreme Court were to apply
this same reasoning to the facts of Fortino, it seems that it would
come to the same result. Fortino would not be considered a party
for purposes of the treaty because although it is unincorporated, it
is a division of a company incorporated in the United States that
happens to be Japanese-owned.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit held in Fortino that the unincor-
porated American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation is not liable
See id.
" Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181-82, 28 FEP Cases at 1754-55.
7 ' Id. at 178, 28 FEP Cases at 1754.
72 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391,57 FEP Cases at 714.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181-82,28 FEP Cases at 1756.
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under Title VII for discrimination in favor of Japanese citizens. 74
The Fortino court relied on the FCN treaty between the United
States and Japan to conclude that in order to effectuate the intent
of the parties to the treaty, the subsidiary must be given the same
rights as its parent company. 75 The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Fortino has taken the protection afforded to foreign corporations a
step further than the United States Supreme Court was willing to
do in Sumitomo by extending these rights to American subsidiaries.
VI. GENDER DISCRIMINATION
A. *Statutory Denial of Unemployment Compensation Benefits to an
Individual Who Voluntarily Leaves Employment to Relocate with a
Spouse: Austin v. Berryman'
Section 60.2-6 I8(1)(ii) of the Code of Virginia Annotated den-
ies unemployment compensation to an individual who voluntarily
leaves employment to relocate with his or her spouse. 2 In general,
the statute allows individuals who voluntarily leave employment to
collect benefits if they can demonstrate to the Virginia Employment
Commission ("VEC") that they left for a "good cause." Subsection
(ii), however, creates a presumption that relocating with a spouse is
not good cause for leaving employment.4 Although the Virginia law
'4 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393, 57 FEP Cases at 715-16.
75 Id.
* By Vickie L. Feeman, Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 955 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Austin V].
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618(1)(ii) (Michie 1992). The statute states "'good cause' shall
not include . (ii) voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany or to join his or
her spouse in a new locality." Id. This provision was added in response to pressure from
public employers of the spouses of frequently transferred military personnel. Austin V, 955
F.2d at 226. Instead of paying a standard tax, public employers in Virginia have the option
of reimbursing the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund for the full amount of any
benefits paid to their employees, Id. Thus, public employers directly benefit from the denial
of unemployment compensation to any of their former employees. See id.
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618(1). The issue of whether relocating with a spouse constitutes
"good cause" for voluntarily leaving employment has been subject to considerable debate;
states that lack a controlling statute have been split on the issue. See, e.g., Lind v. Employment
Sec. Div., Dep't of Labor, 608 P.2d 6, 7 (Alaska 1980) (need to join husband was good cause);
Robinson v. Unemployment Sec. Bd. of Review, 434 A.2d 293, 303 (Conn. 1980) (accom-
panying husband who had been transferred to another state was good cause); Douglas v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 133 Cal, Rptr. 604, 610 (1976) (accompanying husband
for a three-month assignment in another state was for personal pleasure and not good cause).
* VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618(1)(ii). This automatic denial of benefits was approved by the
Associate Regional Administrator for Unemployment Insurance ("Administrator") of the
United States Department of Labor, who found that the Virginia law did not conflict with
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is facially gender-neutral,5 the group of individuals denied benefits
under the statute is largely comprised of women, indicating possible
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
In 1979, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the
United States Supreme Court held that a statute that is gender-
neutral on its face does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment solely because of its disproportionate
impact on women.? The plaintiff in Feeney challenged a gender-
neutral statutory preference system for hiring veterans based on
the fact that a disparate percentage of the adversely affected class
were women' The Feeney Court reasoned that when faced with an
equal protection challenge based on a statute's disparate impact, a
court should apply a two-fold inquiry. 9 Initially, a court must ask
whether the statute's classification is overtly or covertly gender-
based.'° If it is neither, the court must ask whether the adverse
effects of the statute reflect invidious gender-based discrimination."
Applying this inquiry to the facts of Feeney, the Supreme Court held
that the veteran preference statute did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
The Feeney Court began its analysis by recognizing that classi-
fications based on gender require a heightened level of scrutiny due
to the pervasive and subtle discrimination traditionally surrounding
such classification.' 3
 Furthermore, the Court noted that facially neu-
tral statutes are often merely a pretext for discrimination." The
the requirements of the Federal Employment Tax Act ("FETA"). 26 U.S.C. 3304 (1988).
See Austin v. Berryman, 768 F. Supp. 188, 189 (W.D. Va. 1991) [hereinafter Austin RS This
is an important consideration as the grant of federal funds to state unemployment systems
is conditioned upon federal approval of state laws. 42 U.S.C. 502 (1988). The original form
of the provision submitted to the Administrator only applied to individuals in public em-
ployment, and as such was found by the Administrator to contravene the requirements of
FETA. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6)(A) (1988). To resolve this problem, the bill was amended
before enactment to apply to all employers, public and private. Austin IV, 768 F. Supp. at
189.
5 VA. CODE ANN. 60.2-618(1).
6 Austin V, 955 F.2d at 226. Women comprised 86.8% of the affected group. Id.
7 See 442 U.S. 256, 274, 19 FEP Cases 1377, 1384 (1979).
" See id. at 259, 19 FEP Cases at 1379.
9 1d. at 274, 19 FEP Cases at 1384.
10 Id.
" Id.
See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281, 19 FEP Cases at 1387.
13 Id. at 273, 19 FEP Cases at 1384. The Court has held that classifications based on
gender must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives.
Id. at 273, 19 FEP Cases at 1384.
" See id. at 272, 19 FEP Cases at 1384.
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Court also recognized, however, that some level of classification is
inevitable as is some degree of disparate impact on group mem-
bers.'' Thus, a mere disproportionate impact on a particular group
does not necessarily signify that a classification is a pretext for
discrimination.i° To strike a balance between these countervailing
concerns, the Court devised a two-fold inquiry of gender bias and
invidious discriminatory purpose.°
To determine whether a classification demonstrates gender
bias, a court must inquire into the purpose of a statute. 18 The Feeney
Court reasoned that where a classification can be explained as serv-
ing a legitimate purpose, gender bias cannot be inferred from im-
pact alone.' 9 Even where a legitimate purpose is served, however, a
court still needs to determine whether the adverse effect of a statute
reflects invidious discrimination. 20 Where a statute's impact can be
explained in neutral terms, the Feeney Court reasoned that merely
foreseeing that the classification will disadvantage women does not
indicate discriminatory intent. 21
Many states have enacted statutes that deny benefits to individ-
uals who voluntarily leave employment to relocate with a spouse or
to fulfill marital, filial or domestic circumstances. 22 The statutes vary
in detail and application, but, with one exception, they have been
upheld in the state courts." Instead of applying the two-fold Feeney
inquiry, each state court that has upheld its statute has reasoned
15 See id. at 271-72, 19 FEY Cases at 1384.
16 hi.
17 See Feeney, 442 U.S, at 274, 19 FE? Cases at 1384.
L8 Id. at 274-75, 19 FEP Cases at 1385.
19 Id. The Court in Feeney found that the veteran preference statute served the legitimate
goal of rewarding veterans for their service. Id. at 277, 19 FEP Cases at 1385. Further, the
distinction between veterans and non-veterans is directly related to this purpose. See id. at
275, 19 FEP Cases at 1385. The Court also held that there was no evidence of a gender-
based purpose. Id. at 281, 19 FEP Cases at 1387.
28 Id. at 274, 19 FEP Cases at 1384-85.
It The Court noted that the impact could easily be described in neutral terms because a
large number of men are included in the class of non-veterans, and women are included in
the class of veterans. Id. at 275, 19 FEP Cases at 1385.
22 See Miss. CODE ANN. 71-5-513(A)(1)(a) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. 35-4-5(a) (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 72.1366 (Supp. 1992); Act of Dec. 5, 1936, P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended,
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802 (amended 1980) [hereinafter PA. CONS. STAT. § 8021; 1953 Cal.
Stat. § 1309 (renumbered § 1264) (repealed 1976) [hereinafter Gal. Stat. 13091.
23 See, e.g., Warren v. Board of Review, 463 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Miss. 1985) (court upheld
statute); Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec., 678 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah 1984) (same);
Pyeatt v. Idaho State Univ., 565 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Idaho 1977) (same); Gilman v. Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd. of Review, 369 A.2d 895, 896 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (same). But see Boren
v. California Dep't of Employment Dev., 130 Cal. Rptr. 683, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (court
struck down statute).
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that under the state constitution, the classifications were not dis-
criminatory and thus did not warrant the heightened scrutiny of a
suspect class. 24 Thus the state courts merely examined whether the
classification bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est. 25
For example, in the 1977 case of Gilman v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
upheld a statutory provision that denied unemployment compen-
sation benefits to persons voluntarily leaving employment to relo-
cate with a spouse or for other marital or domestic obligations.
Unlike the Virginia law, however, this provision did not apply to
sole or major family wage earners. 26 The claimant in Gilman, denied
compensation when she terminated employment to follow her trans-
ferred husband, contended that the Pennsylvania law's exemption
of major family wage earners further increased the disparate impact
of the statute because husbands greatly outnumber wives as major
family wage earners. 27 The court, however, holding that numerical
disparity alone is insufficient to demonstrate a gender-based clas-
sification, applied the rational relationship standard of review. 28 The
court reasoned that the neutral distinction between major and sec-
ondary family wage earners was rationally related to the state's
legitimate goal of protecting the unemployed from financial hard-
ship. 29 Consequently, the court held that the classification did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause."
Then in 1984, in Chandler v. Department of Employment Security,
the Supreme Court of Utah upheld a statute that was strikingly
similar to the Virginia statute. 8 ' The six female claimants in Chandler
24 See Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 318; Pyeatt, 565 P.2d at 1382-
83; Gilman, 369 A.2d at 897.
25 See Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 318; Gilman, 369 A.2d at 897.
But see Boren, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
25 369 A.2d at 896. The statute states:
An employe[e] shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . in which
his or her unemployment is due to leaving work (1) to accompany or to join his
or her spouse in a new locality, or, (11) because of a marital, filial or other
domestic obligation . . . provisions of this subsection (2) shall not be applicable
if the employe[e] ... was the sole or major support.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802.
27
 369 A.2d at 896.
25 Id. at 897.
29 Id. The court, noting the historical controversy surrounding the issue of whether
domestic necessity is good cause, reasoned that the distinction was justified because the family
as a whole suffered more from the unemployment of a major wage earner. Id. at 897-98.
3°
 Id. at 898.
n See 678 P.2d at 318. The statute stated that "a claimant who has left work voluntarily
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challenged the statute on an equal protection basis after they were
denied benefits when they left employment to relocate with their
spouses." The Chandler court, describing the classification of relo-
cating spouses as neutral, 33 held that the classification was related
to the state's legitimate goal of limiting unemployment compensa-
tion to those who become unemployed through no fault of their
own,34 Concluding that the classification did not offend the Consti-
tution, the court upheld the denial of benefits. 35
In 1976, in Boren v. California Department of Employment Devel-
opment, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District be-
came the only state court to strike down a statute that denied
benefits to individuals voluntarily leaving employment to relocate
with a spouse or for domestic reasons." The claimant in Boren left
her job when her employer required her to work a shift that con-
flicted with child care arrangements." Although the claimant was
denied compensation on other grounds, the court held both the
relocation and domestic duty portions of the statute unconstitu-
tional." The Boren court noted that under California law discrimi-
nation may be demonstrated by statistics. 39 Because the statute was
found to have had a statistically disparate impact on women, the
court held that the classification was suspect." Then, applying a
strict scrutiny standard of review, the court held that the suspect
classifications did not support a compelling state interest. 4 ' Besides
to accompany, follow or join his or her spouse to or in a new locality does so without good
cause." UTAH CODE ANN. 35-4-5(a).
32 678 P.2d at 316-17.
53 Id. at 318. The court distinguished those who voluntarily left work to follow a spouse
from those who voluntarily left work for other good cause. Id.
s' Id. The court reasoned that an individual who follows a spouse is motivated by personal
lifestyle considerations rather than external pressure. Id.
35 Id.
' 11 See 130 Cal. Rptr. at 690. The statute stated in pertinent part that
an employee who leaves his or her employment to be married or to accompany
his or her spouse to or join her or him at a place from which it is impractical
to commute to such employment or whose marital or domestic duties cause him
or her to resign from his or her employment shall not be eligible for unem-
ployment insurance benefits.
Cal. Stat. § 1309.
" See 130 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
38 Id. at 690. Claimant was ineligible for benefits because she was found to have volun-
tarily left work for domestic reasons. Id. at 690.
'9 1d. at 687.
40 Id. at 686. The court accepted as Fact the plaintiff's allegation that 99% of the persons
disqualified under the statute in 1971 were women. Id.
41 Id. at 689. The court stated that fiscal integrity of state programs may be a legitimate
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being distinguishable as decided under California state law, this case
was decided before the Supreme Court set out its gender-biased,
discriminatory standard in Feeney.42
During the Survey year, in Austin v. Berryman, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's statu-
tory denial of unemployment benefits to an individual who volun-
tarily leaves employment to relocate with his or her spouse did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Because the plaintiff's equal protection challenge was based
on the statute's disparate impact on women, the Austin court applied
Feeney's two-fold inquiry." The court reasoned that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy either prong of the Feeney standard and upheld the
spousal relocation provision of the Virginia Code."
In June of 1985, Austin voluntarily left her employment to
accompany her husband on a move 150 miles from their place of
residence." The purpose of this relocation was her husband's desire
to live with and care for his aging mother. 47 At the time of the
move, Austin was the sole wage earner for her family of four
children." Following the move, she applied for unemployment com-
pensation but was denied benefits pursuant to the Virginia law."
After exhausting the administrative remedies available through the
VEC, 5° Austin filed suit in the District Court for the Western District
of Virginia, claiming that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 '
The district court did not address the merits of Austin's equal
protection claim because it found the Virginia statute to be uncon-
policy choice but that it is not a compelling governmental interest required under strict
scrutiny analysis. Id.
" Id. at 687.
" 955 F.2d 223, 225 (4th Cir. 1992). This is the first time that a federal court has
examined one of the state statutes that deny benefits to individuals who leave employment
to relocate with a spouse. See id.
" Id. at 226.
43 Id. at 229.
45 Id. at 225.
"Austin v. Berryman, 670 F. Supp. 672, 673 (W.D. Va. 1987) [hereinafter Austin I).
"Austin V, 955 F.2d at 225. The Virginia law does not exempt sole or primary wage
earners from the denial of benefits. See VA, CODE ANN. § 60.2-618.
49 Austin V, 955 F.2d at 225.
so Austin IV, 768 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Va. 1991). Austin appealed her disqualification
to an appeals examiner who held that she was not entitled to benefits. Id. The examiner's
decision was affirmed in an appeal to the VEC. Id.
31 Austin I, 670 F. Supp. at 673. Austin's suit in federal district court also claimed that
the Virginia statute violated her First Amendment right to exercise her religious beliefs and
her fundamental marital rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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stitutional based on other grounds raised by Austin. 52 The . VEC
appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the statute un-
constitutional on grounds other than equal protection." In recon-
sideration of the appeal, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, vacated -
its previous opinion and overruled the lower court decision, holding
that the challenges addressed by the lower court were without
merit. 54
Because on rehearing the court of appeals overruled the lower
court's holding that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional, the
case was remanded for consideration of Austin's equal protection
claim. 55 The district court, applying the Feeney test, upheld Virginia's
statute, denying Austin unemployment compensation benefits. 56
Austin appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit."
On appeal, the appellate court applied the two-fold inquiry of
Feeney. 58 Addressing the first prong of the test, the court held that
Austin failed to demonstrate that the statute's classification was
overtly or covertly based on gender." In analyzing this prong, the
court first concluded that the statute was facially neutral because it
52 Id. at 680. The district court held that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional because
it burdened fundamental marital rights by impinging upon the right of married couples to
live together. Id, at 677. The court also held that as applied to Austin, the statute violated
her right to freely exercise her religion by hindering the exercise of her religious belief that
she should follow her husband and honor and help her mother-in-law. Id. at 675.
55 Austin v. Berryman, 862 F.2d 1050, 1055, 49 FEP Cases 26, 27 (4th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter Austin 111. The Fourth Circuit overturned the lower court's decision that the
Virginia statute was per se unconstitutional, reasoning that the denial of unemployment
benefits does not interfere with fundamental marital rights and thus the district court had
erred in applying a heightened level of scrutiny. Id. Instead, the court of appeals held that
the spousal relocation provision bore a reasonable and rational relationship to the state's
desire to protect its Unemployment Compensation Fund from meritless claims. Id. On the
other hand, the appellate court upheld the lower court's finding that, as applied to Austin's
particular situation, the Virginia statute violated her First Amendment right to free exercise
of religion. Id.
54 Austin v. Berryman, 878 F.2d 786, 787, 50 FEP Cases 323, 324 (4th Cir. 1989)
[hereinafter Austin III]. On rehearing, the court of appeals held that Virginia's spousal
relocation provision did not violate Austin's First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, reasoning that the true cause of Austin's unemployment was geographic distance,
not religious belief. Id.
"/d. at 788, 50 FEP Cases at 324.
"Austin IV, 768 F. Supp. 188, 191-92 (W.D. Va. 1991). In applying the Feeney test, the
district court summarily decided the first prong, moving directly to the second prong inquiry
of invidious discrimination. See id. at 191. Then, deferring to the legislature's stated goals,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 191-
92.
57 See Austin V, 955 F.2d at 224.
5" Id. at 226.
"Id. at 227.
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excluded spouses of either gender from collecting unemployment
benefits when they voluntarily left employment to relocate with a
spouse.6° The court then looked at several of the factors suggested
by the Feeney Court under the first prong of the test. 61 Examining
the legislative motivation behind the statute and the legitimate goals
presented by the defendants, the court held that the classification
of "spouses" was not covertly gender-based. 62
Turning to the second prong of the Feeney test, the court held
that Austin failed to demonstrate that the disparate impact of the
statute on women reflected invidious gender-based discrimination.°
The court first noted that the statute negatively impacts men as well
as women by denying men benefits if they leave employment to
follow their wives." The court also noted that it impacts both
spouses regardless of who is denied benefits because it decreases
the total family income. 65
To support its finding that the legislature was not motivated by
invidious discrimination, the court examined the relationship be-
tween the classification and the state's interest. 66 The defendants
claimed that the statute's classification served legitimate state goals:
insuring a stable workforce, avoiding tax penalties on employers
who maintain employee positions and reserving benefits for persons
who become unemployed through no fault of their own. 67 The
court, considering the legislative history of the statute, held that the
state's goals were legitimate and that denying benefits to individuals
who voluntarily leave employment to follow a spouse is rationally
related to attaining those goals. 68
The court summarily rejected Austin's argument that the de-
fendants' knowledge of the possible disparate impact of the statute
demonstrated purposeful discrimination. 69 The court held that the
clear mandate of Feeney requires that the plaintiff demonstrate more
than a mere awareness of disparate consequences." In so holding,
the court reasoned that even if Austin could prove that the defen-
6° Id. at 226.
61 See id. at 227.




66 See id. at 228.
62 Austin V, 955 F.2d at 227.
58 See id. at 228.
62 Id.
70 Id.
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dants knew that the statute would have a disparate impact, such
knowledge would not invalidate the statute. 7 '
After Austin, no matter how overwhelmingly a gender-neutral
statute impacts women, it is unlikely that a fourth circuit court will
find it a pretext for gender discrimination. Challenges of facially
gender-neutral statutes, such as a spousal relocation clause, are
likely to be subject to Feeney's two-fold inquiry rather than warrant-
ing the heightened scrutiny reserved for gender and other suspect
classifications. 72 Thus, even where a large number of the individuals
adversely impacted by a statute are women, the legislature will not
be required to show that the classification was substantially related
to an important governmental objective." Before Austin, because
the class in Feeney was only comprised of 61.3 percent women, a
good faith argument could be made that a statute that overwhelm-
ingly impacted women did not fall under the Feeney test. 74 Now,
however, unless a plaintiff can demonstrate invidious discrimina-
tion, the two-prong Feeney test, with its lower level of scrutiny, will
most likely be applied to equal protection challenges of facially
neutral statutes.
Although the analysis applied by the state courts that have
upheld the state unemployment statutes differs in form from the
Austin court's analysis, it is similar in substance." Instead of using
the two-prong test of Feeney, the state courts merely describe their
statutes' classifications as neutral and proceed to examine whether
the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest." They do not purport to search for invidious discrimina-
tion as did the Austin court." The Feeney inquiry into invidious
discrimination focuses, however, on whether the impact can be
explained in neutral terms and whether the classification is related
to a legitimate purpose. 78 Thus a similar effect is achieved by either
method.
7 ' Id.
72 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274, 19 FEP Cases at 1384.
" See id.
74 See id. at 275, 19 FEP Cases at 1385. Although the disparate impact of the Virginia
statute was more extreme than the impact of the Feeney statute, the court rejected Austin's
attempt to statistically distinguish the Supreme Court decision. Austin V, 955 F.2d at 227.
15 See, e.g., Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 318; Pyeatt, 565 P.2d at
1382-83; Gilman, 369 A.2d at 897-98.
76 Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 318; Gilman, 369 A.2d at 897.
" See Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 317-18; Pyeatt, 565 P.2d at 1382-
83; Gilman, 369 A.2d at 897-98.
75 See 442 U.S. at 276-77, 19 FEP Cases at 1385-86.
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The Austin decision adds one more persuasive argument to the
abundance of state court decisions upholding unemployment com-
pensation provisions that deny benefits to individuals who volun-
tarily leave employment to relocate with a spouse. 79
 This support
will possibly spur a proliferation of such provisions in the future,
significantly increasing the number of individuals excluded from
unemployment compensation systems. 8°
B. *Tenth Circuit Provides Alternative for Majority Plaintiffs to State a
Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Notari v. Denver Water
Department'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. 2
 Congress enacted Title VII in order to
prohibit "disparate treatment," which occurs when an employer
treats some employees less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 3 In passing Title VII,
Congress sought to remove employment barriers that historically
had affected minority group employees. 4
 Nonetheless, Title VII's
79 See Warren, 463 So. 2d at 1077; Chandler, 678 P.2d at 318; Pyeatt, 565 P.2d at 1383;
Gilman, 369 A.2d at 896.
'° See Austin V, 955 F.2d at 226. Conversely, the creation of such statutes could be viewed
as protecting innocent employers, who maintain positions for their employees, from addi-
tional unemployment compensation costs. See id.
* By Bridget E. McKeever, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 59 FEP Cases 739 (10th Cir. 1992).
1
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1965). Section 2000e-2 provides in relevant part:
Unlawful employment practices
Employer practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1286 (American Bar Association 1983). Four theories of employment discrimination have
evolved under Title VII: disparate treatment; policies or practices that perpetuate in the
present the effects of past discrimination; policies or practices that have an adverse impact
not justified by business necessity; and failure to make reasonable accommodation to an
employee's religious practices. Id. at I.
4 See id. at 1286.
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protections do extend to members of historically or socially favored
groups. 5
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the allocation of proof in a non-class
action challenging employment discrimination under Title VII.°
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, a black male, was laid off as a
result of the general reduction of his employer's workforce.? The
next year the employer advertised openings in the plaintiff's trade. 8
The plaintiff applied for re-employment, but the defendant re-
jected his application. 0 After his rejection, the plaintiff sued his
employer for alleged racial discrimination."'
The McDonnell Douglas Court established a three-part analysis
for evaluating a Title VII disparate treatment claim." The plaintiff
has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion;t 2 the burden then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection;' 3 and finally,
if the defendant meets the burden, the court must afford the plain-
tiff a "fair opportunity" to demonstrate that the employer's stated
reason for rejection is in fact "pretext."'q
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court articulated four elements nec-
essary to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under
Title VII.' 5 A plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) that he or she belongs
to a minority group; (ii) that he or she applied and was qualified
for a position for which the employer sought applicants; (iii) that
the employer rejected the plaintiff's application despite his or her
qualifications; and (iv) that, after the plaintiff's rejection, the posi-
tion remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
' See Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252, 41 FEP Cases 1713,
1714 (10th Cir. 1986).
6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 5 FEP Cases 965, 968 (1973).
7 Id. at 794, 5 FEP Cases at 966.
Id. at 796, 5 FEP Cases at 966.
Id.
10 Id. at 797, 5 FEP Cases at 967. The plaintiff also alleged that the employer had refused
to rehire him because of his involvement in the civil rights movement. Id. at 796, 5 FEP
Cases at 966. Before he brought suit in federal court, the plaintiff had filed a formal complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. When the Commission failed to
conciliate the dispute, it advised the plaintiff of his right to bring a civil action in federal
court. Id. at 797, 5 FEP Cases at 966.
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 5 FEP Cases at 969-70.
12 Id, at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
Id.
"Id. at 804, 5 FEP Cases at 970.
L6 Id. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
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from persons of plaintiff's qualifications.' 6
 If a plaintiff establishes
the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima facie case, the plaintiff
creates an inference of discrimination."
The McDonnell Douglas Court acknowledged, however, that the
elements of a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination may not
apply in every respect to differing factual situations. 18
 Thus, the
Supreme Court broadened the first element of a prima facie case
of gender discrimination in Texas Department of Community Affairs v,
Burdine, where the qualified female plaintiff had sought an available
position, but was rejected in favor of a male previously under her
supervision.' 9
 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff needed
only to show that she was a woman in order to satisfy the first
element of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. 2° Similarly,
in Mortensen v. Callaway, where the plaintiff alleged that she had
been passed over for a supervisory position because of her gender,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
a plaintiff in a promotion case meets the fourth element by showing
that the employer hired another person for the position."
In Holmes v. Bevilacqua, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit created an alternative to the four elements of a
prima facie case articulated in McDonnell Douglas. 22
 The plaintiff, a
black male, alleged racial discrimination in the defendant's failure
16
 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
17 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 17 FEP Cases 1062, 1066
(1978). In Furnco, the Supreme Court stated:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination
only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. . . . And we are
willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more
often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race.
Id,
' 0 411 U.S. at 802 n.13, 5 FEP Cases at 969 n.13.
16
 450 U.S. 248, 250-51, 25 FEP Cases 113, 114 (1981).
2° Id. at 254 n.6, 25 FEP Cases at 116 n.6. Referring to the flexibility intended For the
prima facie elements, the Burdine Court noted that:
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has proved a
prima facie case. She showed that she was a qualified woman who sought an
available position, but the position was left open for several months before she
finally was rejected in favor of a male ... who had been under her supervision.
Id.
21
 672 F.2d 822, 823, 29 FEP Cases 111, 112 (10th Cir. 1982).
" 794 F.2d 142, 146, 41 FEP Cases 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1986).
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to promote him, 23 The appeals court held that a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII
either by direct evidence of discrimination or by indirect evidence
whose "cumulative probative force" would support a reasonable
inference that but for the plaintiff's minority status the employment
decision would have favored the plaintiff. 24 The court stated that
without such direct or indirect evidence, the plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas formulation.25
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether a majority plaintiff alleging "reverse discrimination" may
establish a prima facie disparate treatment case under the McDonnell
Douglas formulation, and thus benefit from the resulting inference
of discrimination. 26 In Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated
that a reverse discrimination case demands modification of the
McDonnell Douglas elements. 27 The Parker court held that a majority
plaintiff must show "background circumstances" which support the
suspicion that the defendant is an unusual employer who discrim-
inates against historically favored groups. 28 A number of courts have
adopted the Parker requirement. 29 Other courts, however, have re-
jected this background circumstances requirement and have held
that majority plaintiffs, as well as their minority counterparts, may
rely upon an unmodified McDonnell Douglas prima facie formula-
tion. 3°
During the Survey year, in Notari v. Denver Water Department, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed the
Parker line of cases and held that a reverse discrimination plaintiff
may benefit from the McDonnell Douglas inference only when back-
ground circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is
an unusual employer that discriminates against majority group in-
dividuals. 3 ' The appeals court also held, however, that majority
23 Id. at 143, 41 FEP Cases at 44.
24 Id. at 146, 41 FEP Cases at 46.
25 Id.
28 Notare, 971 F.2d at 588, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
27 652 F.2d 1012, 1017, 25 FEP Cases 889, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252, 41 FEP Cases at 1714; Murray v. Thistledown
Racing Club, 770 F.2d 63, 67, 38 FEP Cases 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1985).
" See, e.g., Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1321, 51 FEP
Cases 1574, 1577 (W.D. Mo. 1990)(court asserted, "Surely the Supreme Court, by recognizing
that proof in Tide VII cases would vary, did not mean to provide the expeditious framework
of McDonnell Douglas only to members of 'socially disfavored groups' and deny it to those
who are members of `socially favored groups.'").
971 F.2d at 589, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
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individuals still may assert an employment discrimination claim even
if they cannot satisfy the elements of a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas. 32 Extending the Holmes alternative to reverse
discrimination cases, the court held that a majority plaintiff may
state a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII if
the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination or indirect
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability that, but for
the plaintiff's status, the challenged employment decision would
have favored the plaintiff." Consequently, after Notari, a majority
employee has an alternative for stating a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination under Title VII and thus shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant.
In 1974, Kenneth Notari, a white male, commenced his em-
ployment with the Denver Water Department." Notari held various
positions with Denver Water, and on five different occasions applied
for the position of safety and security coordinator." In June 1988,
Denver Water selected a woman for that position."
The application process at Denver Water includes an oral board
examination.37 The board rates the candidates and refers the top
three for interviews with the department head. 38 In Notari's case,
the interviewers determined that Notari was the applicant best qual-
ified for the vacant position and submitted their selection sheet to
the Director of Personnel. 39 The Director rejected the interviewers'
selection and advised them that the position's focus should shift
from "safety" to "security." 40 After this shift, the interviewers main-
tained their decision that Notari was the best qualified applicant.'"
Despite this determination, Denver Water conducted a reevaluation
and selected a woman for the position of safety and security coor-
dinator. 42
After Denver Water did not select Notari for the position, he
filed a sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Op-
" Id, at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
" Id., 59 FEP Cases at 743.
s' Id. at 586, 59 FEP Cases at 740.
53 Id.
Notari, 971 F.2d at 586, 59 FEP Cases at 740.
" Id.
22 Id.
22 Id. at 587, 59 FEP Cases at 740. The Director of Personnel at Denver Water was a
woman. Id.
Notari, 971 F.2d at 587, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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portunity Commission ("EEOC"). 43 Notari brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado after the
EEOC terminated proceedings.44 In his suit, Notari alleged that he
was more qualified than the woman and that her selection violated
his rights protected by Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 45 Denver
Water filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court
subsequently granted Denver Water's motion on both the § 1983
and Title VII claims.46
In its analysis of Notari's Title VII claim, the appeals court
referred to the elements of a prima facie discrimination case first
established in McDonnell Douglas:17 Noting that the United States
Supreme Court had acknowledged that such elements must vary
with each Title VII case, the court examined whether reverse dis-
crimination cases require a modification of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie showing. 48 In particular, the court focused upon the
split between courts advocating the background circumstances re-
quirement first established in Parker and those that allow a majority
plaintiff to rely upon the McDonnell Douglas formulation.49
The appeals court followed the background circumstances re-
quirement of Parker and its progeny and required modification of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie formulation when a plaintiff
pursues a reverse discrimination case. 5° The court noted that the
43 Id.
44 Id.
" Notari, 971 F.2d at 587, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
49 Id. The district court granted Denver Water's motion on Notari's 1983 claim for two
reasons. First, the court determined that the 1983 claim arose from the same factual
allegations as Notari's Title VII claim. Second, the court held that Notari had not demon-
strated the violation of an independent constitutional or federal statutory right. The district
court also dismissed the Title V11 claim because Notari had not shown background circum-
stances that would support an inference that Denver Water was an unusual employer that
discriminates against the majority, and thus had not stated a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination. Id., 59 FEP Cases at 741.
In analyzing Notari's 1983 claim, the appeals court referred to its holding in Drake v.
City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1163, 55 FEP Cases 600, 605 (10th Cir. 1991). The Notari
court asserted that a Title VII plaintiff who alleges the violation of his equal protection rights
and requests remedies for the alleged violations under 1983 has stated an independent
basis for that claim. 971 F.2d at 587, 59 FEP Cases at 741. The court noted that Notari's
1983 claim asserted his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. Id. at 588, 59 FEP Cases at 741. Finding the substantive legal bases for
Notari's 1983 and Title VII claims distinct, the appeals court reversed the lower court's
dismissal of Notari's 1983 claim. Id.
47 Id.
49 Id. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 5 FEP Cases at 969.
49 Nolari, 971 F.2d at 588-89, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
so Id. at 589, 59 FEP Cases at 742.
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inference of discrimination in Title VII analysis when a plaintiff
belongs to a minority group may not be justified when a plaintiff
belongs to a historically favored group.'" Consequently, the court
held that to rely upon the McDonnell Douglas formulation and ben-
efit from the resulting inference of discrimination, a majority plain-
tiff must demonstrate background circumstances supporting a sus-
picion that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who
discriminates against the majority. 52
Because Notari had failed to show such background circum-
stances, the court affirmed the district court's holding that he could
not rely upon the McDonnell Douglas formulation to state his prima
facie case." The court, however, held that Notari's inability to rely
upon McDonnell Douglas did not necessarily mean that he had failed
to state a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. 54 The court
stated that reverse discrimination plaintiffs barred from the Mc-
Donnell Douglas formulation must have an alternative for pursuing
their Title VII claims."
In its analysis, the court posited the disparate situations of black
employees and white employees with only persuasive indirect evi-
dence to support a discrimination claim." The black employees'
lack of direct evidence does not foreclose Title VII discrimination
claims because they can state a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas." In contrast, white workers with no direct evidence are
foreclosed by a modified McDonnell Douglas formulation unless they
can show the requisite background circumstances." A failure to
satisfy the background circumstances requirement compels dis-
missal of a white employee's case. 59 Unlike the black employees, the
white plaintiffs would have no opportunity to use their persuasive





Notari, 971 F.2c1 at 589, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
55 Id. at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 743. See also Ortega v. Safeway Stores, 943 F.2d 1230, 1236,
56 FEP Cases 1282, 1288 (10th Cir. 1991), where the court held that historically disadvantaged
plaintiffs alleging a disparate treatment claim must rely either upon the McDonnell Douglas
formulation or present direct proof of discriminatory intent. Id.
Notari, 971 F.2d at 589-90, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
" Id. at 589, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
58 Id. at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
59 Id.
6° Notari, 971 F.2d at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
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The appeals court reasoned that such disparity runs counter
to the goals of Title VII." An individual majority plaintiff can
experience intentional employment discrimination even if no evi-
dence shows that the defendant is that unusual employer who dis-
criminates against historically favored groups. 62 The court stated
that an employee who experiences intentional discrimination, and
who offers sufficient evidence of that discrimination, should be
allowed to proceed beyond the prima facie stage of litigation. 63 The
court asserted that just as the McDonnell Douglas formulation never
operates to foreclose claims of minority plaintiffs who experience
intentional workplace discrimination, so should it not bar similarly
victimized reverse discrimination plaintiffs."
To prevent such disparate outcomes for majority and minority
plaintiffs, the appeals court extended to reverse discrimination
plaintiffs the prima facie alternatives established by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Holmes. 65 The
court held that a majority plaintiff states a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination under Title VII if the plaintiff presents
direct evidence of discrimination, or indirect evidence sufficient to
support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiff's status
the challenged employment decision would have favored the plain-
tiff.66
In establishing this alternative means for stating a prima facie
case, the appeals court emphasized that a plaintiff who uses this
method cannot rely upon the implicit McDonnell Douglas inference
of discrimination. 67 Further, the court asserted that this alternative
approach does not replace the McDonnell Douglas formulation, but
offers an alternative basis upon which plaintiffs can satisfy their
burden of proof and state a prima facie case. 68 In light of this
alternative basis, the court reversed and remanded Notari's case. 69




66 Notari, 971 F.2d at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 742. See Holmes, 794 F.2d at 146, 41 FEP
Cases at 46.
fib Notari, 971 F.2d at 590, 59 FEP Cases at 743.
67 Id., 59 FEP Cases .at 743-44.
60 Id., 59 FEP Cases at 744.
69 Notari, 971 F.2d at 591, 59 FEP Cases at 744. Notari affects only the first step of the
McDonnell Douglas allocation of burdens of proof in a Title VII employment discrimination
case. If a plaintiff states a prima fade case under the Notari alternative, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory justification for its decision. The
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The court's decision in Notari occupies a middle ground be-
tween the Parker "background circumstances" requirement and the
application of an unmodified McDonnell Douglas formulation in re-
verse discrimination cases under Title VII. A number of courts
follow the Parker standard, which effectively can bar majority plain-
tiffs from asserting their Title VII rights. The Notari decision, by
providing members of favored groups with an alternative means to
state a prima facie case of employment discrimination, may allow
more majority plaintiffs to assert their rights under Title VII.
The Notari decision marks a significant shift in Title VII anal-
ysis, which for the most part has sought to alleviate historical in-
equities. Notari gives credence to the assumption that Title VII
proscribes all discriminatory behavior, not just discrimination
against historically disfavored groups. While courts may have ac-
knowledged this general proscription in the past, a number of
jurisdictions still used the background circumstances requirement
effectively to ban majority plaintiffs' claims. By acknowledging this
disparity and establishing a prima facie alternative for majority
plaintiffs, Notari may allow more majority plaintiffs to assert their
Title VII rights.
Indeed, it is likely that Notari will encourage majority plaintiffs
to take advantage of their rights under Title VII. This probable
increase in Title VII claims may prove particularly notable in light
of the current backlash against affirmative action programs: 7c' Fur-
ther, it is likely that other courts will adopt the Notari alternative in
order to provide majority individuals with legitimate discrimination
claims the same legal recourses as their minority counterparts. Al-
though Notari allows majority plaintiffs greater opportunities to
state prima facie discrimination claims, it likely will not herald a
flood of reverse discrimination cases. Even under the Notari alter-
native, questionable claims can be foreclosed at an early stage if a
plaintiff fails to offer sufficient indirect evidence supporting a sus-
picion of discrimination. Thus, just as the McDonnell Douglas for-
mulation allows deserving minority plaintiffs to proceed beyond the
prima facie case stage of litigation, so does Notari offer an equal
opportunity to their similarly situated majority counterparts.
plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's explanation is pretex-
tual. Id.
"A different analysis applies to reverse discrimination cases when affirmative action
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In sum, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, in Notari v. Denver Water Department, held that a reverse
discrimination plaintiff may state a prima facie case under Title VII
in two ways. First, majority plaintiffs may take advantage of the
McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination if they can show the
requisite background circumstances to support a suspicion that the
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against his-
torically favored groups. If majority plaintiffs cannot show this
background, however, Notari allows them to state a prima facie case
by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence
sufficient to support a reasonable probability that but for their
majority status the employment decision would have favored them.
The Notari alternative enables majority plaintiffs to assert the same
Title VII rights as similarly situated minority plaintiffs and may
encourage majority plaintiffs to assert their rights under Title VII.
